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According to legend, the Jade Emperor called all twelve celestial animals 
to his palace to assign them their place in the zodiac. The Pig, a lazy if 
intelligent creature, was still in dreamland when the other eleven turned 
up to claim their places. He ended up last. And so 2019, the eventful Year 
of the Pig (coincidentally also marked by swine fever and a severe pork 
supply shortage in the mainland), ended a zodiac cycle that began with the 
Year of the Rat in 2008, the year of the Beijing Olympics — often referred 
to as the official ‘coming-out’ party of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
By 2019, China had well and truly arrived. It boasted the second biggest 
economy in the world and could claim significant global influence and 
power. Yet the ongoing tit-for-tat trade war with the United States afflicted 
an economy already undergoing its own difficult internal readjustments 
— even if, by the year’s end, the two sides had signed a (precarious) ‘phase 
one’ of a peace deal. In Hong Kong, the nightmarish and increasingly 
violent cycles of protest, police suppression, and popular reaction that 
began with peaceful mass demonstrations in June showed no sign of 
A pig lantern lights up the streets in Singapore for Chinese New Year celebrations in 2019
Source: Choo Yut Shing, Flickr
abating. The US Congress infuriated the Chinese leadership by passing 
the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act and the Uyghur Human 
Rights Policy Act. While Beijing did its best to show a unified and defiant 
face to the world, three spectacular and unusual leaks of secret documents 
revealed the possibility of cracks beneath the surface of unity. These leaks 
included two tranches of documents concerning Xinjiang, one published 
by The New York Times and the other by the International Consortium 
of Investigative Journalists, as well as a collection of speeches made by 
China’s top leaders immediately following the events of 4 June 1989, in 
which they discussed what amounted to a playbook for dealing with future 
mass movements. 
*
The Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi 莊子 once dreamed he was a 
butterfly. When he woke up, he realised he was just a man. Then he 
wondered whether he was not in fact a butterfly dreaming he was a man 
who had dreamed he was a butterfly. As Jingjing Chen writes in ‘Zhuangzi 
and His Butterfly Dream: The Etymology of Meng 夢’, the Chinese character 
for ‘dream’ (as seen on the cover) can be a metaphor for transformation.1 
To speak of a dream in Chinese is also a common way of signifying nostalgia. 
The character meng has historically also been used to indicate the darker 
side of palace politics. It would later acquire, from the Western notion of 
‘dreams’, the meaning of ideals and aspirations, as in the China Dream 
中国梦. Dreams are also illusions, as in another of Chinese culture’s most 
famous dreams, The Dream of the Red Chamber (also translated as The 
Story of the Stone). Annie Luman Ren’s forum, ‘From the Land of Illusion 
to the Paradise of Truth’, looks at the relationship between reality and 
illusion in both the classic Qing dynasty novel and the ‘post-truth’ media 
in the contemporary Chinese world. 
The year 2019 encompassed dreams in every one of these senses, 
from transformations to illusions and aspirations — and nightmares, too. 
When we sat down in February 2019 to plan this China Story Yearbook, 















































course of the year — each representing a different kind of ‘Chinese 
dream’. These included the seventieth anniversary of the PRC — a dream 
of national revolution and renewal that, by the end of 2019, had become 
a dream of empire, with Xi Jinping’s proclamation of the ‘new frontier’ 
新境界 of ‘Chinese rule’ 中国之治. Xi’s own power continued to grow in 
2019 in both practical and symbolic ways. A set of ‘morality guidelines’ 
issued to all citizens in October not only defined the etiquette for singing 
the national anthem and the proper sorting of rubbish and recycling, but 
also called for all to ‘defend China’s honour abroad’ and adopt Xi Jinping 
Thought as their moral ‘core’. The guidelines made no mention of Mao or 
Deng Xiaoping, unlike their last iteration in 2001. The Party also quietly 
eliminated a passage from literary Chinese textbooks that had been part 
of Chinese students’ education for decades, apparently for fear that its 
message of righteous rebellion might be taken too literally, as Esther 
Sunkyung Klein and Victor Fong write in ‘The Changing “Dream” in the 
Classroom: Literary Chinese Textbooks in the PRC’. 
Another highly significant anniversary is that of the May Fourth 
Movement of 1919. As Gloria Davies discusses in ‘A Dream of Perpetual 
Rule’, the May Fourth Movement expanded from a patriotic protest into 
a movement encompassing workers’ and women’s rights, universal 
education, and cultural renewal. Xi Jinping, however, in what Davies calls 
an ‘ahistorical privileging of patriotism’, has narrowed its significance 
to its anti-imperialist beginnings while expanding it to endorse his own 
administration as drawing on its ‘powerful spiritual force’. She also makes 
the point that it is ‘perhaps more important to pay attention to what Xi’s 
China Dream does rather than what it means’.
The May Fourth Movement resonated deeply with the broad movement 
of pro-democracy petitioners and protesters in 1989 — a movement that 
ended in bloodshed when the Party ordered the army to open fire on 
3–4 June that year. The thirtieth anniversary of those events, unlike that 
of May Fourth, cannot be publicly spoken of in China today. But all that 
happened on and around Tiananmen Square in 1989 has resonated 
strongly in Hong Kong from the beginning. Antony Dapiran, the author of 
a book on the Umbrella Movement of 2014, City of Protest: A Recent History 
of Dissent in Hong Kong, and the upcoming City on Fire: The Fight for Hong 
Kong, about the current protests, sums up and analyses the events of a 
chaotic year in Hong Kong in 2019 — a China story that is far from over, 
and one that continues to be a nightmare for many. 
As Louisa Lim and Graeme Smith show in their chapter, ‘Hong Kong 
and the Tiananmen Playbook’, the Party’s reaction to the social and political 
unrest of three decades ago is a key piece in the puzzle of understanding 
its response to the upheavals in Hong Kong in 2019. The ‘Tiananmen 
Playbook’ also informs the Party-state’s actions in Xinjiang. China’s 
extreme repression of Uyghurs in the name of combatting ‘terrorism’ 
continued throughout 2019. Beijing heatedly denies the veracity of the 
leaked documents concerning the Party-state’s policies and practices in 
Xinjiang. Yet they provide a wealth of credible detail on the Party’s policies 
as well as rules for and conditions in the detention camps where perhaps a 
million or more Uyghurs and other Muslims are being held. Although the 
Party-state claims the detainees are receiving ‘vocational training’, 
the system appears designed to exterminate their cultural and religious 
Hong Kong protests
















































identity. Enabling that is an ever-more sophisticated system of surveillance 
that, together with the evolving Social Credit System, has applications 
outside Xinjiang as well, as Gerry Groot writes in his chapter, ‘Schemes, 
Dreams and Nightmares: China’s Paradox(es) of Trust’. Samuel J. Parson 
delves into the ancient philosophical roots of these modern methods of 
control in ‘Legalism and the Social Credit System’. 
Benjamin Penny, in ‘ “Evil Cults” and Holy Writ’, notes another 
anniversary. It has been twenty years since Falun Gong adherents shocked 
the Party leadership by successfully surrounding its headquarters at 
Zhongnanhai in silent protest. While the Falun Gong remains outlawed 
in China today, Penny explains why the Party-state is currently even 
more worried about another religion on its official list of ‘evil cults’: 
the millenarian Church of Almighty God. Ben Hillman reflects on the 
second year of the Party’s campaign to Sweep Away Black and Eliminate 
Evil 扫黑除恶, which promises to build a more harmonious society by 
taking down undesirable elements, including gangsters, local tyrants, and 
corrupt officials. The Party is also using the campaign as a tool of wider 
social control. 
Another anniversary is that of the flight of the Dalai Lama from 
Tibet in 1959 following a Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule. 
Falun Gong remains 
outlawed in China 
today
Source: Geoffrey McKim,  
Flickr
Han migration, strict policing, and surveillance, as well as targeted 
investment, have radically changed the face of Tibet over the intervening 
sixty years. One major change has been rapid urbanisation. In their 
chapter on ‘Urbanising Tibet: Aspirations, Illusions, and Nightmares’, 
Gerald Roche, James Leibold, and Ben Hillman examine what young 
Tibetans’ hopes and fears are about the changing world around them 
and city life, as revealed through three Tibetan pop songs. 
Still in the borderlands, in ‘ “Prairie Mothers” and Shanghai 
Orphans’, Uchralt Otede unearths a forgotten piece of history behind 
Xi Jinping’s award of the honorary title of People’s Model to a 77-year-
old Mongolian woman for her role in relocating thousands of Shanghai 
orphans and abandoned children to Inner Mongolia during the Great 
Leap Forward era six decades ago. Jane Brophy’s Forum about two Inner 
Mongolians infected with the plague being mysteriously ‘transported’ 
to a Beijing hospital in November evokes a recurring nightmare 
with historical, environmental, and authoritarian dimensions. The 
foreboding story presages the outbreak of the coronavirus epidemic in 
the city of Wuhan in January 2020. 
The dreams of Taiwan’s LGBTQ community came true in 2019 
when Taiwan became the first place in Asia to legitimise gay marriage. 
In ‘Queer Dreams’, Jamie Zhao also surveys legal changes in the 
mainland that may signal shifting attitudes there as well. 
The May Fourth Movement advocated for ‘Mr D’ (democracy) 
and ‘Mr S’ (science). If Mr D had a difficult time in 2019, Mr S fared 
better. A number of pieces in the Yearbook survey Chinese dreams 
and accomplishments in science and technology, including China’s 
emerging dominance in some sectors — and some of the controversies 
this has engendered. Adam Ni looks at how private entrepreneurs are 
working with state bodies to realise China’s ‘space dreams’. In ‘Dream 
Babies’, Jane Brophy discusses the Chinese scientist who — horrifying 
many in the international scientific community for his violation of 















































genetically modified babies. Darren Lim and Victor Ferguson tackle 
the tricky topic of Huawei and the Sino–US trade war in ‘Conscious 
Decoupling: The Technology Security Dilemma’. Olivia Shen, in ‘AI 
Dreams and Authoritarian Nightmares’, writes about the implications of 
China’s ambitious plan to lead the world in the theory and technological 
application of artificial intelligence (AI) and to become the global centre 
for AI innovation by 2030. 
Abroad, the footsteps of the China Dream continued to grow in 
2019, including through the ever-expanding Belt and Road Initiative. 
But anti-China sentiment was also rising. This is partly due to revulsion 
at the state’s actions in Xinjiang and sympathy for the demands 
(if not always the methods) of the Hong Kong protesters, and partly due 
to the discomfort of many in the West at the prospect of a powerful 
China rewriting the rules of the ‘rules-based order’. Such issues as 
whether Huawei should run 5G networks in other countries continue to 
create problems and tensions. Arrests of more than a dozen Canadian 
citizens in retaliation for Canada’s detention of Huawei executive Meng 
Wanzhou 孟晚舟 for extradition to the United States, has badly strained 
once-friendly Sino–Canadian relations. Elsewhere, it is the footprint of 
the China Dream itself that feels heavy: in ‘South Korea and the “China 
Effect” ’, Hyung-Geun Kim discusses the choices and challenges faced by 
South Koreans with regard to the Belt and Road Initiative, and Chiung-
Chiu Huang, in ‘Taiwanese Dreams: Security, Sovereignty, and the Space 
to be Seen’, delivers a Taiwanese perspective. Beyongo Mukete Dynamic, 
meanwhile, casts a cool eye on China’s Antarctic dreams in ‘Antarctic 
Ambitions: Cold Power’. Richard Rigby and Brendan Taylor look at 
the big picture in their chapter, ‘Meridians of Influence in a Nervous 
World’. Finally, in ‘Campus Conundrums: Clashes and Collaborations’, 
Jane Golley, Paul Harris, and James Laurenceson examine the situation 
on Australian university campuses, which were front and centre in 
news stories about Chinese influence and interference throughout 
the year.
*
In thinking about the lessons of the year, we return to another of 
China’s most famous dreams, the Golden Millet Dream 黄粱梦. In it, a 
young scholar — poor, unmarried, and having just failed the imperial 
examinations in Beijing — arrives at a small inn, feeling very sorry for 
himself. He meets a Daoist priest there, who urges him to sleep, and 
gives him a special pillow. As the scholar falls into a deep sleep, the 
innkeeper is cooking a pot of golden millet for lunch. In his dream, the 
young scholar marries a beautiful woman from a noble family. He passes 
his examinations and becomes a high official and enjoys great wealth. 
He and his wife have five sons, all of whom become high officials, marry 
well, and give him many grandsons. He lives a long and fulfilling life, 
though there are dramas and tragedies as well. At the age of eighty, he 
becomes ill but just as he is about to take his dying breath, he opens his 
eyes and realises he is back in the inn and the millet is still cooking. Only 
a short time has passed. The Daoist priest is still sitting by his side. ‘Was 
that really just a dream?’, the young scholar asks. The Daoist replies that 
wealth and glory and all the rest are but illusions, and all things pass. 
Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping at the 2019 Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation
















































The China Story Yearbook is a project initiated by the Australian Centre on 
China in the World (CIW) at The Australian National University (ANU). It has 
always been the approach of the Yearbook to view political and economic 
developments as part of a greater picture that encompasses society, 
personalities, and culture, and one that is illuminated by considerations 
of language and history. Our ongoing reference to the China Story 中国
的故事 reflects the principle set out by CIW Founding Director, Emeritus 
Professor Geremie R. Barmé, that China’s story is not only the version 
portrayed by the Chinese Communist Party, but also includes the diverse 
perspectives of a multitude of others, within and outside the PRC.
Many of the subjects we cover in this year’s China Story Yearbook 
are topical in ways we could not have anticipated when we first began 
commissioning the contributions in mid-2019. Co-editors Jane Golley, Linda 
Jaivin, Ben Hillman, and Sharon Strange are enormously grateful to all the 
wonderful scholars and other contributors, new and old, who have taken 
the theme of dreams and applied their unique knowledge, insight, and 
observation to come up with another great collection of essays that we are 
proud to publish. The China Story Yearbook is truly a collaborative effort. 
We also thank Chin-Jie Melodie Liu for her assistance with typesetting the 
book, Jan Borrie for copyediting the book, and two anonymous referees 
for taking the time to read and comment on it prior to publication, as well 
as our designers from CRE8IVE, Laura Sibley and Josh Garrard. 
The Cover Image
The character at the centre of this Yearbook’s cover is meng 梦 (夢 in 
traditional characters). Readings of this character have changed from 
early references to dimness, gloominess, and even chaos in an obscure 
environment, to a metaphor for a forever-lost life (and its material 
pleasures). Since 2013, however, the 
character has been used in the phrase 
the ‘China Dream’ 中国梦. That was the 
inspiration for this Yearbook’s English 
title, China Dreams. The concept of the 
China Dream was first coined by Xi 
Jinping. It describes a set of personal and 
national ideals. The phrase is a loan 
translation: it follows the rendering of the 
‘American Dream’ as Meiguo meng 美国梦. 
For more information on the etymology 
of meng, see the Introduction Forum 
‘Zhuangzi and His Butterfly Dream: The 
Etymology of Meng 夢’, pp.11–14.  
The large red circle that encompasses 
the character meng echoes the aesthetics of traditional Chinese paper-
cutting 剪纸. Present throughout China, paper-cutting is a popular art 
integral to everyday lives. Designs vary greatly and adopt a range of 
regional styles. They are used for interior decor, festivities, or prayer.
The girl on the front cover is the China Dream girl. She is a clay figurine 
nirenzhang, 泥人张. She was the main image of the Chinese Communist 
Party propaganda campaign used to promote the China Dream in the 
early 2010s. She regularly appeared on government billboards with the 
phrase: ‘The China Dream, My Dream’ 中国梦, 我的梦. With an innocent 
expression and flushed cheeks, she presented the campaign’s most human 
vision of the dream.


























































FORMATIONS: THE MANY 
MEANINGS OF MENG  夢
From the Land of Illusion to the Paradise  
of Truth 
·  ANNIE LUMAN REN
Zhuangzi and His Butterfly Dream:  
The Etymology of Meng 夢 




















































































THE 2019 CHINESE Lunar New Year celebration began with the usual 
display of fireworks. But what really 
caught the public eye was an article 
with the over-long title — ‘I Showed 
My Syrian Friend a Video of Fireworks 
from Lunar New Year’s Eve, He Burst 
into Tears’. First published on College 
Daily 北美留學生日報, a WeChat-based 
publication operating from New York 
and Beijing, the article tells a moving 
story of how the fireworks reminded 
the author’s Syrian friend of the 
bombings in Damascus and the death 
of his brother, causing him to weep. In 
this article, the author Deng He (pen 
name He-He), expressed a mixture of 
hope for peace in Syria and the world, 
indignation at Western imperialism 
and colonialism, and a sense of pride 
in being born in the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) — a rising yet peace-
loving global power. The article 
quickly gained more than 100,000 
views, and was reposted by all major 
Chinese government media outlets 
including the People’s Daily, Global 
Times, Xinhua News Agency, and the 
Chinese Communist Youth League.1 
Six months later, The New Yorker 
published an investigative piece 
detailing College Daily’s transition 
from ‘a bare-bones survival guide’ for 
Chinese students studying in North 
America to an influential media outlet 
delivering news with nationalistic 
overtones to Chinese students around 
the world.2 During an interview 
with the journalist Han Zhang, Deng 
He admitted that his piece on the 
Syrian friend was entirely made up. 
It turned out that his boss Lin Guoyu 
F R O M  T H E  L A N D  O F 
I L L U S I O N  TO  T H E  PA R A D I S E 






















































林果宇, who founded College Daily 
in his Beijing apartment in 2014, had 
come up with the idea while browsing 
viral videos online.  
Lin himself denied the article 
was fabricated, but when pressed to 
describe the nature of his publication, 
he chose the term ‘post-truth’, a position 
with which College Daily readers seem 
comfortable. When asked to comment 
on the veracity of College Daily posts, 
a sophomore at New York University 
responded, ‘In my heart they are 
simply not real and not fake.’ This 
answer reminded the journalist Han 
Zhang of Schrödinger’s cat. But for 
me, it evokes a famous couplet from 
the eighteenth-century Chinese classic 
The Dream of the Red Chamber (紅樓夢 
also known as The Story of the Stone in 
the English translation): 
Truth becomes fiction when the 
fiction’s true;
Real becomes not-real when the 
unreal’s real.3
In chapter five of this novel, the 
protagonist Jia Bao-yu 賈寶玉, a young 
aristocratic fop, sees the above couplet 
inscribed on the lintel of an arch in 
a dream visit to the Land of Illusion. 
The dream warns Bao-yu about the 
illusory nature of his love for his girl 
cousins (and also for beautiful boys), 
and of the decline in his family’s 
fortunes. Being young and ignorant, 
Bao-yu pays no attention to his dream. 
He continues to live a life of leisure 
inside a beautiful garden that is the 
main setting of the novel. 
The novel — considered China’s 
finest literary achievement — is 
preoccupied with details of daily 
life inside the garden: how tea is 
prepared with the last year’s snow 
or how themes are set for poetry 
competitions. Tedious as it may sound, 
The article from College Daily begins with a photo of 
Damascus during an air raid
Source: College Daily
this is precisely the novel’s appeal. 
What the author Cao Xueqin 曹雪芹 
(1715–1763), an impoverished Manchu 
banner-man, spent ten painful years 
creating is in fact an entire universe so 
rich in detail that it seems more real 
than life itself. At the same time, Cao 
incessantly reminds his readers of the 
fictional nature of this universe. The 
novel begins with the meeting of two 
characters Zhen Shiyin 甄士隱 and Jia 
Yucun 賈雨村, whose names sound like 
the phrases ‘true events concealed’ and 
‘false words remained’, respectively. 
Bao-yu’s surname is also Jia 賈, a play 
on the word for ‘false or fiction’ (假). 
In another dream, in chapter fifty-
six (you can tell by now, dreams are 
a recurring feature of the novel), he 
encounters another Bao-yu, but with 
the surname Zhen 甄 — a homophone 
for ‘real or true’ (真). 
In the twentieth century, the 
study of The Dream of the Red Chamber 
became a serious academic discipline, 
known as ‘Hong Xue’ or ‘Redology’ 
紅學, granting the novel a unique 
status in Chinese literature. The first 
‘Redologists’ included eminent scholars 
such as Hu Shi 胡適, Cai Yuanpei 
蔡元培, and Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀 
(a founding father of the Chinese 
Communist Party). They all belonged 
to the generation of Chinese students 
who studied abroad, in America, 
Europe, or Japan, at the turn of the 
century. They were also leaders of the 
May Fourth Movement (see Chapter 1 
‘A Dream of Perpetual Rule, pp.19–31) 
advocating for the adoption of ‘science’ 
and ‘democracy’.4 Ironically, in their 
quest for scientific truth, they and 
their disciples have tended to read The 
Dream of the Red Chamber as a historical 
The Dream of the 

























































document on Qing dynasty society or as 
an almost literal guide to the author’s life 
and family, thereby confusing fiction 
and reality. 
The obsession with this novel 
continues into the present century. In 
late 2018, an article claiming to have 
discovered the ‘true authorship’ of 
The Dream of the Red Chamber went 
viral on WeChat. It has no basis in fact, 
yet since then, as a scholar working 
on this novel, I have found myself 
being lectured on the novel’s ‘true’ 
authorship everywhere I go in China. 
From a retired Beijing couple on a 
train to my aunt who is a county-level 
official in Jiangsu, everyone feels the 
need to tell me the ‘truth’ about the 
novel I have spent years studying. 
The first time this happened, I 
was rather amused. A line from the 
novel Fortress Besieged 圍城 by Qian 
Zhongshu 錢鍾書 (1910–1988) came to 
mind: ‘Uneducated people are fooled 
by the words of others because they 
are illiterate; educated people are 
fooled by the written word because 
they are literate.’4 Later, I recalled 
another incident, from the Record of 
the Grand Historian 史記, written more 
than 2,000 years ago. You might call 
this China’s first ‘post-truth’ paradigm: 
Zhao Gao 趙高, a prime minister in 
the emperor’s court, wanted to test 
the limits of his power. He took a stag 
to court, pointed to it, and called it a 
horse. Cowed, some of his fellows 
remained silent, while others agreed 
that this was indeed a horse. As for 
those who dared to speak the truth, 
Zhao Gao had them all executed. 
Unlike their forebears from a 
hundred years ago, many overseas 
Chinese students today choose to 
ignore the more objective sources of 
news and information available to 
them, preferring platforms such as 
Weibo and WeChat and, of course, 
‘self-media’ 自媒體 outlets such as 
College Daily, which willingly engages 
in persuasively detailed ‘post-truth’ 
soft propaganda. As a result, they 
‘Pointing to a stag and calling it a horse’ 指鹿為馬 
Source:  Rawpixel Ltd, Flickr
continue to live in the Land of Illusion, 
where a stag is called a horse. The 
clashes between Chinese nationalists 
and pro–Hong Kong protesters on 
university campuses worldwide are 
indicative of this phenomenon. 
But if we can blame the continued 
delusions of overseas Chinese students 
on language differences and the 
authoritarian regime that currently 
governs China, what excuse do we 
in the West have for our own ‘post-
truth’ world? Perhaps we can all learn 
something from reading Red Chamber 
Dream — a novel that constantly 
challenges our perceptions of truth 
and fiction. At the end of the novel, 
a sorrowful Bao-yu finally comes to 
the realisation that what he thought 
was real was, in fact, only a dream, 
an illusion, nothing but ‘moonlight 
mirrored on water’. Having woken 
from this ‘dream’, Bao-yu finally leaves 
the fictional garden and disappears 
into the snow. But first, in chapter 116, 
he revisits the Land of Illusion in one 
final dream. This time, the Land of 
Illusion is replaced with the Paradise 
of Truth, and the couplet on the lintel 
reads:
When Fiction departs and Truth 
appears, 
Truth prevails; 
Though Not-real was once Real, 
























































































IN ZHUANGZI 莊子, an ancient Chinese text written by Daoist 
philosopher Zhuangzi during the late 
Warring States period (476–221 BCE), 
a story tells that Zhuang Zhou once 
dreamed he was a butterfly, flitting 
and fluttering around, happy, and 
doing as he pleased. As a butterfly, 
he did not know he was Zhuang 
Zhou. All of a sudden, he awoke and 
found he was Zhuang Zhou, solid and 
unmistakably human. But then he did 
not know whether he was Zhuang 
Zhou dreaming he was a butterfly or 
a butterfly dreaming he was Zhuang 
Zhou. In the end, Zhuangzi wrote, there 
was necessarily a difference between 
Zhuang Zhou and the butterfly; this 
difference was the ‘transformation 
of things’ 物化. The transformation is 
a change in consciousness between 
reality and illusion. The constant 
flux between dreams and awakening 
leads the ‘self’ to change from being 
unaware of the distinction of things to 
being aware of the definite distinction 
between and among things. 
Zhuangzi is one of the foundational 
texts of Chinese literature and 
philosophy. Later interpretations of 
dreams in the Chinese literary tradition 
drew on this strange and radical story. 
Much discussion has focused on the 
nature of the atmosphere Zhuangzi 
created for this ‘butterfly dream’, and 
whether it was inherently optimistic 
or pessimistic. Two contrasting 
interpretative traditions have evolved: 
one drawing on the image of the 
carefree butterfly that hinted at a 
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The more melancholy imagining of 
the dream — and of dreams in general 
— as hazy and chaotic is founded 
on the etymology of the character 
meng 夢 (梦 in simplified characters), 
meaning ‘dream’. In its earliest 
appearance in the written record, the 
character resembled the movements 
of a person’s eyebrows, eyes, and limbs 
while dreaming. Later, the radicals 
(the graphic components of a character 
that function as semantic or phonetic 
indicators) ‘roof’ 宀 and ‘evening’ 夕 
were added. Under the Han dynasty, 
the character was simplified and 
standardised in ‘small-seal’ script 
as , similar to the modern 夢. 
Before the standardisation, one of most 
common formations of the character 
was , which comprises other 
semantic radicals related to ‘dream’. It 
is worth noting that despite variations 
in the form of the character due to the 
choice of differing radicals, the graphs 
for a house’s roof and the sun at dusk 
— representing dimness and darkness 
in a restrained space — have always 
figured in its main semantic form.
One of the lines in the Book 
of Songs 詩經 (eleventh–seventh 
centuries BCE), in which meng 
bright and soaring future; the other 
gloomy and melancholy, leading to a 
reading of ‘life is but a dream’. 
Despite the contrast in these 
perspectives, both traditions have 
based their interpretations of the 
dream in the worldly realm. By 
reinterpreting the dream in a worldly 
frame of displacement in space 
and time, they moved away from 
Zhuangzi’s contemplation of the 
question of agency, initiative, and the 
‘distinction’ 分 of things. 
Over the centuries, the optimistic 
school gained the upper hand in 
emphasising the butterfly image in 
Zhuangzi’s dream. Chinese scholars 
and poets tended to refer to Zhuangzi’s 
butterfly dream as if it were a fixed 
allusion for a delightful experience. 
It was assimilated to descriptions of 
a happy existence and expressions 
of self-content. For example, Su Shi 
蘇軾, an eminent scholar and official 
of the eleventh–twelfth centuries also 
known as Su Dongpo 蘇東坡, alluded 
to Zhuangzi in a poem describing 
a wonderful dream he had while 
living in the mountains. Su wrote: 
‘I am unaware of the bell and drum 
announcing the break of dawn; in 
my dreams I am a joyful butterfly, 
Butterfly Dream by Ming 
dynasty painter Lu Zhi 
(c. 1550)
Source: Wikipedia
appears, reads: ‘When I see you so 
mengmeng, my heart is full of pain’ 
視爾夢夢, 我心慘慘. Here, meng 
implies ‘dark’ or ‘confused’. Readings 
of meng expanded to include dimness, 
gloominess, and even chaos in a dark 
environment. In commentaries of 
the Han dynasty, the character was 
restricted solely to descriptions of 
the mood of an individual. From 
the Tang dynasty of the eighth 
century, it pointed to an interaction 
with the wider world and extended 
to descriptions of murkiness and 
disorder in society. Since this time, 
classic exegesis began using the 
character meng in descriptions of the 
unresolved and chaotic politics of the 
imperial court. 
After the thirteenth century, 
scholars became less likely to interpret 
meng as being closely tied to the 
meaning of its component radicals, but 
they still understood it in the context 
of worldly life. They referred more to 
how dreams reflect the displacement 
of time and space. The literature of late 
imperial China (1368–1911) included 
many works with ‘dream’ in the title, 

























































life in the past. Many such works 
were written by members of the 
nobility whose families had declined, 
sometimes in parallel with dynasties 
or societies as a whole, and who no 
longer enjoyed a privileged lifestyle. 
Here, the dream became a metaphor 
for a forever-lost life (and its material 
pleasures) — a lament for displacement 
in space and time. Notable examples 
are Dream Recollections of Tao’an 
陶庵夢憶 and Searching for the West 
Lake in Dreams 西湖夢尋 by Zhang Dai 
張岱 after the fall of the Ming in 1644, 
and The Dream of the Red Chamber 
紅樓夢, written by Cao Xueqin 曹雪芹 
and published in 1791, after a marked 
decline in his family’s fortunes when 
the Qing dynasty itself was beginning 
to decay after having reached its high 
point in the late eighteenth century 
(see Introduction Forum ‘From the 
Land of Illusion to the Paradise of 
Truth’, pp.5–9). These and other works 
drew on sentiments from Zhuang 
Zhou’s dream but tied the idea of 
the dream to material existence. 
Metaphysical discussions of Zhuangzi’s 
final question about the blurring of 
divisions, the so-called transformation 
of things, and the pursuits of spiritual 
existence, were seldom mentioned. 
The current meng 夢 in the China 
Dream 中國夢 is a modern concept, 
a cherished aspiration and an ideal 
dream 夢想 that do not really capture 
the past ideas of dreams in Chinese 
texts such as Zhuangzi. The phrase of 
the China Dream itself, linguistically 
speaking, is a calque or loan translation 
following the word construction of 
meiguo meng 美國夢, translated from 
the American Dream. Thus, in the 
modern period, the character meng 
takes on new meanings by connecting 












































A DREAM OF PERPETUAL RULE
Gloria Davies
PRESIDENT XI JINPING’S SPEECH on 1 October 
2019 in celebration of the seventieth anniversary 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) ended with 
the following appeal to ‘all comrades and friends’: 
While China’s past has already been written 
into the history books of humanity, China’s 
present is being created by hundreds of 
millions of people and it is inevitable that 
China’s future will be even more beautiful. 
All Party members, all members of the armed 
forces and the people making up the various 
nationalities of our country must be even 
more closely united. We must never forget 
our original intention, we must keep our 
mission firmly in mind, we must continue to 
consolidate our achievements and develop 
well our People’s Republic. We must continue 
the struggle to realise the goal of the ‘Two 
Centuries’ and we must also struggle hard to 











































Even among people who grew up in mainland China or live there today, 
a large majority may have only a vague understanding of the meaning 
of opaque expressions such as ‘our original intention’, ‘the goal of the 
“Two Centuries” ’ and ‘the China Dream of the Chinese nation’s great 
rejuvenation’. Nonetheless, for Chinese citizens, regardless of how 
much or how little they understand the slogan-saturated language used 
in speeches by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders, this language is 
an unavoidable part of everyday life. They encounter it from the time 
they enter kindergarten and thereafter throughout their formative 
years, daily in the media, and in the workplace. The Party’s slogans, 
songs, and spectacular national day parades, and the images and stories 
it projects of China’s past and present, are interwoven into people’s 
memories of school life and public holidays. 
This enforced familiarity with the Party’s language is essential for 
understanding the China Dream as a signature idea of Xi’s administration. 
It is perhaps more important to pay attention to what the China Dream 
does — how the term operates and what it enables — rather than what it 
means. For one thing, the tifa 提法 (prescribed formulation) in which the 
China Dream appears tells us that the term relates to the Party’s avowed 
goal of achieving ‘the Chinese nation’s great rejuvenation’. Comprehending 
the China Dream requires understanding of the CCP’s preoccupation with 
the use of tifa. 
Linguistic Encumbrances
In everyday Chinese, tifa refers simply to how an idea or topic is 
commonly expressed. In the Party’s vocabulary, however, it signifies 
the (one) correct way (fa) of discussing an issue (ti). The term was first 
widely adopted as a tool of government during Mao Zedong’s time in 
power (1949–1976). The Party requires all PRC officials to adhere to the 
specific wording approved by the party leadership so that their public 
communications project a picture of ‘unwavering’ 不动摇 (a favoured 
party adjective) unity.2 While political parties everywhere undoubtedly 
want their members to speak with one voice, the CCP may severely 
punish individuals who do not ‘maintain a unified calibre’ 统一口径 — 
that is, stay on message. 
While Mao lived, he wielded such power that his choice of words — 
also known as Mao Zedong Thought — became the only tifa that mattered. 
People accused of transgressing against Mao or Mao’s Thought ended 
up in jail, labour camps, or dead. The awe that Mao commanded in life, 
including the extreme cult of personality he enjoyed during the Cultural 
Revolution (1966–1976), made it impossible for his successors to consign 
Mao’s Thought to the past after his death in 1976. Deng Xiaoping and other 
Party leaders adjudged the Cultural Revolution ‘a catastrophic decade’ and 
implemented economic policies opposite to Mao’s. But Deng nonetheless 
asserted in 1980 that any attempt to discard ‘the banner of Mao Zedong 
Thought’ would be ‘nothing less than to negate the glorious history of our 
Party’. Every post-Mao administration, including Xi’s, has invoked Mao’s 
Thought even as it introduced new tifa to consolidate its own authority. 
‘Study Mao Zedong 
Thought, Be the Sucessors 
of Communism’
Source: Thomas Fisher Rare 










































The use of tifa bears a distinct similarity to what Alexei Yurchak 
calls ‘hypernormalisation’ in his study of language use in the late Soviet 
Union. According to Yurchak, the leaders of post-Stalin administrations 
slavishly replicated formulations that had first enjoyed authority under 
Joseph Stalin, as if by clinging to established discursive norms they were 
demonstrating the Communist Party-state’s enduring legitimacy and their 
own fitness to rule as Stalin’s heirs. As social and cultural change gathered 
pace, however, the more the Party insisted on the authority of its ‘fixed and 
cumbersome forms of language’, the more the increasingly cosmopolitan 
Soviet citizenry on whom it had been imposed took to parodying it.3 
Consequently, in the late 1980s, when Party leaders belatedly called for 
official communications to provide ‘real self-criticism’ and admit ‘real 
problems’, the Party’s language proved incapable of doing so convincingly; 
its hypernormality was too entrenched.4  
Xi has used the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 to warn Party 
members against complacency regarding the CCP’s own future. He has 
stressed the importance of ‘strengthening ideological and political work’ 
to prevent a similar outcome in China. In a 2013 speech, he opined that 
former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev’s admission, in July 1991, that 
‘Communist thinking had become obsolete for him’, signalled a decisively 
negative turn for the Soviet Union.5 Xi asked rhetorically: ‘When the spirit 
of conviction no longer exists, where is the core of a Party and a country?’6 
Xi’s anxieties about waning faith in CCP rule hint at why he has adopted 
the China Dream as his watchword. ‘Dream’, in the Party’s tifa — and unlike 
its more classical meanings (see Introduction Forum, ‘Zhuangzi and His 
Butterfly Dream: The Etymology of Meng 夢’, pp.11–14) — is synonymous 
with desire: people must want, or be taught to want, ‘the Chinese nation’s 
great rejuvenation’, and they must also see this rejuvenation as achievable 
only under CCP rule. For this reason, Xi often juxtaposes two tifa featuring 
the ubiquitous Mao-era word ‘struggle’, using this word to signal fidelity 
to Communism’s ‘original intention’. As he stated in his 1 October 2019 
speech: ‘We must continue the struggle to realise the goal of the “Two 
Centuries” and we must also struggle hard to realise the China Dream of 
the Chinese nation’s great rejuvenation!’ The fact that ‘struggle’ in Mao’s 
time meant ‘class struggle’ — a cause his successors have long abandoned 
— is, tellingly, never mentioned.
The ‘Two Centuries’ refers to the upcoming centenaries of the CCP’s 
founding, in 2021, and that of the PRC, in 2049. The Party has publicly 
committed to achieving ‘moderate prosperity’ throughout China by 2021 
and delivering ‘democracy, harmony, strength and wealth’ by 2049.7 Each 
of these goals comes with its own set of painstakingly formulated tifa, 
for they also form part of the Twelve Core Socialist Values launched at 
the Eighteenth National CCP Congress in November 2012, when Xi was 
inaugurated as the Party’s General Secretary. The constant reiteration of 
these Xi-era formulations in speeches, media articles, and commentary 
aims to demonstrate the Party’s clarity and unity of purpose and to instruct 
citizens how to resonate with the Party’s will in their own communications. 
Propagating the China Dream
Censorship and propaganda go together. The China Dream is the 
propagandistic corollary of the harsh measures Xi’s administration has 
used since 2013 to rein in online parody of the Party’s language, which 
had spread throughout the 2000s and into the early 2010s. Previously, 
parodies took the form of ditties and jokes passed on through friendship 
networks; they had no hope of ‘going viral’. China’s Party leaders 
know that in the digital age, censorship is a poor tool for suppressing 
the expression of public discontent with Party-state rule. They have 
thus sought to win people over with their China Dream campaign. 
Individuals appearing in talent contests and reality TV programs — the 
favourite entertainment of a majority of mainland viewers — tend to 
speak effusively of their ‘dreams’. The China Dream provides a handy 










































On 23 March 2013, Xi nodded to this link when he said: 
In the final analysis, the China Dream is the people’s dream for it is 
entirely dependent on the people for its realisation, and so this is a 
dream that must constantly work to benefit and enrich the people.8 
State-run media regularly quotes this and other statements by Xi that 
highlight the intertwined nature of the China Dream and the dreams of 
individual Chinese citizens. 
University of Sydney anthropologist Gil Hizi’s study of China Dream 
propaganda notes that, since 2013, the Party has employed both state-
run and privatised initiatives to equate the CCP’s goals with the China 
Dream of delivering a good life to the people.9 Schools encourage students 
to write essays and make speeches about their personal dreams as part 
of the China Dream and several universities have held public speaking 
competitions on the theme of ‘China Dream, My Dream’. 
State censorship and surveillance, coupled with the threat of severe 
penalties, have nearly succeeded in wiping out online ridicule of China 
Dream propaganda. On Bilibili, China’s leading video-sharing website, 
Still from the Super 
Speaker show 
Source: NengLiang Media 
Official Channel, YouTube
vox populi–style clips have appeared of people talking positively about 
the China Dream and what it means to them personally. The majority 
of comments on the videos are positive, with only a few users leaving 
sardonic remarks such as: ‘Watching this makes me think of this [meme]: 
“With a population of 1.4 billion, it’s no surprise there are some stupid 
c**ts in China. Do you think you’re living in a paradise?” ’10 Another user 
queried: ‘Shouldn’t the China Dream begin with a hard disk repair?’11  
Conflation of propaganda and entertainment is integral to ideological 
strengthening under Xi. Analysing three televised public speaking contests 
revolving around the China Dream, Hizi writes that contestants in Super 
Speaker, I am Speaker, and Wonderful China — aired respectively in 2013, 
2014, and 2015 — all told stories of personal triumph in the style of ‘filial 
nationalism’. They 
echo the message of the China Dream by offering visions of the fu-
ture through relying on a shared past. They bring into life an imagi-
nary in which stability and reform, conformity and innovation, obe-
dience and self-expression, are by no means antonymic concepts.12  
A good example of the Party’s recent efforts at encouraging identification 
with CCP ideology through entertainment is The Leader 领风者, a cartoon 
series about the life and times of Karl Marx released for streaming on 
Bilibili on 28 January 2019. Made to commemorate the 200th anniversary 
in 2018 of Marx’s birth, this seven-episode series was an initiative of the 
Central Office for the Research and Construction of Marxist Theory 中央
马克思主义理论研究和建设工程办公室. The Hangzhou-based animation 
company Wawayu TV produced the series with support from the Inner 
Mongolia branch of the Party’s Propaganda Department and the Inner 
Mongolia Film Group, which the Propaganda Department controls. 
The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the Propaganda 
Department of the Communist Youth League were also involved in 










































In The Leader, Communism’s founding father is depicted as tall, slim, 
and wide-eyed, with a high forehead, well-defined jawline, arched brows, 
and dark wavy hair — resembling any number of popular heroic male 
anime characters. The point was to ‘reinvent and broadcast Marxism as 
widely as possible, [to] bring Marx and Generation Z together’, as the title 
of a Guangming Daily editorial put it.14 However, an article published in 
the online magazine Sixth Tone pointed out that The Leader also had the 
unintended effect of leading viewers to pay ‘more attention to Marx’s high 
cheekbones and good looks than his theories’.15  
The Guangming Daily editorial’s gushing endorsement of the cartoon 
series was to be expected. This newspaper is directly controlled by the 
CCP’s Central Propaganda Department (CPD). The Shanghai-based Sixth 
Tone, conversely, is an English-language outlet owned by the Shanghai 
United Media Group, a commercial operation supervised by the Shanghai 
Committee of the CCP. Its primary audience is an international Anglophone 
readership. Sixth Tone’s good-humoured criticism of the cartoon series is 
characteristic of this outlet’s more sophisticated approach to ‘maintaining 
a unified calibre’ with the CPD. Self-described as covering ‘issues from the 
perspectives of those most intimately involved to highlight the nuances 
and complexities of today’s China’, Sixth Tone’s editors and writers ensure 
that the engaging content they publish never amounts to serious dissent.16 
In a 2016 article about Sixth Tone’s equally readable Chinese-language 
sister publication, The Paper 澎湃, the China Media Project’s David 
Bandurski points out Xi’s description of effective propaganda in 2015 as 
being capable of extending its ‘tentacles’ to ‘wherever the readers are, 
wherever the viewers are’. He elaborates on Xi’s octopian metaphor: 
Propaganda can no longer repulse, as it has so often done in the 
past, with its dead and colourless reports. It must attract. More to 
the point, it must attach. It must reach out to us and attach itself to 
us. Draw us in and lead us along. We must say: What a wondrous 
creature this is! Look at the way it lives and breathes, and coils itself 
around our lives!17 
The injection of entertainment value into party ideology does not make 
it less coercive. If rigid and formulaic party tifa reflect a hypernormal 
— hence pathological — insistence on linguistic conformity to signify 
the Party’s lasting power, the use of anime, rap, and other forms of 
entertainment culture to exalt the Party turns everything into grist for 
the Party’s ideological mill. In an interview, Zhong Jun 钟君, a researcher 
at CASS and head writer for The Leader, likened the ‘revolutionary’ series 
to the work of intellectuals in the 1910s, whose self-declared ‘literary 
revolution’ brought modern standard Chinese into existence: 
The transition from the premodern literary language [文言文 wenyan-
wen] to the modern vernacular [白话 baihua] was a revolution. Our 
adaptation of theoretical discourse into a language intelligible to the 
masses is similarly a revolution.18 
Disfiguring May Fourth
The ‘literary revolution’ that took place from 1915 until the early 1920s 
was a cultural movement initiated by progressive intellectuals based 
at Peking University. These included, among others, the CCP’s two most 
prominent founders, Chen Duxiu 陈独秀 (then Dean of Arts at Peking 













































University) and Li Dazhao 李大钊 (the university’s chief librarian), as 
well as Lu Xun 鲁迅 (China’s best-known twentieth-century writer, 
whom Mao posthumously lauded as ‘the sage of modern China’) and Hu 
Shi 胡适 (China’s foremost liberal thinker). These individuals despaired 
that even after the collapse of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) and the 
founding of the modern republic in 1912, China had failed to modernise. 
They vowed to eradicate everything ‘old’ that was holding Chinese society 
captive to the oppressive habits of its dynastic past. They espoused a 
New Culture (新文化 xin wenhua) that would deliver mass literacy 
through the nationwide adoption of a modern, plainspoken language 
(白话 baihua), based on the Beijing dialect. They perceived China’s 
difficult premodern literary language (文言文 wenyanwen) to be a tool of 
oppression, accessible only to the elite scholar-official class (as 士, 绅士, 
士大夫, or 文人, shi, shenshi, shidaifu, or wenren). They hoped that 
baihua, as a language in which ordinary Chinese people could express 
themselves freely, would help to bring into existence a just and 
democratic society. 
Students of Beijing Normal University returning to campus after being detained during the May 
Fourth Movement
Source: Sgsg, Wikipedia
Zhong’s comparison of the propagandistic cartoon The Leader with the 
New Culture advocacy of baihua as an egalitarian language that belongs to 
everyone may seem egregious. But ‘Make the past serve the present, make 
the foreign serve China’ 古为今用, 洋为中用 was one of Mao’s favourite 
sayings, and one that Mao’s successors have turned into an authoritative 
tifa. Xi, who has quoted this saying on several occasions, evidently sought 
to make the legacy of New Culture intellectuals serve his ends when he 
commemorated the centennial of the May Fourth Movement in 2019. 
New Culture and ‘May Fourth’ 五四 are often used interchangeably, 
with the former being generally subsumed under the latter. Student 
activists of the New Culture movement initiated the historic street 
protest in Beijing on 4 May 1919. Sparked by the poor treatment China 
received at the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, May Fourth expanded 
from a political protest to a national social and political movement that 
encompassed workers’ rights, women’s rights, and universal education. 
Mao’s 1940 description of May Fourth as the starting point of China’s 
‘history of “cultural revolution” ’ has ensured the reverential observation 
of this anniversary in the PRC ever since. In Xi’s speech of 30 April 
2019, he narrowed the significance of May Fourth to the patriotism 
shown by ‘progressive students and intellectuals’ who led ‘the broad 
masses’ in a ‘thoroughly anti-imperialist and anti-feudal great patriotic 
revolutionary movement’.19 
Xi used these Mao-era tifa to evoke continuity with Mao while 
suppressing the discourse of ‘cultural revolution’ that these tifa originally 
served. Instead, he claimed that May Fourth offered ‘profound historical 
evidence’ of ‘patriotism flowing in the veins of the Chinese nation past 
and present, irremovably, indestructibly, and inextinguishably’. This 
ahistorical privileging of patriotism allows Xi to tie the achievements 
of May Fourth to those of the CCP under Mao, after Mao, and up to his 











































Xi used his own tifa — ‘to realise the China Dream of the Chinese 
nation’s great rejuvenation’ — six times (with minor variations), first 
in his opening paragraph and then as a concluding refrain to different 
sections of his speech. Coupled with his eleven other mentions of ‘great 
rejuvenation’ and twenty-eight references to the New Era (a temporal 
designation understood to mean Xi’s era, which began in October 2017 
with the inauguration of ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics for a New Era’; see China Story Yearbook: Power, Chapter 
2 ‘Talking (Up) Power’, pp.37–48), Xi effectively reduced May Fourth to a 
mere rhetorical device for exalting CCP rule under his stewardship. Of the 
twenty-eight references to New Era, twenty-two were to ‘Chinese youth 
in the New Era’ 新时代中国青年. Xi was, in this instance, emulating the 
celebration of youth in both New Culture writings and Mao’s speeches. He 
exhorted ‘China’s youth in the New Era’ to 
continue developing the spirit of May Fourth, to take the realisation of 
the Chinese nation’s great rejuvenation as their personal responsibility, 
to betray neither the Party’s and the people’s expectations of them nor 
the trust the nation has placed in them, and to never fail to live up to 
this great era of ours.
Party discourse is circular and self-referential because its function is to 
demonstrate that the Party’s word is law. Xi’s speech is no exception. The 
China Dream, so construed, cannot be meaningfully developed in open 
discussions. The function of a guiding tifa such as the China Dream, by 
virtue of its self-definition as a correct form of words, is to foreclose in-
quiry and reflection. Yurchak wrote of Party language in the Soviet Union 
that it generated ‘a peculiar paradox’: for a population habituated to au-
thoritarian censorship and propaganda, ‘although the system’s collapse 
had been unimaginable before it began, it appeared unsurprising when 
it happened’.20  
The propagation of the China Dream as each individual Chinese 
citizen’s dream is the remedy Xi hopes will prevent a similar collapse of 
Party rule in China. He is not offering citizens the freedom to discuss what 
dreams they can realistically achieve in a highly competitive and unequal 
society under increasing state control. Rather, he is telling them to dream 
as patriots. When he urged students at Peking University to be patriotic 
like their May Fourth predecessors, Xi reminded them that ‘in present-day 
China, the essence of patriotism is to uphold the maximal unity of one’s 
love for the country, the Party, and socialism’. 
In 1922, Lu Xun likened Chinese society to the unconscious 
inhabitants of a hermetically sealed ‘iron house’ 铁屋, walled in by the 
archaic and obsolete ideas of dynastic rule and wenyanwen, suffocating 
to death as they slept. Figuring New Culture and May Fourth as attempts 
to rouse some from their slumber, he asked his friend Qian Xuantong 钱
玄同 whether any good could come of rousing these unfortunate few. The 
outcome would be only to alert them to the ‘agony of irrevocable death’ in 
an indestructible iron house. Qian replied: ‘But if a few wake up, you can’t 
say there is no hope of destroying the iron house.’21  
In 2019, Xi’s administration intensified its aggressive measures to 
curtail academic freedoms, force-feed students Xi Jinping Thought, and 
punish the Party’s critics at mainland universities. It also incarcerated 
more than one million Uyghurs and people from other Muslim ethnicities 
in China in political re-education camps in Xinjiang. Justifying these actions 
as necessary for achieving the ‘Chinese nation’s great rejuvenation’ only 
makes sense if the ‘Chinese nation’ is merely a synonym for the CCP. In 
short, the China Dream tifa tells us the Party-state aspires to nothing less 






































Xi Jinping’s War on ‘Black and Evil’ 
·  BEN HILLMAN 
The Changing ‘Dream’ in the Classroom:  
Literary Chinese Textbooks in the PRC 

























































































THE CHINESE COMMUNIST  Party’s Sweep Away Black and Eliminate 
Evil 扫黑除恶 campaign entered its 
second year in 2019. When it launched 
in 2018, the three-year campaign 
promised to take down criminal or 
‘black society’ gangs 黑社会 involved in 
gambling, prostitution, and extortion, 
as well as other ‘black and evil forces’, 
such as the coercive monopolies 
of ‘sand tyrants’ 沙覇 who force 
construction companies to buy building 
materials through them at inflated 
prices, and ‘underground police’, 地下
执法队 who enforce informal rules in 
street markets.
Loan sharks and usury 高利贷 are 
also high on the hit list. Loan sharks 
charge high interest for fast cash, 
and loan terms are typically short. 
Borrowers find themselves in serious 
trouble if they fail to repay the loans 
on time. A common loan shark tactic is 
the ‘nude loan’ 裸贷, which comes with 
the condition that borrowers (who are 
usually young and female) provide 
the loan shark with nude photos of 
themselves that will be posted on 
the Internet in case of default. Law 
enforcement in the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) calls such offences ‘soft 
violence’ 软暴力. And it can get a lot 
worse for loan shark victims. According 
to a local policeman I interviewed in 
Yunnan province: 
X I  J I N P I N G ’ S  WA R  O N 















































[G]angs will do anything to 
terrorise people who owe them 
money, [including] flushing 
people’s heads in the toilet and 
making them eat shit. Sometimes 
they imprison people in a room 
until they come up with a plan for 
repayment. 
False (illegal) imprisonment is 
apparently so common that, along with 
nude loans, it has been specifically 
identified as one of the ‘black and evil’ 
acts to be eradicated in the campaign. 
In a Yunnan village I visited in 
March 2019, locals confirmed the 
policeman’s report, and offered many 
examples of people who had met 
sorry fates at the hands of loan sharks. 
The villagers also confirmed that the 
Sweep Away Black and Eliminate Evil 
campaign was having a good effect. 
‘The gangs are quiet now’, a former 
township head told me: ‘They know 
this [crackdown] is serious.’ The 
state news agency Xinhua reported 
that, by the end of March 2019, the 
campaign had uncovered 14,226 cases 
of ‘black and evil’ activity involving 
79,018 people.1 
Sweep Away Black and Eliminate 
Evil targets not only evil forces 黑恶 
势力 within society, but also the 
‘protective umbrellas’ 保护伞 and 
‘relationship networks’ 关系网 that 
sustain them from within the state — 
government officials and members of the 
police force who aid and abet gangsters. 
Complementing President Xi Jinping’s 
anti-corruption drive, the campaign 
Billboard on Kunming street 
showing loan sharks. The 
sign reads: ‘Remove the 
cancer of black and evil 
forces’ and provides hotlines 
and an email for reporting 
crimes
Source: Ben Hillman
seeks to break up the patronage 
networks of ‘little kingdoms’ 小王国 
that have evaded previous efforts 
at eradication.2 China’s provinces 
have jockeyed with one another to 
achieve the highest number of arrests 
of officials serving as ‘protective 
umbrellas’, with regular public 
announcements about the latest busts. 
In April 2019, Liaoning province’s Office 
for Discipline Inspection announced 
that it had investigated and responded 
to more than 1,000 ‘black and evil’ 
cases, including some involving ‘big 
fish’ such as Ji Hongsheng, former 
Deputy Chief of Dandong City Public 
Security Bureau. Ji was sentenced to 
ten years for helping criminals avoid 
prosecution.3 In the dock, Ji said: ‘I 
thought I was helping out a friend — no 
big deal. I didn’t think it was a crime, 
but now I regret it.’4 
It is a common grievance on the 
streets of China that well-connected 
people receive only light punishment 
when they fall foul of the law. Media 
attention given to cases such as Ji 
Hongsheng’s is designed to reassure 
the public that the Party is determined 
to root out local corruption and see 
justice served. A government official 
told me in March 2019 that the crime- 
busting element of Sweep Away Black 
and Eliminate Evil was very popular 
with ordinary citizens. 
But not all elements of the 
campaign have been popular. In 
2019, the campaign’s scope expanded 
to include social disorder 乱. The 
expanded mandate — revealed in a 
number of Party documents released 
throughout the year — is reflected 
in campaign propaganda across the 
country. The road sign on the next page 
is typical of the revised propaganda; 
it reads: ‘Where there is black, sweep 
it, where there is no black, eliminate 
evil, and where there is no evil, cure 
disorder.’ Security forces are on notice: 
there is always someone to catch! Party 
documents and propaganda suggest 
that the inclusion of ‘disorder’ is a 
natural extension of the campaign and 
reflects the emphasis on rule of law 
and China’s new social governance 
systems. Nanjing City, for example, 
announced in 2019 that it was 
strengthening its grid-based social 
governance system to ensure that ‘evil 
forces’ — including village, city, and 
transport 行霸 ‘tyrants’ (for example, 
taxi and delivery monopolies) — had 
nowhere to hide.5 
The spectre of the ‘black hand’ 
or ‘black and evil forces’ draws on a 














































legal discourse that goes well beyond 
the sense of ‘gangster’ or ‘miscreant’. 
The term has been used frequently as 
shorthand for enemies of the state in 
Communist Party rhetoric and is now 
used routinely to dehumanise and 
delegitimise protestors and dissidents. 
State media has described the Hong 
Kong protests of 2019, for example, as 
being orchestrated by ‘black hands’ 
with support from ‘foreign black 
hands’. Protests in China’s Tibetan 
areas a decade ago were similarly 
characterised.6 Another Chinese 
term frequently used to dehumanise 
enemies is ‘fly’ 拍蝇, which routinely 
appears in Sweep Away Black 
propaganda. For example, a Shanghai 
City government notice highlights 
central party directives to sweep away 
‘local flies’ 基层 ‘拍蝇’ alongside ‘black 
and evil forces and the corrupt’.7 
With Sweep Away Black and 
Eliminate Evil campaign committees 
now firmly established and empowered 
at all levels of administration, security 
agencies mobilised, and undesirable 
types filling police detention centres, 
the campaign is proving useful for 
the Party as it continues to tighten its 
political control over local society. The 
persistence of ‘black and evil forces’ 
provides justification for the expansion 
of authoritarian social control systems 
such as surveillance and social credit 
schemes. The campaign also coincides 
with a stricter application of ‘political 
checks’ 政审 for college applicants and 
jobseekers. As a local businesswoman 
told me: ‘Sweep Away Black and 
Eliminate Evil is the Party’s latest 
initiative to make us more obedient.’  
Local party branches are using 
the campaign to squash dissent. The 
Roadside billboard 
in Yunnan Province: 
‘Where there is black, 
sweep it, where there is 
no black, eliminate evil, 
and where there is no 
evil, cure disorder’  
Source: Ben Hillman
‘black hand’ label is often associated 
with dissent in China, and once a 
‘black hand’ has been identified, it is 
easy for local Party bosses and law 
enforcement to make arrests under 
the auspices of Sweep Away Black. I 
learned of one case in which villagers 
who complained about an exploitative 
land deal were swept up and detained 
after assembling in a large group to 
protest. In another village, twenty-
three people were arrested in a 
single police swoop. When I returned 
to Yunnan later in 2019, villagers 
who had previously celebrated the 
campaign’s takedown of gangland 
activities expressed concern about 
its mission creep. Some expressed 
fears that their association with or 
family ties to someone swept up in the 
campaign could land them in trouble. 
Others reported that a young woman 
had been expelled from a corporate 
recruitment program because her 
father had been apprehended by the 
Sweep Away Black and Eliminate Evil 
committee. As one villager explained 
to me: 
We worry because someone 
only needs to report you to 
the committee for you to be 
investigated. People have started 
making false reports against 
their enemies. It’s like the 
Cultural Revolution. 
Sweep Away Black and Eliminate Evil 
promotes a vision of a safer, fairer, 
and more harmonious society, but 
the campaign’s broad mandate and 
its combative revolutionary style 
has begun to arouse memories of a 
nightmarish past that post-Mao China 













































































NO DREAMS ARE MORE powerful or poignant than those a nation 
imparts to its children. One revealing 
window into such dreams is a school 
textbook. On 20 February 2019, an 
anonymous post on Weibo disclosed 
that updates were being proposed to 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
middle-school textbook for literary 
Chinese, including the removal of 
the rousing story of Chen She 陳
涉 (d.208 BCE), the peasant leader 
of a grassroots rebellion against the 
tottering Qin empire (221–207 BCE). 
Chen’s biography comes from Sima 
Qian’s 司馬遷 (b.145 BCE) Records of 
the Historian 史記, a classic of Chinese 
literature as well as a foundational 
work of history. The current textbook 
selection narrates Chen’s life from his 
youth until his rise in the rebellion. 
According to a manual for teachers, 
it is supposed to ‘demonstrate the 
tremendous power of the first righteous 
peasant uprising in our country’s 
history’ and give students a sense of 
‘the spirit of struggle underlying the 
peasants’ righteous uprising’.1 
According to the Weibo source, 
education authorities plan to replace 
Chen She’s story with an anecdote 
about Zhou Yafu 周亞夫 (d.143 BCE), an 
upright and law-abiding general of the 
Han dynasty (202 BCE–220 CE) whose 
story is also found in the Records of 
the Historian.2 Since the early 1960s, 
T H E  C H A N G I N G  ‘ D R E A M ’  I N 
T H E  C L A S S R O O M :  L I T E R A R Y 
C H I N E S E  T E X T B O O K S  I N 
T H E  P R C













































































generations of mainland Chinese 
students have learned Chen She’s story 
by heart, which is why news of its planned 
removal from the latest textbooks 
astonished the Chinese public.
News outlets reported an outcry 
on social media.3 The new textbook’s 
editor-in-chief told the state-run Global 
Times that the change was ‘a purely 
academic adjustment’ to ‘avoid inter- 
disciplinary overlap’, since parts of 
Chen She’s story will remain in the 
history textbooks. Xu Guoqi 徐國琦, 
Professor of History at the University 
of Hong Kong, instead interprets the 
update as an expression of fear: a story 
that once symbolised the noble cause of 
(Communist) revolution could be seen 
today as an encouragement to protest.4 
We argue further that the change 
points to a profound shift in the nature 
of the national ‘dreams’ being proposed 
to the younger generation in which 
heroic revolutionary courage is no 
longer a priority. What is called for 
instead is the courage to uphold the 
system, as expressed by the current 
Party line of ‘ruling the nation in 
accord with law’ 依法治國 (see the 
China Story Yearbook 2016: Control, 
Chapter 2 ‘Control by Law’, pp.43–57).
The Political Role of School 
Textbooks in China
Textbooks present themselves as 
unbiased sources of knowledge 
(even though in virtually all non- 
scientific cases this is blatantly 
not true). In mainland China, this 
makes them powerful purveyors 
of official ideology to susceptible 
young minds. Robert Weatherley 
and Coirle Magee have argued that 
the Chinese Communist Party would 
consider middle-school history 
textbooks ‘an ideal medium for the 
transmission of political propaganda’, 
and therefore carefully control the 
content and how it is framed.5 The 
literary Chinese curriculum can 
produce an even more powerful 
effect, since the political subtext is 
submerged in stories that themselves 
are inspiring and also linked to a 
proud cultural heritage. Presented 
in the context of language learning, 
The tomb of Chen She in Hunan province
Source: Baike
stories such as these are justly prized 
and not merely part of a program of 
flat-footed ideological instruction.
In 1951, when the leading 
authorised textbook publisher, People’s 
Education Press (PEP), produced the 
PRC’s first middle-school textbooks, 
they did not include the story of Chen 
She. At the time, the People’s Daily 
criticised them for failing to present 
inspiring tales of ancient heroes 
engaging in the ‘glorious Chinese 
tradition of revolution’ that had 
culminated in the establishment of the 
‘New China’. It was in this context that, 
beginning in 1960, PEP included Chen 
She’s story in textbooks. China’s youth 
were instructed to dream of further 
revolution, with consequences that are 
now well-known. 
The Party-state under President 
Xi Jinping is placing ever more 
importance on the role of textbooks 
in political messaging. In the past, 
publishers following the lead of 
provincial departments of education 
were allowed to compile local 
textbooks that took into account 
regional differences. But since 2017, 
with the establishment of its National 
Textbook Commission 國家教材委
員會, the Party-state has started to 
oversee the compilation of school 
textbooks. It plans to replace the 
various current versions with 
nationally standardised texts by 2020. 
Announcing this news, the 
Ministry of Education said the new 
textbooks would ‘adhere to the correct 
political direction … and fully represent 
the new political theory, ideology, and 
strategy of the Party Central Committee 
with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core’.6  
The New Party Line and Zhou  
Yafu’s Story
Since Deng Xiaoping launched his 
policy of Economic Reform and 
Opening Up to the outside world in 
1978, China’s economy has grown 
tremendously, but so too have 
economic inequality and official 
corruption. The pro-democracy protest 
movement of 1989 began in response 
to corruption. Both corruption and the 
perceived inability or unwillingness of 
China’s legal system to deliver justice 
have also led to other, more local 
uprisings. Xi Jinping’s administration 
has responded by placing great 
emphasis on ‘rule by law’ and a large-
scale anticorruption campaign (see the 
China Story Yearbook 2015: Pollution, 
Chapter 2 ‘The Fog of Law’, pp.67–85 












































































S Chapter 1 Forum ‘Power Surge: 
China’s New National Supervisory 
Commission’, pp.31–33). The notion of 
‘ruling the nation in accord with law’ 
has therefore become an important 
slogan. It is against this background 
that we interpret the state’s 
discomfort with taking the righteous 
rebel Chen She as a paradigm, and 
its preference for the law-abiding 
Zhou Yafu.
Zhou Yafu, a Han dynasty 
general, successfully suppressed the 
Rebellion of the Seven Princes of 154 
BCE. Sima Qian characterised him 
as an upright military man devoted 
to strict discipline. The anecdote 
selected for the textbook begins when 
the emperor orders Zhou and two 
other generals to set up camps by the 
border to repel incursions by hostile 
neighbouring peoples. The emperor 
himself visits the camps to encourage 
the troops, with the other two generals 
immediately welcoming their ruler. At 
Zhou Yafu’s encampment, however, 
armed sentries greet the emperor’s 
party and allow him in only after he 
shows his official imperial credentials. 
This story promotes the notion that 
things must be done in accordance 
with the law and echoes Xi’s slogan. It 
also implies that the same rules should 
apply to everyone, even to the most 
powerful person in the country — that 
is, it hints at a dream of full ‘rule of 
law’ rather than just rule by laws that 
do not constrain the rulers themselves. 
The language of traditional Chinese 
historiography has always hidden 
its critical intent between the lines. 
Whoever chose the Zhou Yafu story as 
part of the new China Dream continues 
this tradition, hinting at a version of 
‘rule of law’ that far exceeds what Xi 
Jinping would likely endorse.
Sima Qian’s 司馬遷 
(b.145 BCE) Records 












































HONG KONG’S RECKONING 
Antony Dapiran
IN 2018, VALENTINE’S DAY coincided with the 
Lunar New Year holidays. To celebrate, a young 
Hong Kong couple, Poon Hiu-wing 潘曉穎, twenty, 
and her boyfriend Chan Tong-kai 陳同佳, nineteen, 
went on a romantic long-weekend getaway to Taipei. 
On the night of 16 February, as families across China 
were celebrating the first day of the Lunar New Year, 
Poon and Chan fought. Chan later confessed to Hong 
Kong police that in the course of their argument he 
killed Poon, stuffed her body into a pink suitcase and 
disposed of it in a field near a remote Taipei subway 








































No-one could have expected that this tragic incident would lead to the 
greatest crisis Hong Kong — and possibly the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) — has faced since 1989, an ongoing crisis that, at the time of writing, 
shows no signs of fading. But there is a direct path from that hotel room 
in Taipei in 2018 to tear gas and bullets on the streets of Hong Kong in 
2019. Although Chan confessed the murder to police in Hong Kong, his 
case moved into a legal lacuna. Under Hong Kong law, Chan could not be 
charged for committing a murder outside Hong Kong and he could only 
be extradited to a jurisdiction with which Hong Kong had entered into an 
extradition treaty. Taiwan was not one of those jurisdictions.
Facing the possibility that Poon’s murderer would escape justice, Hong 
Kong’s Chief Executive, Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor 林鄭月娥, proposed 
a solution that she felt would both address the injustice and please her 
political masters in Beijing: amending Hong Kong’s Fugitive Offenders 
Ordinance to remove the geographic restrictions so that, provided certain 
procedural steps were met, fugitives could be extradited to anywhere in 
the world, including Taiwan — and mainland China.
Aerial view of the protests
Source: Studio Incendo, Flickr
At first blush, it appeared to be something of a legal technicality, 
not the kind of thing to arouse the passions of millions. But the proposal 
touched a nerve; for the first time, it established a direct link between 
Hong Kong’s justice system — built on the common law principles of an 
independent judiciary and the separation of powers — and that of the 
mainland, which is opaque, unpredictable, and ultimately beholden to the 
Chinese Communist Party. Not since 2003 had the Hong Kong government 
— with its notorious ‘Article 23’ national security legislation — attempted 
to push a policy that was so blatantly in the interests of Beijing, and so 
contrary to the interests of the people of Hong Kong.
‘Fan Song Zhong’ 返送中
The international media covered subsequent events. First came a march 
of one million Hong Kongers all dressed in white on Sunday, 9 June 
2019, in response to which the government announced that the proposal 
would be proceeding regardless. Tens of thousands of protesters then 
laid siege to the Legislative Council (‘LegCo’) building on Wednesday, 12 
June, preventing the LegCo from meeting and effectively putting a stop 
to the proposal; police violently dispersed the protesters using tear gas 
and rubber bullets. On the following Sunday, 16 June, there was another 
march, this time of two million Hong Kongers — more than one-quarter of 
the population — all dressed in black. 
Lam seemed surprised that the extradition bill provoked such a 
visceral response from the Hong Kong populace. She should not have been. 
Nerves had already been rattled when mainland agents abducted several 
booksellers from Hong Kong’s streets in 2015 and spirited them across 
the border (see the China Story Yearbook 2016: Control, Chapter 7 Forum 
‘Control and Resistance in Hong Kong’, pp.269–275). It also did not help that 
the anti-extradition bill cause aligned the interests of Hong Kong’s pan- 








































elite, whose business dealings on the mainland left them the most exposed 
of all to the risks of the extradition law. More than that, the proposal also 
triggered anxiety about deeper issues of identity.
In the past, Hong Kong had distinguished itself on the basis of wealth. 
For decades, its people were rich compared with those in China, which 
from the late 1970s, began struggling to lift itself out of poverty. However, 
since the handover from the United Kingdom to the PRC in 1997, as Hong 
Kong’s economy drifted and China’s boomed, that distinction failed to 
hold. Hong Kongers replaced their pride in material success with pride 
in ‘Hong Kong Core Values’ — those rights and freedoms that distinguish 
life in Hong Kong from life in the rest of China. The concept of Hong Kong 
Core Values was first articulated by a group of pro-democracy scholars 
and politicians in 2004, initially as an expression of alarm that these 
values were being lost. However, the concept was soon coopted by the 
government and more widely across Hong Kong society to articulate Hong 
Kong’s competitive advantage over the rest of China, and indeed much of 
Asia. Hong Kong Core Values include clean, corruption-free government, a 
lively and unfettered media, freedom to criticise the government, rule of 
law and due process, an independent judiciary, and, of course, the right to 
protest. Hong Kong Core Values became the answer to the question: ‘What 
does it mean to be a Hong Konger?’
The proposed extradition law, which would have breached the legal 
firewall between Hong Kong and the mainland, was seen as another 
attack on these core values. The protesters on Hong Kong’s streets were 
protesting against not just a theoretical risk of extradition to the opaque 
mainland criminal justice system, but also a threat to their very identity 
as Hong Kongers. And, by taking to the streets, they were expressing their 
dissatisfaction by exercising their key rights and freedoms. Their protest 
became a performance of identity.
The protesters’ initial demand was summed up in a three-character 
slogan: ‘Fan song zhong!’ A direct translation would be ‘Oppose sending 
[accused criminals] to China’, but song zhong 送中 is a homophone for 
送終, meaning ‘to see off a dying relative’. (It is also, incidentally, a 
homophone for the phrase 送鐘 ‘to give a clock’, which is why the 
Chinese consider a clock an unlucky gift as it in effect wishes death on the 
recipient.) The slogan thus could be understood to mean ‘Oppose sending 
us to our death’ — whether by extradition to China or through the death 
of civil liberties in Hong Kong.
It was unfortunate that, some weeks into the protests, Lam turned to 
mortality-tinged metaphors when she announced that the extradition bill 
would not be proceeding. In her English statement to the press, she said 
bluntly: ‘The bill is dead.’ In Chinese, she said the bill ‘shou zhong zheng 
qin’ 壽終正寢, meaning it had ‘died a natural death from old age in its bed’. 
Commentators were quick to point out this did not reflect the true state of 
affairs for a bill that had more accurately been killed by the protests.
It mattered little to the protesters that Lam had suspended the bill 
indefinitely. This was in part because they demanded its formal withdrawal 
and did not trust Lam’s assurances that the suspended bill would not be 
revived. In the meantime, protesters’ demands had broadened to include, 
among other matters, an independent inquiry into police behaviour as well 
as universal suffrage. The former demand arose from numerous incidents 
that had damaged public trust in the police: beyond the unrestrained use 
by police of tear gas, rubber bullets, and other ‘less lethal’ weaponry on 
Tension between police and 
protesters on the streets of 
Hong Kong








































the citizenry, Hong Kongers were particularly incensed when Triad gang 
members attacked young protesters and other commuters at Yuen Long 
Mass Transit Railway (MTR) station as they returned home after a protest 
on the night of 21 July, savagely beating them with bamboo canes. Police 
were slow to respond and were later photographed casually chatting with 
the armed thugs. The latter demand was the unfinished business of 2014’s 
Umbrella Movement. The contrast between that utopian movement and 
the dystopia of the 2019 protests marked this movement as something 
more desperate.
From Dream to Nightmare
Many recall the ‘occupied’ sites of the Umbrella Movement as mini-utopias 
that reflected the hopes of the movement itself, which agitated for a ‘more 
perfect’ democracy for Hong Kong. Rows of rainbow-coloured tents lined 
the roads while cultural expression flourished: banners, posters, chalk 
drawings, and sculptures adorned the sites. Thousands flocked with their 
families to visit on sunny weekends, when the mood felt like a community 
arts festival, with movie screenings, musical performances, and arts 
and crafts activities. The Umbrella Movement became performative 
of the kind of society it hoped Hong Kong would become — a peaceful, 
self-regulating community, built on mutual support and sharing, a gift 
economy of donated goods and services, all of which were a far cry from 
the self-interested rampant capitalism for which Hong Kong was known.
Like the Umbrella Movement, the 2019 protest movement had a lively 
and prolific visual culture. Vast amounts of graphics, cartoons, posters, 
and memes were generated, many responding to events on a daily basis. 
These circulated online and were also posted on ‘Lennon Walls’ — sites for 
public expression that expanded from one single site in Admiralty during 
the Umbrella Movement to multiple sites blossoming across the city 
throughout the year. However, in 2019, the tone changed. Far from the 
utopian ideals of the Umbrella Movement, demonstrators in 2019 were 
fighting against their city sliding into what they saw as a dystopian 
nightmare of police brutality, arbitrary detention, and extrajudicial 
punishment. Not only was this something they feared if extradition to the 
mainland became a reality; they also saw it increasingly unfolding on the 
streets of their own city, as police began using arrest as a method of crowd 
control, with innocent passers-by arrested for ‘unlawful assembly’, and 
many arrestees complaining of beatings and other mistreatment at the 
hands of police while in detention. The initially peaceful protest movement 
became mired in an escalating cycle of violence; police deployed tear 
gas on the streets of Hong Kong every week for months. Police also used 
rubber bullets, pepper pellets, beanbag rounds, water cannons loaded 
with ‘tear water’ (a skin irritant), an indelible blue dye to help them locate 
the protesters they had hit, and — finally — live ammunition. Protesters 
responded in kind, arming themselves with clubs, shields, and slingshots, 
and throwing bricks and petrol bombs.
Protest posters at bus stops







































S The darker shadows of history have hung heavily over the 2019 
protests. These are the shadows of Hong Kong’s 1967 riots — which lasted 
longer, and featured much more violence and greater loss of life — and 
1989’s Tiananmen Square protests and 3–4 June crackdown, the ghosts of 
which were summoned by Beijing in mid-August when it conspicuously 
stationed People’s Armed Police forces in a sports arena across the border 
in Shenzhen (see Chapter 8 ‘Hong Kong and the Tiananmen Playbook’, 
pp.223–235). The troops were shown on television carrying out crowd 
control exercises in which the police shouted in Cantonese and their 
antagonists were attired strikingly like the Hong Kong protesters.
The protesters’ slogans evolved to reflect the darkening mood. In the 
early stages of the movement, the rallying cry was ‘Hong Kongers, add 
oil!’ 香港人加油, reflecting the identity-centric nature of the movement. 
After Lam used emergency powers to implement a ban on face masks on 
4 October, that chant became ‘Hong Kongers, resist!’ 香港人反抗. And, 
following the death on 8 November of a young student protester who fell 
from a multistorey car park, reportedly while trying to evade police, the 
chants became ‘Hong Kongers, revenge!’ 香港人報仇.
To describe their protest strategy, the protesters adopted the slogan: 
‘Be water!’ The Umbrella Movement had followed the ‘occupation’ logic of 
worldwide protest movements such as the Occupy Wall Street movement. 
This time around, Hong Kong’s protesters took their inspiration from a 
‘Hong Kongers, resist!’ (left); ‘Restore Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times!’ (right)
Source: Studio Incendo, Flickr
source closer to home: local hero and kung-fu–movie star Bruce Lee, who 
famously advised: ‘Be water!’ The protesters adopted a highly mobile, 
agile style of protest, flowing like water. A rally would turn into a march; 
a march would begin in one direction and abruptly change to another 
direction; and protesters carried out targeted ‘wildcat’ occupations of 
roads or buildings. With no entrenched positions and an unpredictable 
and mobile presence, the protesters effectively rendered themselves 
immune to clearance and arrest. If they met police resistance, they would 
immediately disperse — flowing away like water.
Another notable and hugely popular slogan has been: ‘Restore Hong 
Kong, revolution of our times!’ 光復香港, 時代革命. It was originally the 
campaign slogan of Hong Kong independence advocate Edward Leung Tin-
kei 梁天琦 in a January 2016 LegCo by-election. Leung was subsequently 
jailed for his role in the Mong Kok ‘Fishball Riot’ of 2016 (see the China 
Story Yearbook 2016: Control, Chapter 7 Forum ‘Control and Resistance in 
Hong Kong’, pp.270). In 2019, the slogan became a rallying cry as a more 
radical and political expression of Hong Kong identity. The protestors 
began to use the slogan around the same time they began to target the 
symbols of PRC state power in Hong Kong: it was graffitied on the walls 
of the LegCo when that building was stormed by protesters on 1 July, and 
was first noticeably taken up as a rallying cry by the crowds on the night 
of 21 July, when protesters attacked and vandalised the Liaison Office of 
the Central People’s Government 中聯辦, Beijing’s official representative 
office in Hong Kong. All of these actions can be seen as part of the struggle 
for what political scientist Dr Brian C.H. Fong 方志恆 calls the ‘stateless 
nation’ of Hong Kong.1 Fong argues that Hong Kong — like Quebec, 
Catalonia, and Kurdistan — is a nation trying to establish its autonomy 
under the rule of a strong centralist state. 
Nations — or ‘imagined communities’ as theorised by Benedict 
Anderson — are built just as much with politics as with cultural moments 
or icons, and the 2019 protest movement has also provided plenty of those. 








































online forum LIHKG (lihkg.com), a local Hong Kong website operating a 
low-fi discussion board, have provided means of collective communication 
and discussion beyond official control. In addition to the wide proliferation 
of strikingly creative and sometimes darkly humorous artwork, posters 
and slogans have often made use of the Cantonese language — a key 
aspect of Hong Kong identity. For example, when a police officer swore at 
a journalist ‘Gei nei lou mou!’ 記你老母 (roughly, ‘Journalist, your Mum!’), 
the phrase was taken up as a protest slogan and weapon of political 
satire. In another example of the creation of national cultural symbols, 
a pseudonymous local Hong Kong composer wrote a song, ‘Glory to Hong 
Kong’ 願榮光歸香港, that many called Hong Kong’s ‘national anthem’. 
With lyrics posted and workshopped on LIHKG, the song has a stirring, 
martial feel. Within a week or two of the song making its first appearance 
online, protesters and sympathisers sang it at rallies, soccer matches, and 
at pop-up protests in shopping malls. 
The online forums and chat groups also enabled a protest movement 
that some have referred to as ‘leaderless’ — and others have called 
‘leaderful’. Unlike the Umbrella Movement, the 2019 protest movement 
had no discernible leaders, with everyone contributing what they were 
willing and able in a networked ‘hive mind’ of activists, operating in 
the virtual world and on the ground during protests. This was partly 
an effective protest strategy and partly driven by necessity — few were 
willing to risk being a visible leader, knowing that many of the Umbrella 
Movement leaders had been jailed for their roles in those protests.
‘Lawfare’ Continues
The Hong Kong government’s aggressive prosecution and jailing of 
Umbrella Movement leaders formed part of a campaign of what I called 
‘lawfare’ in the 2017 edition of this Yearbook (see the China Story Yearbook 
2017: Prosperity, Chapter 9 ‘Prosperity and Freedom: Hong Kong’s 
Dilemma’, pp.295–307). Lawfare is the use of Hong Kong’s legal system 
to manage or silence 
political opponents 
and/or achieve political 
objectives. The lawfare 
campaign has been 
politically astute, as it 
enables the authorities 
to appeal to the need 
to uphold Hong 
Kong’s rule of law — 
universally recognised 
as a Hong Kong Core 
Value — while using that same legal system to target the actions of 
dissenting politicians and activists.
In 2019, the Hong Kong government pursued the ongoing lawfare 
campaign with renewed vigour in response to the ongoing protests. The 
Umbrella Movement ended after taxi, minibus, and tour bus companies 
who claimed their businesses had been affected by the road closures 
obtained injunctions in the Hong Kong courts requiring the roads to be 
cleared. Injunctions were weaponised against protests again in 2019. 
In October and November, Hong Kong courts, at the request of the 
government, granted injunctions to bar the public from discussing online 
the use of violence against persons or property, to prevent the disclosure of 
personal information or photographs of police officers and their families, 
to prohibit the public from inspecting the registry of voters, and to stop 
people damaging or obstructing the residences of police. What is more, Lam 
invoked emergency powers not used since the oil crisis of 1973 to bypass 
the LegCo and introduce a new law banning the wearing of face masks — 
a law that Hong Kong’s High Court declared unconstitutional in late 
November. The day after the ruling, a spokesman for China’s National 
People’s Congress (NPC) said only the NPC had the right to make such a 
judgement — a comment that threw Hong Kong’s legal community into 
Protesters wearing face masks








































disarray as it appeared to repudiate the entire separation of powers 
doctrine on which Hong Kong’s common law legal system is based. At 
the time of writing, the NPC has not made any further statements on the 
subject and the Hong Kong government is in the process of appealing the 
decision in the courts.
Meanwhile, police used mass arrests as a crowd control tool. As with 
the Umbrella Movement, we should expect aggressive prosecutions of 
those arrested, and heavy sentences pursued by prosecutors in a process 
that will be dragged out over years, calculated to wear down the opposition 
and tie up their leaders and supporters in the courts.
Hong Kong in the World
At the same time, Beijing has sought to impose its narrative on the events 
in Hong Kong, both inside China and globally. From the beginning of the 
protests in June, Beijing’s spokespeople blamed the protests on ‘foreign 
interference’. In mid-July, after the protesters attacked the central 
government Liaison Office, Beijing began referring to the protesters as 
‘separatists’ and said the protests were an attempted ‘colour revolution’; 
Foreign companies and prominent individuals are becoming accustomed to dealing with Chinese efforts to 
police their speech on a growing list of ‘sensitive’ topics
Source: Studio Incendo, Flickr
and, from August, as protests took a more violent turn, they equated 
the movement with ‘terrorism’ — a chilling description given the same 
charge has been used as the basis for the internment of Xinjiang’s Uyghur 
population.
Through a propaganda push in official state media as well as by 
manipulating the conversation on social media inside China’s ‘Great 
Firewall’, Beijing has ensured that domestic sentiment is hostile to the Hong 
Kong protests. Attacks on mainlanders, such as an incident in which two 
mainlanders suspected of being PRC agents during a protest at Hong Kong 
Airport were detained and beaten by protesters, were given prominence 
in mainland media coverage, further stoking anger there. This hostility 
spilled on to university campuses and streets worldwide, as pro-China 
supporters clashed with Hong Kong protesters, often encouraged — if not 
organised — by Beijing’s diplomatic representatives abroad, one of whom 
lauded the ‘patriotism’ of the pro-China demonstrators following clashes 
at the University of Queensland (see Chapter 9 ‘Campus Conundrums: 
Clashes and Collaborations’, pp.255–267).
The pro-China protesters often sought to prevent others exercising 
their freedom of speech in relation to Hong Kong, or other issues relating 
to China, on foreign soil. Twitter and Facebook identified and terminated 
hundreds of accounts that Twitter called part of a ‘coordinated state-
backed operation’ that was ‘deliberately and specifically attempting to 
sow political discord in Hong Kong’. Twitter also said it would no longer 
accept advertising by ‘state-controlled news media entities’ after PRC news 
outlets extensively advertised anti–Hong Kong messages on the platform. 
Foreign companies and prominent individuals are becoming 
accustomed to dealing with Chinese efforts to police their speech on a 
growing list of ‘sensitive’ topics, from the ‘three Ts’ (Tibet, Taiwan, and 
Tiananmen) to Xinjiang and the South China Sea. This year, Hong Kong 
joined that list of sensitive topics. Beijing pressured Hong Kong businesses 
to ‘take a stand’ 表個態 — to publicly support Carrie Lam’s government 






































airline Cathay Pacific’s CEO Rupert Hogg and a key deputy were forced to 
resign in August 2019 under pressure from Beijing after it was discovered 
that some of Cathay’s staff had been involved in the protests or had simply 
voiced messages of support. In the same week, following the publication 
of a crowd-funded advertisement supporting the demonstrations in the 
name of ‘a group of Big Four accounting firm employees’, the Global Times 
called on the Big Four to ‘fire employees found to have the wrong stance 
on the current Hong Kong situation’. 
Companies, cowed by fear of provoking the Chinese government — 
or the Chinese consumer — believe if they do not self-censor, Beijing will 
quickly make its displeasure known, with serious financial consequences. 
One week in October saw four different examples of this:
• Darrel Morey, Manager of the Houston Rockets NBA basketball team, 
tweeted the Hong Kong protesters’ international rallying cry: ‘Fight for 
freedom; stand with Hong Kong.’ He quickly deleted the tweet, but not 
before it was caught by the Beijing outrage machine and blown into 
an international incident. The NBA initially rebuked, but then stood 
behind, Morey, in the face of a China-wide government-led boycott 
of the NBA, which included cancelling all match broadcasts and 
withdrawing merchandise from sale.
• Video game company Blizzard (a subsidiary of American gaming giant 
Activision Blizzard, in which PRC Internet titan Tencent owns a five 
percent stake) penalised a Hong Kong player who shouted the protest 
slogan ‘Restore Hong Kong, revolution of our times!’ during a video 
game livestream.
• Apple withdrew from sale on its App Store the ‘HKMaps’ app after 
complaints from China. The app revealed the locations of Hong Kong 
police in real time.
• Jeweller Tiffany & Co. withdrew an advertisement that showed a model 
covering one eye. This resembled the ‘covered eye’ gesture adopted by 
Hong Kong protesters after a young female first-aid provider was shot 
in the eye and blinded by a police beanbag round.
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All of these developments heightened 
international awareness of the impact of 
President Xi Jinping’s ambitious program to 
extend China’s global influence. The Hong 
Kong protesters seemed to be at the vanguard 
of what author Richard McGregor has called 
the ‘backlash’ against Xi’s ambitions for a global 
China Dream.2 
Another example of that backlash came 
when the US Congress enacted the Hong Kong 
Human Rights and Democracy Act in a rare 
display of bipartisanship; the bill had sponsors from both sides of the 
aisle and was passed unanimously by the Senate. President Donald Trump 
signed the bill into law in November. The Act provides for sanctions 
against individuals suppressing human rights and freedoms in Hong Kong 
and, importantly, creates a mechanism whereby the Secretary of State will 
need to issue an annual certification of Hong Kong’s autonomy, thereby 
ensuring the issue of Hong Kong will be raised annually in Congress. 
China was predictably incensed by the Act, which it said amounted to 
interference in its internal affairs, and retaliated with sanctions on a 
number of US-based nongovernmental organisations that it said were 
fomenting the Hong Kong protests.
The Silent Majority Speaks
As the protests raged on — with increasing vandalism, violence, and 
disruption to daily life — Carrie Lam and the pro-Beijing politicians in Hong 
Kong spoke of a ‘Silent Majority’: patriotic Hong Kongers who opposed the 
protests but were afraid to speak out. The district council elections, on 
24 November, would give them a chance to speak. The election was seen 
as a referendum pitting the protest movement against Lam’s government 
Winnie the Pooh








































and Beijing. And speak the people did, although they did not say what Lam 
and Beijing had hoped they would.
In a day that saw Hong Kong’s highest ever election turnout — with 
2.9 million people, representing seventy-one percent of eligible voters, 
casting a vote — the pan-democrats won in a landslide. Pan-democrat 
candidates won 385 seats; pro-Beijing (‘establishment’, pro-government) 
candidates won only fifty-nine seats; eight seats went to independents.3 (For 
comparison, in the 2015 district council elections, pan-democrats won 126 
seats, pro-Beijing candidates won 298 seats, and independents won seven 
seats.) Pan-democrats won control of seventeen of the eighteen district 
councils; previously, they had controlled none. (For the remaining council, 
Outer Islands, pan-democrats won a majority of the seats open to popular 
vote but pro-Beijing parties retained control due to ex officio positions 
given to rural chiefs.) The results were unequivocal: a clear majority of 
Hong Kongers supported the protest movement and placed the blame for 
the ongoing chaos at the feet of Lam, her government, and the pro-Beijing 
politicians who support her.
Beyond this objective and indisputable measure of public opinion, 
the district councils themselves enjoy little real power. However, the pan-
democrats’ win came with a bonus prize: control of the district councils 
effectively entitles them to appoint a 117-person bloc of representatives to 
the 1,200-member Chief Executive Election Committee, which will select the 
next Chief Executive, in 2022.
China in Hong Kong
The district council elections ushered in a period of relative calm, but it 
is unlikely the protests have ended entirely. Indeed, it is difficult not to 
wonder whether this represents a ‘new normal’ for Hong Kong: a constant 
background level of discontent and civil unrest occasionally bursting into 
violent confrontation. Meanwhile, Hong Kong sank into recession in the 
third quarter of 2019, with the economy shrinking 3.2 percent. Retail and 
hospitality industries were particularly hard hit, with retail sales in August 
2019 falling twenty-three percent from a year earlier to the worst level on 
record, and visitor numbers fell thirty-seven percent year-on-year for the 
third quarter of 2019.
Some have openly begun to speculate about a ‘Belfastisation’ of Hong 
Kong, as some among the protesters pushed closer to extremism (including 
with more violent attacks on police and government targets), deepening 
social and political divisions. All of this might suit Beijing’s interests in 
demonstrating to the rest of China the ‘chaos’ unleashed by popular pro-
democracy movements, emphasising the need for the steadying hand of 
the Party, while justifying tightened control over Hong Kong.
The Party’s Fourth Plenum meeting in October confirmed that Beijing 
intends to use all of the tools of China’s state power necessary to bring 
Hong Kong to heel: the propaganda campaign, pressure on businesses in 
Hong Kong and abroad to toe the party line, demands that Hong Kong 
government leaders and the civil service demonstrate their patriotism 
and loyalty to Beijing, with appointments closely scrutinised for political 
acceptability, the promotion of ‘patriotic education’, and extensive United 
Front activities. The year 2019 will go down as the one that defined post-
handover Hong Kong; perhaps it will be remembered as the last year of 
Hong Kong as it once was.
Closed shop fronts 
during the protests






































Legalism and the Social Credit System 
· SAMUEL J .  PARSONS  
‘Evil Cults’ and Holy Writ 










































































IN EARLY NOVEMBER 2019, Smartisen CEO Luo Yonghao 
罗永浩 received a ruling from a 
court in Danyang that he had been 
added to a national database of 
discredited individuals. Due to his 
large debt, Luo now faces restrictions 
on travel, finance, luxury spending, 
and educational opportunities for his 
children. A similar story applies to 15 
million other citizens of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) who have 
run afoul of its recent crackdown 
on behaviour it deems unsociable. A 
similar fate awaits those who score 
poorly in the emerging Social Credit 
Systems (SCSs). These social sanctions 
form part of the push by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) to encourage 
good behaviour and honesty among 
the country’s immense citizenry using 
emerging technologies.
The SCS consists of several 
independent trials — commercial 
and governmental — united by 
common characteristics. All SCSs 
operate through assigning a social 
credit score to individuals, which is 
altered according to their behaviour. 
Actions that can lower your score 
range from fraudulent dealings to 
jaywalking and religious association; 
those that can raise it are charitable 
acts, prompt repayment of loans, and 
good familial conduct. Punishments 
vary from restrictions on travel and 
employment to public shaming, 
while rewards include preferential 
access to government services and 
tax deductions. The SCS is not a 
monolithic enterprise, but an evolving 
series of localised trials loosely guided 
by governmental memorandums. 
L E G A L I S M  A N D  T H E  S O C I A L 
C R E D I T  S Y S T E M
















































The Doctrine of Legalism
The ancient philosophical school of 
legalism 法家 arose in the chaos of 
the Warring States period from 475 
to 221 BCE. The legalists sought peace 
and stability through a regime of near-
totalitarian social control based on 
the principles of fa 法 (law), shu 术 
(management), and shi 势 (power). 
By combining these three concepts 
with an extensive system of mutual 
surveillance, a ruler could effectively 
dominate his empire without needing 
to leave his palace.
The central pillar of this system 
is fa: the use of harsh penal law as a 
tool of absolute domination. With 
certain caveats, its application was 
to be universal, with the exception of 
the ruler himself, so that ‘the highest 
minister cannot escape’ and ‘the 
There have been more than forty 
trials, all with their own goals, 
variations on the system, rewards, 
and punishments. 
When then secretary-general 
Jiang Zemin first proposed the SCS in 
2002, it was presented as a method 
to increase the ‘trustworthiness’ 守
信 of financial actors.1 By 2014, it had 
evolved into a general method of social 
control. The fragmentary network of 
trials and experiments that makes up 
the SCS today shares a common aim: the 
instilling of behavioural codes, backed 
by rewards and punishments, which 
promote ‘self-governance’ by citizens. 
SCS, in its use of big data, artificial 
intelligence (AI), and sophisticated 
surveillance, including of all online 
activity, takes on a high-tech guise. But 
the scheme’s philosophical roots lie 
deep in Chinese history. 
Jaywalking can 
lower your social 
credit score 
ratings in China 
Source: Gautheir 
Delecroix, Flickr
lowest farmer’ would ‘not be passed 
over’.2 Legalists advised rulers to tailor 
this legal code to encourage behaviour 
that would meet the needs of the state. 
They suggested implementing a set of 
rewards and punishments (the ‘two 
handles’ of government) that would 
exploit people’s tendency to pursue 
pleasure and avoid pain. Fear, it was 
thought, was a greater motivator 
than pleasure, so punishments 
should be disproportionately harsh 
compared with the crime committed, 
and rewards benign. To enhance 
enforcement, people were grouped 
into communal units held mutually 
responsible for any crimes committed 
by any of their number.3 
The legalists paid special 
attention to ministers and officials. 
The ruler relied on his advisors 
but was vulnerable to deceit or 
even usurpation. This is where shu 
came in; it was a system of ‘names 
and tallies’ 姓名 by which to assess 
ministerial performance. The ‘name’ 
was a specific task or position and the 
‘tally’ a record of actions and results. 
If they matched, a minister would 
be rewarded and promoted; if not, 
he would be punished severely. By 
ignoring what was said and focusing 
on what was done, the ruler could no 
longer be deceived.4 
While fa and shu were ingenious 
methods of social control, they 
counted for little if the ruler could not 
enforce them. Hence the ruler must 
also have shi: effective power. Both 
fa and shu rely on the rulers’ ability 
to monitor the actions of individuals 
and dole out the appropriate rewards 
and punishments. The legalists 
thus advocated a system of mass 
surveillance to guarantee that no good 
deed went unrewarded and no bad 
deed unpunished.5 
Legalism rose to prominence 
under Qin Shi Huang, who conquered 
the Warring States and unified 
China in 221 BCE. Though the Qin 
dynasty lasted only fifteen years, the 
state bureaucracy and legal system 
it produced survived relatively 
unchanged throughout the history of 
Imperial China, despite the adoption 
of Confucianism as the official 
state ideology. 
Similarities with the Social Credit 
System
Both this legalist philosophy and the 
rationale underlying the SCSs espouse 
















































system of rewards and punishments, 
embracing the logic of self-governance 
via the ‘two handles’. Under some of 
the trial SCSs, family members and 
associates of individuals with low 
social credit scores may also find 
their own scores lowered, with all 
that entails. 
As with the legalist ideal, these 
schemes do not apply a single behav-
ioural code to every area of society. 
Rather, there are sector-specific crite-
ria. There are different sets of rules, 
rewards, and punishments for the 
healthcare sector, heavy industry, 
tourism, business, and education.6 
This mirrors the ancient system of 
‘names and tallies’.
Some commentators interpret the 
promotion of trustworthiness in these 
schemes as a Confucian measure.7 Yet 
the State Council frames it as a method 
first to ‘further perfect the socialist 
market economy system’ and then to 
build a ‘socialist harmonious society’.8 
This goal more closely matches the 
legalist ideal of building a strong and 
rich state than any Confucian ideal 
of an empire governed in accordance 
with the Way (Dao 道).
A spirit of fa and shu underlies 
the logic of the SCSs. President Xi 
Jinping makes frequent references 
to legalist writers in his speeches 
and books,9 as well as to the legalist 
notions of ‘wealth and power’ 富强 
and the ‘rule of/by law’ 法治, which 
Poster depicting the 




the Eighteenth Party Congress in 
2012 listed as Core Socialist Values 
社会主义核心价值观. The similarities 
with legalist systems of governance 
look more than coincidental. While 
the SCS is still in its experimental 
phase, it is difficult to predict its 
scope or effectiveness. However, 
the increasingly sophisticated mass 
surveillance networks and big data 
algorithms currently in development 
in tandem with them may provide 
the shi necessary to realise what 
Qin Shi Huang could not: the ideal 
system of legalist governance. Most 
people within China are not affected 
by the SCS, and many do not even 
know of its existence; among those 
who do, 80 percent approve of it.10 At 
this moment, the SCS does not weigh 
heavily on people’s lives. However, if 
the case of Luo Yonghao is any guide, 
many Chinese citizens who score 








































TWENTY YEARS AGO, a dramatic event brought the Falun Gong to 
the world’s attention. Early on Sunday 
morning, 25 April 1999, around 10,000 
practitioners of the banned religious 
group gathered to meditate in silence 
outside the northern and western 
walls of Zhongnanhai, the compound 
in which the leaders of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) live and work. 
They were protesting the detention 
of forty-five of their co-religionists 
in Tianjin the previous week 
following another, much smaller, 
demonstration. After some hours, 
and much consternation on the part 
of the officials inside Zhongnanhai, 
who had no warning that such a 
demonstration was planned, five 
designated leaders of the protest 
were allowed in to meet premier Zhu 
Rongji 朱镕基. Afterwards, all the 
demonstrators departed peacefully, 
apparently satisfied. But whatever 
assurances were given on that day 
proved empty. Only three months 
later, on 20 July, the Party-state 
launched a brutal suppression of 
Falun Gong. In October, a new law 
was passed banning Falun Gong 
and other ‘evil cults’, as the official 
translation of xiejiao 邪教 (literally, 
‘heterodox teachings’) has it.
Unsurprisingly, the twentieth 
anniversary of these events was 
not observed in Beijing, although 
groups of Falun Gong practitioners 
commemorated it in different 
‘ E V I L  C U LT S ’  A N D  









































countries around the world. 
Coincidentally, on 17 July 2019, Zhang 
Yuhua 张玉华, an adherent of Falun 
Gong who had been imprisoned in 
China, became one of twenty-seven 
‘survivors of religious persecution’ 
from around the world invited 
to the White House to meet US 
President Donald Trump. Two days 
later, a Chinese foreign ministry 
spokesman commented: 
Those the US invited to the so-
called religious meeting include 
a member of the Falun Gong cult 
and some other people who have 
been smearing China’s religious 
policy … It [the United States] 
should stop using religion as 
a pretext to interfere in other 
countries’ internal affairs.1 
Although Falun Gong is still illegal in 
China — and anyone still practising 
it there does so in secret for fear of 
certain arrest — the government is 
now more concerned about another 
of the religions that features on 
their list of ‘evil cults’. This is the 
Church of Almighty God 全能神
教会, more popularly known as 
Eastern Lightning 东方闪电. The latter 
name derives from a verse in the 
Gospel of Matthew: ‘For as lightning 
that comes from the east is visible 
even in the west, so will be the coming 
of the Son of Man.’ Followers quote 
this verse to justify their assertion that 
Jesus has returned to Earth, this time 
in the form of a Chinese woman. The 
founders of this millenarian group 
seem to have been originally affiliated 
with the Local Church of Watchman 
Nee, an evangelical group founded 
in China in the 1930s by Ni Tuosheng 
倪柝声, whom the Communists 
imprisoned for twenty years until 
his death in 1972. The Church of 
Almighty God’s primary teachings 
now derive from a new scripture, The 
Word Appears in the Flesh 或在肉身
显现, which began to be ‘revealed’ in 
1991. For China’s more mainstream 
Protestant churches, both official and 
unofficial, the beliefs of the Church 
of Almighty God are heretical. The 
government focuses on the alleged 
crimes of church members, including 
the alleged kidnapping in the early 
2000s of members of another church 
to convert them, and the murder of a 
woman in a McDonald’s restaurant in 
Zhaoyuan 招远, Shandong province, 
in 2014. The fact of the murder is not 
disputed, nor is the fact that the six 
people who committed it represented 
themselves as missionaries of 
Almighty God. What remains 
contested is whether the killers ever 
belonged to the church. Some foreign 
scholars, such as Massimo Introvigne, 
agree with the church’s position that 
the six were never members,2 while 
others, such as Australian scholar 
Emily Dunn, have concluded that the 
six had once been members but at the 
time of the murder they belonged to 
a kind of schismatic microsect who 
believed they had received their own, 
new revelations.3 Whatever the case, 
the Church of Almighty God, along 
with several other new religions that 
grew out of Protestant Christianity, 
as well as Falun Gong, remain firmly 
defined as ‘evil cults’ according 
to the Chinese government and 
continue to be subject to the full force of 
state suppression.
A more pervasive influence on 
the realm of religion in 2019 — one 
less violent and confrontational — 
is President Xi Jinping’s signature 
injunction to religions to ‘Sinicise’ 
中国化.4 Inseparable from his vision 
of China moving into a New Era, the 
policy of Sinicisation applies both 
to religions of foreign origin and to 
religions that are Chinese or have 
been present in China for millennia. 
For Christianity and Islam, this 
means adopting a ‘Chinese style’ 
of architecture, music, and other 
cultural expressions of faith as well as 
reworking their liturgies and theology 
to emphasise what is compatible 
with Chinese ideas and morality as 
defined by the Party. For Daoism 
and Buddhism — for whom an 
order to Sinicise would appear to be 
redundant — official pronouncements 










































make the direction of the policy as a 
whole very clear: religions must keep 
up with the times and be relevant 
for today’s China. How? By ‘firmly 
upholding the Party’s leadership’ 
and ‘profoundly understanding Xi 
Jinping’s thinking on socialism with 
Chinese characteristics’, and digging 
deeply into their traditions to find 
elements that bolster Xi’s Twelve Core 
Socialist Values (prosperity, demo-
cracy, civility, harmony, freedom, 
equality, justice, rule of law, 
patriotism, dedication, integrity, and 
friendship). By so doing, religions 
can thus ‘participate in the national 
rejuvenation and the fulfillment of 
the Chinese Dream’.5 
For many religious believers 
in China, as well as most scholars 
of religious studies in Chinese 
universities and think tanks, these 
prescriptions are as banal and 
doctrinaire as they may appear to 
foreign observers. Yet the weight 
of official fiat means even officially 
sanctioned religious groups and their 
leaders must discuss them, implement 
them, and report on their fulfillment 
as if they were great profundities — 
or holy writ.
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MERIDIANS OF INFLUENCE  
IN A NERVOUS WORLD
Brendan Taylor and Richard Rigby
MANY PEOPLE IN Asia and, indeed, across the world 
are growing increasingly nervous about the prospect 
of a more powerful People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
A number of analysts hold that Beijing is seeking to 
establish a traditional sphere of influence, just as 
other great powers have done throughout history. 
We argue that the ‘sphere of influence’ concept does 
not accurately explain China’s present and emerging 
strategic behaviour. For one, commentators do 
not agree on where, precisely, China is seeking to 
establish a ‘sphere of influence’. There is also little, 
if any, historical evidence of China seeking spheres 
of influence even when it has been at the height of 
its power — for example, during the Tang (618–907) 
or Qing (1644–1911) dynasties. The voyages of Zheng 
He in the early Ming dynasty, between 1405 and 
1433, could be seen as an attempt to carve out such a 
sphere, but these were both atypical and short-lived, 
so tend to prove rather than disprove the point. This 
is not to argue that China’s future will necessarily 
mirror its past. But much closer and more rigorous 
analysis needs to be undertaken, focusing on the 
question of whether Beijing is, in fact, seeking one 
or more spheres of influence — and, if so, where and 
how? And to what degree should Australia, and the 



























































What Are Spheres of Influence?
The late Australian international 
relations scholar Hedley Bull 
dated the practice of states 
establishing spheres of influence 
back to the fifteenth century.1 The 
most famous historical example 
is the so-called Monroe Doctrine 
of December 1823, wherein 
US President James Monroe 
specified that any attempt by 
a European power to extend 
its influence into the Western 
Hemisphere would be regarded 
‘as dangerous to [America’s] 
peace and safety’. What he 
meant by ‘Western Hemisphere’ encompassed the Americas (north and 
south) and their surrounding waters. At the same time, Monroe implicitly 
recognised European spheres of influence by stating: ‘In the wars of the 
European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken 
any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so.’2 Interestingly, 
however, the first recorded use of the term ‘sphere of influence’ was in 
1869, in a letter from Russian foreign minister Alexander Gorchakov to 
his British counterpart Lord Clarendon, confirming that Afghanistan lay 
outside the Russian ‘sphere of influence’.3 The concept rose to prominence 
during the Cold War period (1947–1991). And yet ‘spheres of influence’ 
remain the subject of surprisingly little scholarship.4 
In one of the few scholarly treatments produced during the Cold 
War, Bull’s protégé Paul Keal defined a sphere of influence as ‘a definite 
region within which a single, external power exerts a predominant 
influence, which limits the independence or freedom of action of states 
A 1912 newspaper cartoon highlighting the United 
States’ influence in Latin America following the 
Monroe Doctrine
Source: Wikipedia
within it’.5 Keal noted that a sphere of influence can be understood 
either formally or tacitly. He also observed that the use of military force 
within a sphere of influence is rare as the predominant powers generally 
prefer other instruments of statecraft. Keal thus argued that spheres of 
influence could potentially be stabilising, because they provide the great 
powers with guidelines or ‘rules of the road’ to follow. This was certainly 
the general pattern during the Cold War. Even during the October 1962 
Cuban Missile Crisis, when the Soviets deployed intermediate-range 
missiles to Cuba — within striking distance of the United States — Moscow 
ultimately acquiesced to American demands after recognising the 
upper limits of what Washington was willing to accept within its sphere 
of influence.
‘Spheres of influence’ fell from favour after the Cold War. Many 
people believed that great-power strategic competition would become 
a thing of the past following the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the 
rest of the world coming to accept the overwhelming dominance of 
the sole remaining superpower, the United States, and playing within 
the rules it set. Over the past decade, however, the term has returned 
to prominence. After Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 
early 2014, German Chancellor Angela Merkel commented that this was 
‘a conflict about spheres of influence and territorial claims of the kind 
we know from the 19th and 20th century [that] we thought we had put 
behind us’.6 The US national security strategy of December 2017 used 
similar language, charging Russia with attempting ‘to restore its great 
power status and establish spheres of influence near its borders’.7 
A Chinese Sphere of Influence?
In one of the only post–Cold War references to the concept before the 
Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, the American political 



























































divided into distinct Chinese and American spheres of influence. The 
Chinese sphere would encompass continental East Asia, including North 
Korea, the Russian border states (such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan), and mainland South-East Asia (namely, Cambodia, Myanmar, 
Thailand, and Vietnam). The US sphere would extend over maritime East 
Asia, encompassing Japan, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.
Like Keal, Ross optimistically predicted that this would be a 
stabilising arrangement. Because these spheres would be separated by 
water, Ross maintained, military intervention by one power in its own 
sphere would not threaten the interests of the other power.8 
There is now considerable divergence of opinion even among 
analysts who think China is seeking to establish a sphere or spheres 
of influence as to where precisely its (or their) limits are. Denny Roy, 
a senior research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies 
in Hawai‘i, for instance, argues that China’s irredentist claims — 
history-based claims over territory such as the disputed islands in the 
South China Sea — illuminate the boundaries of its aspirational sphere 
of influence. 
Unlike Ross, Roy views this Chinese sphere as having both continental 
and maritime dimensions. He sees the disputed land and maritime 
territories along China’s east coast forming 
a seamless geographic region beginning with the Yellow Sea in the 
north and continuing southward through the East China Sea, Taiwan 
and the Taiwan Strait, and the upper and lower halves of the South 
China Sea.9 
The Australian academic Hugh White offers another perspective, seeing 
the emerging contest for Asian supremacy as one between China and 
India. White believes the United States will ultimately vacate the region, 
resulting in this new bipolarity. New Delhi will rapidly realise, according 
to White, that it has no hope of dominating the Western Pacific and Beijing 
will come to the view that any attempt to establish supremacy in the 
Indian Ocean would be equally futile. White argues that Asia will thus 
divide into ‘two separate spheres of influence, with China dominating East 
Asia and the Western Pacific, and India dominating South Asia and the 
Indian Ocean’.10 
Other analysts argue that Beijing’s forays into the Western Pacific 
— namely, in the South and East China seas — are largely designed to 
distract from its primary interest in establishing a sphere of influence 
in Central Asia. Victoria University’s Van Jackson, for instance, contends: 
Asia’s most extensive sphere of influence involves the rarely discussed 
border areas surrounding China … Especially with smaller neighbours 
who are structurally dependent on Chinese economic ties — including 
Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.11
Nadège Rolland of the American National Bureau of Asian Research 
concurs. She regards burgeoning Sino-Russian collaboration as temporary, 
maintaining that it will eventually give way to Chinese dominance. In 
Rolland’s words: 
Russia is presumed to be bitter and resentful of China’s rising economic, 
political and military capabilities, and its increased presence in areas 
that Moscow still covets as its exclusive sphere of influence. 
In the long run, she argues: ‘Russia will become a toothless former 
superpower, surrendering the stage for Beijing to fully assert its own 
influence over Eurasia.’12 
Yet another interpretation sees China seeking a sphere of influence 
further afield, in South-East Asia or even the South Pacific. Paul Dibb 
of The Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre contends that ‘Southeast Asia is likely to be a focus of Chinese 



























































Chinese hegemony and a sphere of influence’.13 Some commentators have 
also alluded to the possibility of growing Chinese power encroaching on 
Australia’s sphere of influence in the South Pacific — typically defined 
as the areas to the north and north-east of Australia, from Papua New 
Guinea and Solomon Islands to Vanuatu and Fiji. Writing in July 2019, 
White posed the question: ‘What can Australia do, then, to restore and 
preserve our sphere of influence in the South Pacific, and deny it to 
China?’14 
China rejects any suggestion it is seeking spheres of influence in the 
South Pacific or elsewhere. In May 2019, the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
issued a statement paraphrasing a speech given by President Xi Jinping 
during a visit to Beijing by Vanuatu’s Prime Minister: ‘We have no private 
interests in island countries, and do not seek a so-called “sphere of 
influence”.’15 The following month, addressing the Shangri-La Dialogue, 
Chinese Defence Minister Wei Fenghe 魏凤和 asserted that ‘in the future, 
no matter how strong it becomes, China shall never threaten anyone or 
establish spheres of influence’.16 
What is to be made of these competing interpretations of China’s 
actions and intentions? It could be that the application of this concept to 
the Chinese case is simply inappropriate.
Chinese Defence 
Minister Wei Fenghe 




The American scholar David C. Kang, author of the article ‘Getting 
Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks’, published in 
International Security, cautions against applying concepts of predominantly 
European origin to an Asian setting. He has long been sceptical that Asia 
— with its unique and highly diverse histories, cultures, economies, 
and demographics — can be considered an entity similar to Europe, for 
example. He believes that new and different analytical frameworks are 
needed for Asia. In his words: 
This is not to criticize European-derived theories purely because they 
are based on the Western experience: The origins of a theory are not 
necessarily relevant to its applicability. Rather these theories do a 
poor job as they are applied to Asia.17 
There are certainly some historical precedents from the Chinese 
experience that suggest that the term ‘sphere of influence’ may not be 
entirely inappropriate. Some might argue, for instance, that the traditional 
Chinese vision of world order known as ‘Tianxia’ 天下 or ‘All-Under-
Heaven’ is analogous to a sphere of influence. Tianxia dates back to the 
Zhou 周 period (1046–221 BCE) and is a conceptual model for a world order 
based on the family. It is inclusive of all peoples, living in harmony with an 
absence of hegemony; it represents, in that respect, the very antithesis of 
the idea of predominance that lies at the heart of the spheres of influence 
concept.18 But it is really more of a worldview than a practice of statecraft.
The Chinese tributary system arguably makes for a better analogy. 
The tribute system, which guided early modern East Asian international 
relations, was hierarchical in nature. Neighbouring states were required 
to recognise Imperial China’s dominance. In return, China showed 
restraint towards its neighbours and would even provide them material 



























































required acknowledgement of 
China’s cultural superiority. Rank 
in the hierarchy was determined 
by a state’s cultural similarity 
to China. There was little, if 
any, attempt to achieve political 
dominance over these states, 
however, which were largely 
given a free hand to run their own 
domestic and foreign policies as 
long as they did not go directly 
against China’s interests.19 This, 
once again, stands in contrast 
to the lack of independence and 
freedom of action experienced 
by subservient states within a 
traditional sphere of influence.
China’s historical experience with foreign spheres of influence was 
extremely negative. In China, the concept is most commonly associated 
with the ‘century of humiliation’, which started with the Opium Wars 
(1839–1860) and culminated in the Sino-Japanese War (the Japanese 
invasion and occupation) of 1937–1945. During this period, China was 
essentially carved up by Europe’s major powers and East Asia’s rising 
one into spheres of influence in the context of their larger contest for 
supremacy. Central to his signature China Dream is President Xi’s pledge 
to make the country so wealthy and powerful that it will never again be 
subject to such treatment. According to official Chinese pronouncements 
such as those quoted above, however, this will not include creating 
‘spheres of influence’ as such.
It could be more useful to look at the term that the Party-state under Xi 
favours when it talks about coalition building: the ‘community of shared 
destiny’ (see the China Story Yearbook 2014: Shared Destiny, Chapter 2 
‘The World is For All’: Calligraphy by Sun Yat-sen, 1924
Source: Wikimedia Commons
‘Whose Shared Destiny?, pp.59–73) — or, as it is now generally referred 
to, a ‘community of shared future for mankind’. Foreign Minister Wang 
Yi explains: 
As China enters the critical stage of the great national renewal, its future 
and destiny are ever more closely connected with that of the world. 
As part of advocating and advancing the building of a community of 
shared future for mankind, China will promote the interests of its own 
people in conjunction with the common interests of people all over 
the world and pursue the Chinese dream in the course of attaining 
the dream of the whole world, thus adding a more profound global 
significance to the great renewal of the Chinese nation. 
The slogan embodies a vision of China as a ‘responsible major country’, 
synergising its ‘development with the common development of the world’. 
According to Wang, in promoting 
a shared future for mankind, China encourages all countries to coexist 
peacefully, engage in sound interaction and seek win-win cooperation. 
This in turn will create a favorable environment for the great renewal 
of the Chinese nation.20
Moving the Needle
Whatever the true ambitions of the Party-state under Xi, China’s ability 
to establish a sphere of influence — by whatever name — across the 
entire Asian region is limited and will likely remain so. The presence of 
other major powers in this part of the world — the United States, India, 
and Japan — will prevent this from happening. It is true that China may 
ultimately become stronger than any of these countries. But it remains 
hard to imagine a situation where it develops the ability to significantly 



























































Beyond the major powers, recent polling conducted by the Pew 
Research Center shows that unfavourable views of China have increased 
across the Asia-Pacific, with resistance to even seemingly anodyne goals 
such as the ‘community of shared destiny’ making them harder for Beijing 
to achieve.21 Consistent with these findings, the Lowy Institute’s 2019 poll 
of Australian attitudes towards the world found that only 32 percent of 
respondents said they trusted China. This was a 20 percent drop from 
the previous year and the lowest result since the poll commenced 
in 2005.22 Beijing may have better luck in Central Asia, but that will 
depend on whether Moscow is willing to tolerate (or able to prevent) 
Chinese encroachment into what it regards as its own traditional sphere 
of influence.
In the longer term, a Chinese sphere of influence in the South China 
Sea is also conceivable. To be sure, much has been made of China’s building 
and militarisation of artificial islands here. But the South China Sea covers 
some 3.7 million square kilometres. Notwithstanding the impressive 
gains China’s military has made since its second modernisation drive in 
the 1990s (the first being the one prompted by Deng Xiaoping as part of 
the Four Modernisations in 1977), it is an exercise that reflects Chinese 
weakness as much as strength. The primary rationale for these islands 
was to compensate for China’s shortcomings relative to the United States 
when it came to aircraft carriers — the sine qua non of military power 
projection — even if some commentators now question the continued 
utility of these platforms in a world of more powerful and accurate anti-
shipping missiles.23 
Most improbable of all is the prospect of China developing a sphere 
of influence in the South Pacific, although it may establish a military base 
here. Rumours circulated in April 2018 that Beijing was in discussions 
with Vanuatu regarding this very prospect — speculation that was swiftly 
quashed by Port Vila.24 But the South Pacific is a long way from China 
and, in particular, from the focus of the Belt and Road Initiative. Power 
projection would be even more challenging for Beijing here than in the 
South China Sea, especially during periods of conflict. The South Pacific’s 
strategic importance to Beijing is less than that of the South China Sea and 
the Indian Ocean, where access to sea lanes is critical. Rather, Beijing’s 
interests in the South Pacific relate to this region’s resource potential 
— including in fisheries, timber, minerals, gold, nickel, and liquified 
natural gas — and, with an estimated 20,000 Chinese nationals living in 
the region, the ability to evacuate them should there be a crisis.25 
This is good news for Australia. On grounds of likelihood and 
proximity, the spectre of a South-East Asian sphere of influence is one 
that Australian policymakers will be watching more closely. But even 
this is far from a foregone conclusion given the tensions in the South 
China Sea, which continued to simmer along in 2019, with Vietnam 





























































even banning the American-Chinese co-produced children’s animation 
Abominable over a scene displaying China’s contentious Nine-Dash Line 
map claiming sovereignty over mutually disputed islands.26
Acupuncture Diplomacy
Rather than seeking any kind of traditional sphere of influence in the 
historical European sense of the term, it is worth considering whether 
Beijing might, instead, be engaging in the longstanding Chinese practice of 
what we suggest calling ‘acupuncture diplomacy’. The traditional Chinese 
medicinal technique involves probing specific ‘acupuncture points’ with 
a fine needle to gauge the reaction and make fine adjustments to the flow 
of qi, the vital essence or energy that flows across the body’s meridians, 
or pathways, freeing blockages, calming it where appropriate, and 
strengthening it where that is judged to be what is needed. In the case 
of acupuncture diplomacy, offers of loans, infrastructure building, aid, 
Does ‘acupuncture diplo-
macy’ better account for 
China’s present and emerg-
ing strategic behaviour?
Source: Pscheirer, Flickr
invitations, or scholarships might be just what are needed to get blocked 
relations flowing again. Solomon Islands politicians, for example, were 
allegedly offered hundreds of thousands of dollars to cut ties with Taiwan 
and to formally re-establish relations with the mainland in September 
2019.27 In the final analysis, this idea of ‘acupuncture diplomacy’ may 





































PROJECTING THE DREAM 
Dreams in Space 
·  ADAM NI 
Antarctic Ambitions: Cold Power 

















































































ON 3 JANUARY 2019, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) made 
history by becoming the first country 
to land a spacecraft on the far side of 
the Moon.1 The China National Space 
Administration hailed the successful 
landing of the Chang’e 4 probe as 
the opening of ‘a new chapter in 
humanity’s exploration of the Moon’. 
Indeed, beyond this momentous 
achievement, China’s great leap 
forward in space technology and 
activities in recent years is closing the 
gap between China and the established 
space powers.
Driven by national pride and the 
pursuit of international prestige, as 
well as technological and economic 
imperatives, terrestrial strategic 
interests, and national security 
considerations, China is investing 
billions in its space program. It spent 
about US$8.4 billion in 2017 alone 
— almost three times as much as 
Russia, although still less than the 
United States, which spent US$14 
billion. According to the 2016 white 
paper on space activities released 
by the State Council Information 
Office, China’s space program aims 
‘to provide strong support for the 
realisation of the Chinese Dream of 
the renewal of the Chinese nation’.2 
In the words of President Xi Jinping, 
‘the space dream is part of the dream 
to make China stronger’.3
China’s space dream is highly 
ambitious, with orbital, lunar, and 
deep-space activities planned for the 
next two decades. Closer to Earth, 
China is sending up satellites at a rapid 
rate to build satellite constellations 
for navigation and global positioning, 
communications, observation, remote 



































exploration missions to Mars, Jupiter, 
and asteroids from the early 2020s.8
China’s lofty space dream is 
backed by political endorsement from 
the top, sustained and substantial 
financial investment by the state, and 
policies that aim to foster a vibrant 
space industry. Since China’s opening 
of the space sector to private companies 
in 2014, the number of Chinese space 
start-ups has ballooned to more than 
one hundred.9 In July 2019, a four-
stage small commercial carrier rocket 
developed by the Beijing-based rocket 
developer iSpace achieved the first 
successful orbital launch by a private 
Chinese firm.10 If China is to become 
a top space power, private innovation 
will likely play an increasingly 
important role in complementing 
state-backed programs.
sensing, and imagery.4 In 2019, China 
conducted around 30 orbital launches 
— more than any other country.5 At 
the level of near-Earth orbit, just as 
the International Space Station — 
which is funded mainly by the United 
States, Russia, and the European Union 
— is facing funding uncertainties 
that could see it decommissioned by 
2025, China is looking to launch its 
own space station, with construction 
scheduled to finish in 2022.6 It will 
welcome international astronauts and 
spacecraft, too, so long as the latter 
are equipped with a Chinese docking 
mechanism. Looking to the Moon, 
China plans to send four more probes 
to explore the lunar surface before 
embarking on a crewed lunar landing 
mission and possibly the construction 
of a lunar outpost in the 2030s.7 Plans 
are also under way for deep space 
China is the first 
country to land a 
spacecraft on the far 
side of the Moon
Source: NASA/JPL/USGS
Until now, China’s space ambitions 
have been carefully couched in a 
narrative that centres on expressions 
such as the ‘exploration and utilisation 
of outer space for peaceful purposes’ 
and ‘multilateral cooperation’.11 
This is not surprising. China’s rapid 
advances in space worry some in the 
international community, including 
the administrator of the US National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), Jim Bridenstine, who in 
September 2019 described China’s 
activities in space as ‘aggressive’.12 
Regardless of whether one agrees with 
such characterisation, what is certain 
is that Beijing’s pursuit of space power 
is intimately connected to its growing 
terrestrial footprint and interests — in 
other words, to geopolitics. 
Beijing will certainly gain 
political influence through some 
China-led space initiatives, such as 
the Belt and  Road Initiative Space 
Information Corridor, the launch of a 
remote-sensing satellite constellation 
for the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, and South Africa) and 
the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation 
Organization Joint Small Multi-Mission 
Satellite Constellation Program.13 It 
is also cooperating bilaterally with 
countries including France and Italy 
on satellites to monitor such things 
as climate change and earthquake 
activity. These initiatives will tie 
participating countries tighter into 
China’s own orbit, both on Earth 
and beyond.
Beijing is keenly aware of the 
importance of space to national 
security. According to China’s 2019 
defence white paper, ‘space is a critical 
domain in international strategic 
competition [that] provides strategic 
assurance for national and social 
development’.14  China’s military has 
prioritised the development of space 
capabilities to support its expanding 
military footprint on Earth as well as 
to counter potential adversaries in 
space. At the end of 2015, the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) established 
the Strategic Support Force (SSF) 战
略支援部队. It consolidates military 
space and cyber warfare capabilities 
across the PLA to facilitate integrated 
operations.15 Its creation highlights 
the importance of the new ‘strategic 
frontiers’ 战略边疆 of space and 
cyberspace for China’s hard power as 
well as its broader strategic interests, 
including economic growth and 
technological development.16 
Beijing is also eyeing off 


































including the exploitation of resources. 
The Moon, for example, hosts large 
quantities of rare-earth elements 
and helium-3 — a rare element that 
can be used in nuclear fusion.17 
China reportedly aims to establish 
a ‘space economic zone’ in ‘cislunar 
space’ (inside the Moon’s orbit) 
by mid-century, with a staggering 
estimated yearly economic output of 
US$10 trillion.18
Beijing’s space ambitions may 
have a sovereign aspect to them 
as well. In the words of Ye Peijian 
叶培建, the head of China’s lunar 
exploration program: 
[T]he universe is an ocean, the 
Moon is the Diaoyu Islands and 
Mars is Scarborough Shoal. If we 
don’t go there now when we can, 
our children would blame us. If 
others go there and take over, 
then [we] wouldn’t be able to go. 
That is reason enough.19 
The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are 
claimed by both China and Japan, 
while the Scarborough Shoal is 
claimed by China, Taiwan, and the 
Philippines. China’s approach to these 
and other territorial disputes on Earth 
China is sending up satellites into space at a rapid rate 
Source: European Space Agency
raises questions about how it will 
conduct itself in space with respect to 
the global commons. This is uncharted 
territory.
China’s rapid rise as a major 
space power and its grand ambitions 
in space are intimately tied to 
terrestrial geopolitics. A key question 
is whether China will ultimately tilt 
towards collaboration or competition 
in space. Some observers think a 
confrontational space race is already 
under way between China and the 
United States.20 Following China’s lunar 
success, the United States announced 
that it would speed up its own plan 
to return to the Moon, by 2024. In 
a speech in March 2019, US Vice-
President Mike Pence said: ‘Make 
no mistake about it: we’re in a space 
race today, just as we were in the 
1960s [with the Soviet Union], and the 
stakes are even higher.’ He called on 
NASA to meet the challenge with ‘new 
urgency’ and focus.21 In the words of 
Bridenstine: ‘Some people call space 
— China specifically — the American 
Achilles’ heel.’22 
As the country once known as the 
Celestial Empire reaches for the stars, 
lines from a 1965 poem by Mao Zedong 
come to mind:
We can clasp the moon in the 
Ninth Heaven
And seize turtles deep down in 
the Five Seas:
We’ll return amid triumphant 
song and laughter.
Nothing is hard in this world

































































































ANTARTICA’S DOME A, 4,000 metres above sea level and 
near the centre of East Antarctica, is 
one of the best places on Earth from 
which to observe space. The Antarctic 
convention is that, when more than 
one country has a scientific interest in 
an area of the continent, such as Dome 
A, that country may suggest a ‘code 
of conduct’; if accepted, that country 
manages the area’s use. At the annual 
summit of nations with a presence in 
Antarctica, held in late July 2019 in the 
Czech Republic, the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) proposed a code of 
conduct for Dome A. The Australian 
government, which claims sovereignty 
over forty-two percent of the Earth’s 
southernmost continent, firmly 
rejected the proposal.1
Scientists maintain that 
Antarctica holds large reserves 
of natural resources. It is also 
strategically located for military 
and space operations. Although the 
landmass is covered in ice, several 
countries including Australia and 
China maintain both seasonal and 
permanent stations in the region.2 
Australia’s sovereignty claim is 
historical. Between 1911 and 1914, a 
group of Australians led by Sir Douglas 
Mawson undertook the country’s first 
expedition to the Antarctic aboard the 
wooden ship, SY Aurora.3 However, 
Australia’s territorial claims in the 
A N TA R C T I C  A M B I T I O N S : 
CO L D  P O W E R


















































Antarctic date back to 1841, when the 
British government claimed ‘Enderby 
Land’ in the north-east of the continent. 
The British government formally 
transferred the territory to Australia 
in 1933.4 
Beijing’s proposed code of conduct 
is part of several Chinese activities in 
Antarctica that have raised questions 
about its intentions.5 In 2016, with 
China’s presence in the region on 
the rise and growing concern that 
Beijing intends to challenge legal 
and operational norms there, the 
Australian government proposed a 
policy to protect and maintain the 
status quo.6 
China’s interest in the Antarctic is 
not new, however. In 1977, the Chinese 
government requested permission for 
Chinese scientists to take part in an 
Australian Antarctic expedition; two 
participated in Australia’s 1979–1980 
annual austral-summer Antarctic 
expedition.7 In 1981, Australia invited 
five Chinese scientists ‘in the hope that, 
through this assistance, [Australia] 
could influence China’s future policies 
on Antarctica in Australia’s favour’.8 
The Chinese government, working 
cooperatively with the Australian 
government, built its second Antarctic 
base in 1989 on Australian Antarctic 
Territory. By 2019, China had five 
bases there, including the Kunlun 
base, built in 2009, on Dome A. 
Since establishing its first base in 
1985, China has become a leading polar 
player and the nation with the biggest 
national investment on the continent.9 
Beijing’s large-scale investment in the 
region has raised concerns that, in 
the long term, Beijing will challenge 
existing territorial claims, develop 
bases in strategic locations, block 
freedom of operations in the region, 
and engage in resource exploitation 
contrary to the existing Antarctic 
Treaty System (ATS).10 
The ATS is the continent’s 
system of governance. Member 
nations of (or parties to) the ATS 
meet annually to discuss pressing 
issues. Only consultative parties that 
have demonstrated their interest in 
Antarctica by ‘conducting substantial 
research activity there’ may take part 
in decision-making processes.11 The ATS 
consists of the Antarctic Treaty, which 
was enacted in 1959 and came into 
force two years later, and the Madrid 
Protocol, which was enacted in 1991 
and came into force in 1998; Australia 
is an original signatory to both. China 
ratified the Antarctic Treaty in 1983 and 
gained consultative status with voting 
rights in 1985. It is also a signatory to the 
Madrid Protocol.12
Scholars have warned that 
the ATS is too weak to regulate the 
ambitions of Beijing (and Russia) or 
to guarantee the long-term interests 
of Australia and other claimant 
states. ANU Antarctic expert Elizabeth 
Buchanan, writing in The Strategist in 
September 2019, argues: 
The Antarctic Treaty System 
worked well in the 1960s, when 
nuclear weapons were seen as 
the key to global security. But 
this Cold War peace agreement 
is inadequate to respond to the 
security challenges of the 2020s.13 
She and other observers suggest 
that the strategic importance of the 
Antarctic region to China’s military 
and global political ambitions will 
likely outweigh Beijing’s deference to 
the ATS.14 Arguing that the ATS is less a 
‘long-term fix’ and more of ‘a stop-gap 
solution to the issue of who owns the 
continent’, Buchanan notes that Cold 
War fears of a ‘red continent’ have 
materialised, with China ‘the emerging 
heavyweight there’ (and notably, an 
active Russian presence as well).
Another point of concern over 
the viability of the ATS, through which 
territorial claims in the Antarctic are 
managed, is whether China may start 
to challenge existing claims or make 
its own. There are currently seven 
claimants to the continent: Australia, 
Argentina, Chile, France, Norway, New 
Zealand, and the United Kingdom. 
Marie Byrd Land in West Antarctica is 
unclaimed, while only New Zealand, the 
SY Aurora on the 
Douglas Mawson 
Antarctic expedition
Source: Frank Hurley, 



















































United Kingdom, France, and Norway 
recognise Australian sovereignty 
in Antarctica.
New Zealand scholar Anne-Marie 
Brady, author of China as a Polar Great 
Power, has pointed out that, while the 
ATS currently prevents new claims, 
from 2049, the treaty system will be 
open for modification or amendment, 
which may pave the way for Beijing to 
challenge the status quo.15 
In contrast, legal scholar Nengye 
Liu of Adelaide University argues there 
are enough safeguards within the ATS 
to prevent China from undermining 
the current system: ‘The Chinese 
Government is in persistent support of 
the purposes and gist of the Antarctic 
Treaty, and has been committed to 
safeguarding the stability of the ATS.’16 
Liu notes that 
although the Antarctic Treaty 
may be modified or amended at 
any time, unanimous agreement 
of the contracting parties must be 
achieved to do so. It is a mission 
impossible for China to persuade 
all other consultative parties 
so as to amend the Article IV to 
facilitate any potential claim.17 
Liu warns of the dangers of 
exaggerating the threat posed by 
China to Australia’s interests. Yet the 
Australian government has begun to 
take a tougher approach to China’s 
presence in the region, announcing 
the Australian Antarctic Strategy and 
20 Year Action Plan at the end of 2018, 
which will assert Australia’s interests 






The strategy encompasses the 
maintenance of freedom of navigation 
in the Antarctic, the preservation 
of Australian sovereignty over its 
territorial claims, support for ‘a strong 
and effective Antarctic Treaty system’, 
and increased funding for ‘world-class 
scientific research consistent with its 
national priorities’.19 
China’s growing presence in the 
Antarctic is likely to continue to raise 
concerns about its intentions and its 
effects on the existing legal framework 
and territorial claims, particularly 
if relations between Beijing and 
Canberra continue to deteriorate. It 
may not be Cold War II just yet, but 
‘cold power’ games in Antarctica are 
well and truly under way.
However, within this hypersensitive 
milieu, Beijing’s capacity to undermine 
the ATS may be overestimated. While it 
may be too early to understand Beijing’s 
true intentions in the Antarctic, Australia 
and other countries seem poised to 




































































THE TECHNOLOGY SECURITY DILEMMA
Darren J. Lim and Victor Ferguson
WHEN PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP took to 
Twitter in August 2019 and ‘hereby ordered’ 
American companies to look for an alternative 
to manufacturing in the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), many scoffed at what seemed like a 
ham-fisted and unenforceable (and thus typically 
Trumpian) salvo in the US–China trade war. 
Reports the following month, however, indicated 
that the White House was considering delisting 
Chinese companies from US stock exchanges. 
The US Commerce Department, citing human 
rights concerns, but with broader strategic 
considerations also in mind, announced it would 
be placing an additional twenty-eight Chinese 
organisations — including firms specialising 
in emerging technologies such as artificial 
intelligence (AI), voice recognition, and data 
analytics — on a blacklist, effectively prohibiting 
them from purchasing US components. If 2018 was 
the year when the world recognised that China 
had risen as a major technological innovator, in 
2019, we learned how the United States intends 



































































This was the year the concept of ‘decoupling’ graduated from being 
an academic talking point to a real-world dimension of the bilateral 
relationship.1 Decoupling refers to the process by which the deep 
economic interdependence binding the United States and China over the 
past four decades would be unwound, especially (but not exclusively) 
in high-tech industries. While senior figures in Beijing downplay this 
prospect as unrealistic,2 a growing number of Chinese academics warn 
that it is ‘completely possible’3 and some national security experts in the 
United States declare it ‘inevitable’.4 Many global business leaders appear 
to share the last expectation.5 In the short to medium term, technological 
decoupling would impose real costs on both economies, not to mention the 
collateral damage to the existing supply chains of their trading partners 
across the world. In the longer term and taken to the extreme, decoupling 
could result in a bifurcation of the global economy, with other states facing 
a binary choice between US-centred and Chinese-centred alternatives 
for a growing number of high-tech ecosystems, for the end-use products 
themselves, as well as the education, research and development (R&D) 
processes, and supply chains that lie behind them.
At its essence, the decoupling concept falls into the category of policy 




— flows of goods, capital, people and/or ideas, and information — in 
the name of other national interests. Invoking a concept developed by 
security studies scholarship during the Cold War, we argue that China 
and the United States are caught in a ‘technology security dilemma’, in 
which mutual insecurity is driving efforts to decouple on both sides, and 
that such a trend, despite the economic sacrifices it entails, is likely to 
persist over the longer term.
Sources of Insecurity 
For the United States, decoupling is a consequence of what Washington 
labels China’s ‘economic aggression’. The Trump White House cites a 
broad range of acts undertaken by Chinese commercial actors as well 
as official economic policies that it claims pose a fundamental threat 
to US national security and broader economic interests. These include 
intellectual property theft via industrial espionage or forced technology 
transfer, extensive state subsidies and other forms of assistance to support 
‘national champions’ in the technology space under Beijing’s Made in 
China 2025 (MIC 2025) initiative, and discriminatory licensing restrictions 
imposed on foreign firms operating in China. Cumulatively, the argument 
goes, these actions provide Chinese technology companies with an unfair 
advantage, while also harming the national security of the United States.
In its 2017 national security statement, the White House claimed 
that ‘economic security is national security’.6 Linking economic activity 
with national security is not new; during the Cold War, for example, 
the United States used export controls to limit the military capabilities 
of the Soviet Union.7 What is new is the extensive scope of technology 
related economic activities deemed to affect national security. It is 
undeniable that many new technologies designed for consumers can 
have military applications. The interconnected and technology-driven 

































































vulnerable to the hacking of critical infrastructure, cyber espionage, 
and political interference, through the manipulation of social media, 
for example. The link between economics and security is further 
strengthened by the belief that the national security of a leading power 
will be eroded if it falls behind in technological innovation vis-á-vis a 
strategic rival, or otherwise loses competitiveness or market share in 
high-tech industries.8 
Washington has responded with a broad range of measures to 
limit or otherwise manage exchange between the two economies. It has 
introduced tariffs targeting a broad range of Chinese products including 
industrial technology targeted in MIC 2025. It has tightened restrictions 
on inward investment and broadened the scope of the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to review and block 
Chinese investment targeting ‘critical technology’ and introduced new 
controls on the export of ‘emerging and foundational technologies’. 
More controversially, Washington has targeted Huawei, ZTE, and other 
Chinese technology companies, ostensibly for sanction violations and 
human rights concerns, and indicted a range of Chinese nationals 
and firms on allegations of industrial espionage.9 With the possible 
exception of some tariffs, these measures do not appear to be anomalous 
manifestations of Trumpism. There is broad bipartisan consensus in 
Washington for action to address the perceived Chinese threat to US 
technology leadership.10
Beijing, on the other hand, argues that such national security 
concerns are overblown, misguided, or made in bad faith. The Chinese 
government believes that Washington’s policy responses are not 
defensive but part of a broader containment strategy designed to slow 
or stop China’s economic development and rightful rise as a science and 
technology leader. Many in Chinese academic circles share these views.11 
By seeking to limit China’s technological advancement, Washington has 
exacerbated Beijing’s perceptions of insecurity.  
The Internet: Where Decoupling is Already 
a Reality
Former Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd has pointed out that 
decoupling has already occurred online between the two major powers 
as a consequence of the differences in their political systems.12 China’s 
construction of the ‘Great Firewall’ and restrictions on content effectively 
block the inward flow of politically ‘sensitive’ information and ideas 
from the outside world. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views a free 
and open Internet as incompatible with its Leninist Party-state model 
of authoritarian governance, and potentially a direct threat to its own 
legitimacy. For China, controlling the Internet is fundamental to national 
security and public order. This outweighs any potential economic benefits 
that might be reaped from allowing the likes of Facebook, Google, or The 
New York Times to offer products to Chinese consumers. 
Internet regulation illustrates how the Chinese government broadly 
construes the concept of national security. Anything that undermines 
the authority or control of the CCP potentially justifies government 
intervention, even if the economic costs are high. To the extent that the 
Chinese government enjoys the support of its vast population, this is at 
least partly due to the country’s economic performance.13 To continue 
on its successful trajectory and achieve the Party’s ‘two centenary goals’ 
of becoming a ‘moderately well-off society’ by 2021 and a ‘completely 
developed country’ by 2049,14 the Chinese economy must develop or 
acquire the latest technology.15 The government is therefore extremely 
sensitive to various kinds of economic disruptions that go beyond more 
traditional security concerns such as energy security or food security. 
Thus, measures from Washington that constrain China’s technology 
sector only provide greater incentive for Beijing to strengthen many of 

































































Conceptualising the Technology Security  
Dilemma
A ‘security dilemma’ describes a dynamic in which actions taken by one 
actor to increase its own security are perceived to have the zero-sum 
impact of reducing the security of another actor.17 For example, I buy 
a gun to defend myself. My neighbour, unsure of my intentions, buys a 
weapon herself, in turn feeding my own insecurity. A rich vein of security 
studies scholarship posits that, in the anarchic international system, even 
non-aggressive actions by one state seeking to bolster its security can 
be perceived by another as decreasing its own. Given the absence of a 
global sovereign to police and enforce rules, states must guard their own 
security and question the present and future intentions of others.18 Under 
these conditions, relations between two states with peaceful objectives 
can descend into a spiral of mutual suspicion, mistrust, arms races, and 
even war. 
The concept of ‘security’ in the traditional dilemma focuses on military 
power — defence against physical attack and limiting the possibility of 
domination by coercive military force. Yet the events of 2019 remind us 
that national security can mean much more, especially to the United States 
and China, which are now engaged in what we call a bilateral ‘technology 
security dilemma’. Each side is taking measures in the technology domain 
that it deems necessary and legitimate to safeguard its national security, 
triggering a spiral of tit-for-tat reactions fuelled by mutual insecurity. 
Below, we offer two examples of these dynamics.
The first is in semiconductor trade.19 Despite vigorous efforts to bolster 
its semiconductor industry over recent decades, China’s manufacturing 
sector remains heavily reliant on advanced chips from the United 
States and other developed markets, importing approximately ninety 
percent of its needs annually.20 In a bid to end that dependence, China 
has employed a raft of measures, including three that sit at the heart of 
US concerns about ‘economic aggression’: industrial policies, including 
multibillion-dollar funds 
for the development of 
integrated circuits; foreign 
acquisitions; and, allegedly, 
industrial espionage.21 The 
US government perceives 
all three of these activities 
as threats to its national 
security. The United 
States objects to the first 
two because of potential 
military applications and 
because it fears ceding 
technology leadership to 
a peer competitor. As for 
the third, the United States perceives such theft as being at odds with 
global rules, damaging to its own ability to control and profit from 
American technological innovation and, for some technologies, a direct 
security concern. 
As noted above, the United States has responded by blocking 
acquisitions, issuing indictments, and banning US companies from 
trading with Chinese chipmakers, including ZTE (in April 2018) 
and Huawei (in July 2019). The Trump administration has wound 
back or delayed some of these measures, but they continue to have 
serious impacts on companies such as ZTE, which some claim 
would have folded had Trump not lifted his three-month ban on 
the company in July 2018.22 Huawei’s future remains unclear, and 
other firms are reeling,23 though patriotic consumers in China are 
reportedly ditching their iPhones for Huawei smartphones.24  But 
the sanctions are not having the intended effect. Rather than reining 
in the behaviour that Washington deems threatening, the Chinese 
government has doubled down on its quest for self-sufficiency.25 This, 


































































in turn, reignites US concerns, exemplifying the spiral dynamics of a 
security dilemma.
A second example of the technology security dilemma arises from 
the links between the Chinese state and China’s key technology firms. Part 
of China’s growth strategy is to build and support ‘national champions’, 
encouraging them to ‘go out’ and compete in international markets. 
Such state support — which can take the form of subsidies, loans, and 
cheap finance — is a central pillar of MIC 2025.26 Huawei is the perfect 
example of a national champion. Though Huawei is privately owned, 
state support has helped it grow to become a global industry leader in 
5G and telecommunications infrastructure.27 But influence over such 
companies that the state exercises in return raises the prospect that 
Beijing could direct a company such as Huawei to do its bidding — for 
example, by using its technical capabilities to spy on targeted foreign 
actors or entities.28 The close links between Chinese technology firms 
and the state, and indeed the possibility that national champions with 
global operations might one day become Trojan horses for surveillance 
and interference, have generated national security concerns for the 
United States and allies such as Australia, explaining their reluctance to 
allow Huawei to run their 5G networks.29 
Some Western commentators have described measures to deny 
Chinese technology firms market access as efforts to ‘cripple’ or ‘crush’ 
them.30 As with semiconductors, China’s response has largely been to 
boost its support for national champions — reasserting the central 
role of the state in the economy, consolidating state-owned and private 
enterprises in strategic areas,31 and further supporting leading firms 
in a range of technology sectors, from 5G to artificial intelligence to 
semiconductors.32 As the connections between the state and Chinese tech 
firms increase, so do security fears among Washington and its allies.
These dynamics present daunting challenges for policymakers. The 
literature that deals with military security dilemmas suggests that, if 
the competing states want to break the cycle, they need to reassure each 
other about their own non-aggressive intentions.33 The challenge is to 
apply these insights to the technology sphere. What, for example, is the 
analogue of an arms control agreement in the trade and investment 
space as it relates to the development and use of new technologies? How 
can each side be made to feel more secure in this issue area?
Pathways to Reassurance
Both Washington and Beijing need to understand the reasons for the 
other side’s insecurity in the technology domain and take steps to relieve 
these concerns. For Washington, this would mean recognising Chinese 
worries about reliance on foreign — in particular, American — suppliers 
of core technologies and components such as semiconductors. Speaking 
in 2016, President Xi Jinping stressed that ‘the fact that core technology 
is controlled by others is our greatest hidden danger’.34 Discussing AI in 
2018, Xi similarly emphasised the need to reduce ‘external dependence for 
key technologies and advanced equipment’.35 
How might the United States provide reassurance regarding these 
concerns? It could try to send a credible signal that it will not interfere 
with the operation of global markets that supply Chinese firms. This 
would see the US government revive the tradition of what John Ikenberry 
US companies ban 




































































calls ‘strategic restraint’: binding itself more tightly to institutions that 
would limit its ability to exercise power over markets and international 
supply chains.36 This would likely require the United States to agree to 
be bound by some kind of enforcement mechanism, akin to the World 
Trade Organization’s compulsory dispute-settlement regime, and invite 
third parties, such as the European Union and Japan, to monitor and 
enforce compliance. Given the current scepticism towards multilateral 
institutions displayed by the White House, an alternative would be 
to bind itself with domestic institutions — that is, pass laws through 
Congress to provide greater clarity and transparency regarding any 
market interventions on grounds of national security.
On the other side of the Pacific, reassurance would similarly involve 
the Chinese government acknowledging Washington’s own concerns, 
including that with regard to the link between the state and firms such 
as Huawei, ZTE, Tencent, and Baidu.37 Exploring credible ways through 
which Beijing could limit state influence over these companies might 
send reassuring signals to Washington. For unlisted companies such 
as Huawei, a public listing on a US stock exchange, which subjects the 
company to stringent reporting requirements, might be an effective 
confidence-building measure. Steps to increase transparency regarding 
There are concerns in 
Washington about the link 
between the Chinese state and 
companies such as Baidu
Photo: Jon Russell Flickr
such companies’ governance structure and operations, such as agreeing 
to submit to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) reporting standards and install independent directors, might 
also prove effective.38 Licensing locally developed Chinese technology 
for use by non-Chinese firms — an idea recently floated by Huawei’s 
founder Ren Zhengfei 任正非 with regard to 5G — might also enable 
Chinese companies to continue growing and competing in Western 
markets without raising undue concern.39 
Conclusion
These pathways to reassurance are not necessarily realistic policy propos-
als given the current state of bilateral relations between China and the 
United States. But they do help illuminate our diagnosis of the technol-
ogy security dilemma. Our argument is that decoupling, and the damage 
it could impose on the global economy, results from mutual insecurity. 
To arrest this alarming trend, policymakers in Washington, Beijing, and 
other capitals caught in the crossfire must find creative solutions to make 
both sides feel more secure. 
If neither side is willing to be proactive in seeking to reassure, 
it is likely that the process of decoupling itself will alleviate some of 
these pressures over the medium to long term. What has already 
happened in the online world might point the way.40 To the extent, for 
example, that decoupling forces Chinese companies to develop fully 
independent technology supply chains, vulnerabilities generated by US 
export controls and other restrictions will dissipate. And if Chinese and 
American technology companies were to be completely shut out of each 
other’s markets, and those of states falling within each side’s sphere of 
influence, concerns about what those companies might do on behalf of 

































































Such broad changes may occur due to continuing government 
efforts to regulate bilateral trade and investment.41 At the same time, 
actors in the private sector may independently decide to reduce their 
exposure to political risk in foreign markets or other uncertainty 
created by strained bilateral relations. US firms may even do so because 
China’s cost advantage is diminishing over time as labour costs and 
regulations increase. At the time of writing, some estimates suggest that, 
since the advent of the trade war, approximately thirteen percent of US 
companies with operations in China have shifted or plan to shift some 
or all of their activity out of the country.42
There is perhaps a middle ground between the devastating long-
term costs of decoupling and the leap of faith required by reassurance. 
The two major powers could engage in a focused dialogue about the 
areas in which they feel most vulnerable to take steps towards mutual 
reassurance. Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Thomas Wright 
suggested as early as 2013 that one area in which such an arrangement 
might prove valuable is information technology and telecommunication 
networks.43 Mutually limiting access to specific industries in that space 
or others that involve ‘critical technologies’ would be a good first step.44 
Other areas of economic interdependence that are mutually beneficial 
and not perceived to create significant vulnerability, such as agriculture 
or merchandise trade, might then continue unimpeded, avoiding a 
costly, full-scale unwinding of supply chains.45 Such an agreement 
would produce a form of ‘selective decoupling’46, or what others have 
called ‘managed interdependence’.47 This ‘conscious decoupling’ could 
be formalised in a treaty — an economic equivalent to the strategic 
arms limitation treaties negotiated by the United States and the Soviet 
Union in the 1970s.
There are obvious difficulties, however. For example, even if areas 
of potential insecurity are identified, the challenge would be to agree 
on mutually acceptable rules, and on establishing a mechanism to 
enforce them. This would require the dedicated, ongoing, and creative 
involvement of third parties. Given such high stakes, one would hope 
that all parties could overcome their likely insecurities about the process 











































































THE PROMOTION OF the China Dream has had an increasingly 
visible, ambiguous, and complex 
impact on LGBTQ-related public 
discourse in China, and on the LGBTQ 
community itself. This was especially 
evident in 2019, when elsewhere in 
the Chinese-speaking world there 
were significant breakthroughs 
regarding both legal and political 
rights for LGBTQ people. On 17 May 
2019, Taiwan became the first country 
in Asia to legalise same-sex marriage. 
On 30 May, the Hong Kong High Court 
overturned four laws that criminalised 
behaviour (such as anal sex) that was 
illegal only when carried out by gay 
men; it also revised three other laws.1 
This progression of LGBTQ legal rights 
has enhanced the global reputation 
of both places for their sociocultural 
openness. In mainland China, 
homosexuality was decriminalised 
in 1997 and depathologised in 2001. 
While a realisation of mainland China’s 
own ‘queer dreams’ would help to 
promote a ‘positive and inclusive 
discourse’ domestically and benefit 
its global soft power,2 throughout the 
2010s, the Party-state was ambivalent 
in both rhetoric and action.
The Party-state’s approach to 
including LGBTQ within the China 
Dream combines nationalism, China-
centrism, cosmopolitanism, and 
neo-liberalism. For instance, on 
18 May 2019, in an English post on 
Twitter (which has been blocked in 
mainland China since 2009), the party 
newspaper People’s Daily celebrated 
Taiwan’s move towards LGBTQ rights 
with a ‘Love Is Love’ GIF.3 At the same 





































time, it attributed the decision to 
‘local lawmakers in Taiwan, China’, 
subtly ‘owning’ legislation that applied 
only to same-sex couples in Taiwan, 
while asserting Beijing’s claim of 
sovereignty over the island.4 This was 
not the first time the People’s Daily had 
attempted to elevate China’s global 
status and promote national unity 
by alluding to LGBTQ rights. Back in 
April 2018, the online People’s Daily’s 
‘Strong Nation Forum’ published a 
commentary that criticised Weibo’s 
censorship of homosexual content.5 
However, the commentary — while 
implicitly depicting China as a 
socioculturally inclusive and diverse 
nation — also explicitly urged 
LGBTQ people to be well-behaved, 
socially responsible citizens.6 
These sorts of official statements, 
circulated on both local and foreign 
social media, appear to be aimed 
more at bolstering China’s 
sociopolitical harmony than defending 
LGBTQ rights. 
A major advance in LGBTQ 
rights in mainland China in recent 
years is the extension of officially 
notarised guardianship agreements 
to same-sex couples. China’s new 
legal guardianship system, in which 
‘all adults of full capacity are given 
the liberty of appointing their own 
guardians by mutual agreement’, was 
amended by the National People’s 
Congress in March 2017.7 This was 
followed by the approval of same-sex 
guardianship by the Notary Office of 
Nanjing in late 2017 and then by the 
notary offices of Changsha, Chengdu, 
Guangzhou, Shanghai, Xiangyang, 
2019 Taiwan Pride Parade 
Source: Ben Hillman 
and Beijing in August 2019.8 While 
the Party-state has no intention of 
legalising same-sex marriage, the 
notarisation can be understood as 
part of the government’s commitment, 
given in March 2019, to comply with 
the UN Human Rights Council’s five 
anti-discrimination recommendations 
on LGBT+ issues.9
Since 2015, various LGBTQ 
communities in Shanghai have 
staged annual film events — the 
ShanghaiPRIDE Film Festival 
(ShPFF), CINEMAQ, and Shanghai 
Queer Film Festival — despite media 
censorship of homosexual content 
deemed to be promoting ‘vulgar’ 
or ‘abnormal’ content.10 In the case 
of the ShPFF, collaboration with 
foreign consulates enabled it to 
evade censorship.11 
According to Bloomberg, there 
exists a US$300 billion ‘rainbow 
economy’ for LGBTQ merchandise in 
major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, 
and Chengdu, as well as in Chinese 
cyberspace.12 There has even been 
a burgeoning ‘glocalised’ drag ball 
culture in Shanghai since the middle 
of the past decade.13 
This surge and celebration of 
LGBTQ consumerism and culture 
coexist uneasily with the government’s 
smothering of agitation for greater 
gender and sexual equality, which 
challenges China’s hetero-patriarchal 
sociopolitical system and traditions 
of sexual morality.14 The Party-state 
clamps down on displays of rainbow 
signs or queer activist slogans 
in the mass media as well as on 
online shopping sites, and censors 
explicit scenes of homosexuality in 
imported movies (such as Bohemian 
Rhapsody), as well as feminist social 
media accounts and hashtags, such 
as #MeToo.15 
This set of mixed policies allows 
politically innocuous LGBTQ-centred 
media and popular cultures to exist, 
and helps to promote a seemingly 
open-minded image to audiences both 
at home and abroad, while keeping 
more serious debates on human 
rights out of the public space.16 By 
managing ‘queer dreams’, the Party-
state effectively neutralises the 
potential of these dreams to transform 
society while turning them into useful 
elements in China’s self-portrayal 


















































AI DREAMS AND AUTHORITARIAN 
NIGHTMARES
Olivia Shen
IN JULY 2017, the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) announced its ambitious 
plan to lead the world in the development and 
application of artificial intelligence (AI). China aims 
to become the global centre for AI innovation by 2030. 
Government agencies have released five strategic 
papers in recent years articulating how AI will 
profoundly change human society and stressing the 















































China’s ministries, local authorities, companies, and the scientific and 
academic communities are underwriting its AI ambitions through 
extensive financing and political support. Meanwhile, state media is 
helping popularise AI in the public consciousness, linking it to China’s 
continued prosperity and modernisation. Citizens are starting to see the 
benefits of AI throughout the economy, from smart devices and robots that 
provide daily conveniences to autonomous vehicle trials easing congestion 
in major cities. Unsurprisingly, the Chinese are more optimistic than 
other nationalities about the potential for AI to do good.2 They also appear 
to be confident in China’s AI capabilities, with fifty-five percent believing 
they are already leading or leapfrogging ahead of other countries in 
AI development.3
The Dark Side of AI
On the darker side of China’s AI ambitions are efforts to harness AI for public 
security. The Chinese government has not been shy about experimenting 
with AI for authoritarian ends. This is starkly evident in Xinjiang 
province, where the government’s Strike Hard Campaign 严厉打击暴力 
恐怖活动专项动 is turning Xinjiang into a testing ground for the 
use of innovative technologies for social control. Facial recognition, 
machine learning, natural language processing, and genetic profiling 
allow authorities to keep the community in check with unprecedented 
efficiency, scale, and secrecy. More than one million Uyghurs and Kazakhs 
have been sent to ‘political education’ camps, many of them arbitrarily 
detained for activities that are by no means illegal under Chinese law4 
(see Chapter 7 ‘Schemes, Dreams and Nightmares: China’s Paradox(es) of 
Trust’, pp.199–211).
To domestic constituents, China’s government promotes AI as an 
accurate scientific tool for monitoring and preventing security threats 
and unrest. The State Council’s 2017 New Generation Artificial Intelligence 
Development Plan declares: 
AI technologies can accurately sense, forecast, and provide early 
warning of major situations for infrastructure facilities and social 
security operations; grasp group cognition and psychological changes 
in a timely manner; and take the initiative in decision-making and 
reactions — which will significantly elevate the capability and level 
of social governance, playing an irreplaceable role in effectively 
maintaining social stability.5
This faith in AI may be misguided. As the saying goes, ‘Garbage in, 
garbage out’. If an AI system is built on biased assumptions or poor 
data, it is likely to codify existing prejudices and inequalities or generate 
inaccurate results. 
Relying on AI in security and law enforcement settings can have 
its pitfalls. In London, recent trials of live facial recognition by the 
Metropolitan Police produced inaccurate matches ninety-six percent of 
the time.6 In the United States, AI algorithms deployed to predict crime 
have discriminated unfairly against African Americans because the 
systems are trained using historical crime data collected by police with 
a record of targeting minorities.7 Biased AI systems are prone to error, 
overlooking or misidentifying security threats because the algorithms 
have been trained to look for the wrong indicators. In the Strike 
Hard Campaign, authorities are directed to collect information about 
suspicious individuals. However, many of the behaviours that are 
deemed suspicious are either integral to the Islamic faith (for example, 
collecting money for mosques, going on Hajj) or innocuous activities 
(curiously including welding and using too much electricity, as well 
as spending time abroad).8 Such inherent biases create a pernicious 
feedback loop. Muslims, welders, and frequent flyers are more likely 
to be flagged as security threats and investigated, which then validates 
subjecting these groups to even more invasive monitoring. Far from 
being neutral tools, algorithms are what AI ethicist Cathy O’Neil calls 















































The Chinese government has a vested interest in presenting AI as 
scientific, precise, and unimpeachable. If it portrays AI as an objective 
guarantor of security and other public goods, its citizenry can trust that 
AI will only harm those individuals who deserve it — criminals, terrorists, 
separatists, cheats, and other social undesirables. This narrative has been 
powerful in justifying mass surveillance. China’s first national video 
surveillance program, Skynet 天网, is based on a Chinese idiom about the 
inescapability of justice (天网恢恢, 疏而不漏 — ‘heaven’s net is wide, but 
nothing escapes it’). State media calls the system ‘the eyes that safeguard 
China’ and claims it has helped police make numerous arrests.10 Ironically, 
‘Skynet’ is the name of the superintelligence in The Terminator movies 
that is intent on destroying humankind. China’s Skynet is no killer robot, 
but the potential for repressive uses of AI is growing as Beijing rapidly 
expands its surveillance apparatus and access to citizens’ data.
Big Data Gets Bigger
From 2020, two programs due for completion will combine to collect and 
aggregate a massive trove of information about Chinese citizens, their 
movements and their behaviours. The first is Skynet’s successor, Sharp 
Eyes 雪亮 (literally, ‘snow-bright’), which will blanket all key public places 
Surveillance Cameras
Source: Pixabay
and major industries with live surveillance cameras.11 Like Skynet, the 
name of the program is deliberate and symbolic. ‘Sharp Eyes’ derives 
from a Cultural Revolution–era saying, ‘the eyes of the masses are bright 
as snow’ 群众的眼睛是雪亮的, which encouraged people to snitch on 
political subversives. It is a chilling reminder of a time when neighbours 
and relatives denounced one another for party disloyalty12 (see also 
Chapter 2 Forum ‘Xi Jinping’s War on “Black and Evil” ’, pp.43–46).
The year 2020 will also see the national rollout of the Social Credit 
System that tracks the trustworthiness of companies, government agencies, 
and citizens. Social credit metes out punishments and rewards based on 
compliance with government regulations and court orders, among other 
metrics for good citizenship. The worst offenders are added to a blacklist; 
the most compliant are added to a ‘red list’. The system requires regulatory 
agencies and companies to frequently update information to the lists.13 
Authorities can also request access to the data that companies collect 
in the course of delivering products, services, content, and advertising 
to their customers. Research by the US-based Center for Data Innovation 
suggests that consumer data quantity is one of the few crucial areas 
for AI development where China already has an advantage over the 
United States.14 This is partly thanks to China’s lead in mobile payment 
technologies. With an estimated forty-five percent of the Chinese 
population using mobile payments, including on omniscient applications 
such as WeChat, information is continuously being digitised as people 
go about their daily lives. Companies such as Tencent, owner of WeChat, 
vacuum up data about what people buy, how they communicate, where 
they travel, the news they read, the charities to which they donate, and 
the games they play. 
Data collection is also increasingly global. Companies such as Global 
Tone Communication Technology, an offshoot of the Central Propaganda 
Department, boasts that it gathers ten terabytes of unstructured global data 
(equivalent to 4,000 hours of high-definition video streaming) through its 















































estimates that China will hold twenty percent of global data, or forty-four 
billion terabytes, by 2020.16 
Push for Privacy
In an increasingly data-driven and surveillance-rich world, citizens in 
many countries are demanding more privacy and transparent uses of their 
personal information. In 2018, Europe passed the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) to enshrine protections for personal data including a 
right to be free from ‘automated processing’ by algorithms. The United 
States is also debating federal data privacy laws, with some states, such as 
California, pushing ahead with their own versions of the GDPR.
China is grappling with similar concerns and challenges. It is a 
common misconception that China is devoid of privacy debates or 
protections. Many netizens were outraged when Baidu founder Robin Li 
李彦宏 claimed in 2018 that Chinese were less sensitive about privacy and 
would exchange privacy for convenience or efficiency.17 Following a series 
of high-profile data breaches and scams, citizens have called for stronger 
privacy laws in recent years.
The government has responded to those calls, but in a manner that 
targets unscrupulous businesses while maintaining its own access to 
citizens’ data. In 2016, the National People’s Congress adopted the Cyber 
Security Law, which bans online service providers from collecting and 
selling users’ personal information without consent. A 2018 Personal 
Information Security Specification, modelled on Europe’s GDPR, further 
establishes national standards for seeking user consent and collecting, 
storing, and sharing personal data.18 So far, the new regulations have 
been strictly enforced, with government watchdogs cracking down on 
smartphone applications that illegally or excessively collect users’ data.19 
While companies are constrained from violating people’s privacy, the 
same cannot be said for the government itself. The very Cyber Security Law 
that offers better consumer protections also stipulates that online platforms 
must provide technical support and assistance to government agencies 
for the purposes of safeguarding national security and investigating 
criminal activities.20 China’s national security laws, particularly the 2017 
Intelligence Law, invest security agencies with sweeping powers to ensure 
that companies cooperate with intelligence work. The Cyber Security Law 
further cements those powers. New e-commerce laws that took effect in 
January 2019 also require e-commerce operators to provide data to the 
authorities when requested, validate users’ real identities, prevent illegal 
content or activity online, and retain transaction information for no less 
than three years.
The government throws the book at companies that misuse their 
customers’ data or breach their privacy. However, it shows few signs of 
curbing its own data mining, surveillance, and censorship capabilities, 
and advances in AI are rapidly expanding those capabilities. The kinds of 
technologies seen in Xinjiang are becoming the new normal across much 
of China. Cities such as Suzhou and Weihai have launched ‘police cloud’ 
警务云 databases that use machine learning to parse massive volumes 
of data about residents for crime prevention and prediction.21 Facial 
recognition is now so commonplace it is used for shaming jaywalkers 
and dispensing toilet paper in public toilets.22 Meanwhile, the Cyberspace 



















































Administration will soon require social media algorithms to steer users 
towards online content that promotes ‘mainstream values’ such as party 
policies and Xi Jinping Thought.23 
From Privacy to AI Ethics
Advances in AI have deepened Chinese concerns about privacy and data. 
In the 2018 China Economic Life Survey 中国经济生活大调查, jointly 
run by Tencent’s research arm and state media, almost eighty percent of 
respondents said they thought some applications of AI would compromise 
their privacy. More than thirty percent also worried that AI would threaten 
their livelihoods.24  
In an effort to boost public trust, the government has made a range 
of commitments to build AI that is ethical and beneficial for society. The 
State Council’s New Generation AI Development Plan includes a goal to 
establish laws, regulations, and ethical norms for AI by 2025. Beijing has 
joined the international effort to develop technical AI standards that 
will also grapple with ethics and safety risks.25 In May 2019, the Beijing 
Academy of Artificial Intelligence and the Chinese Ministry of Science 
and Technology released the ‘Beijing AI Principles’, which call for AI to be 
responsible, diverse, open, and beneficial for humanity.26 The principles 
carry the endorsement of Peking University, Tsinghua University, the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, and China’s largest tech firms, including 
Tencent, Baidu, and Alibaba. Encouragingly, the Beijing Principles are 
broadly consistent with other AI ethics frameworks recently agreed by 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and the G20.27
These positive signs of China’s engagement on AI ethics contrast with 
China’s aggressive use of the same technologies to manage, and in some 
cases repress, its own people. Yet for China, there is no contradiction. 
Social management and safeguarding internal security are part and parcel 
of the AI dream. According to the party line, to eschew the capabilities of 
AI would in fact be unethical. But even if the Chinese population accedes 
to this argument, international observers are far more sceptical.
International ‘Techlash’
One risk for China is that its use of authoritarian AI leads to an international 
backlash that stunts its AI ambitions. Western media coverage over the 
past year has highlighted China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang and 
Hong Kong, with growing emphasis on the role of technology in enabling 
those abuses. The ongoing scrutiny has prompted some players in the AI 
field to restrict research and technology transfers.
In October 2019, the United States added twenty-eight Chinese 
firms to a list of entities barred from buying American products 
and components, citing human rights concerns. According to the US 
Department of Commerce, the new listings specifically target firms 
involved ‘in the implementation of China’s campaign of repression, mass 
arbitrary detention and high-technology surveillance against Uyghurs, 
Kazakhs, and other members of Muslim minority groups’.28 This includes 
companies such as Hikvision, Dahua, Yitu, and SenseTime — some of the 
world’s largest manufacturers of video surveillance products.





















































This is the first time human rights have been explicitly declared a US 
foreign policy interest resulting in the listing of entities.29 Some speculate 
the entities listing was motivated more by US trade war tactics than by 
genuine human rights concerns, coming as it did on the eve of trade 
negotiations. Nevertheless, the move amplifies concerns about working 
with China on new technologies. After employee protests, Google 
terminated a project to build a censored version of its search engine 
for the Chinese market.30 Bad publicity also forced American company 
Thermo Fisher to cease selling DNA sequencers to authorities in Xinjiang 
for genetic mapping.31
Ethical considerations are complicated by the fact that many AI 
technologies are ‘dual use’. Beneficial and harmful AI can be almost 
indistinguishable at a technical level. Prominent American geneticists 
who have shared DNA samples with China’s Institute of Forensic Science 
have subsequently discovered that their research was used for genetic 
profiling.32 Australian universities have also been implicated, with the 
University of Technology Sydney and Curtin University forced to review 
their research approval processes after their academics were involved in 
projects that may have aided Chinese government surveillance.33 
Despite impressive investment and progress in indigenous AI 
development, China still needs global supplies of AI talent and knowhow. 
With the onset of the China–US trade war, Beijing is particularly sensitive 
to the risk of overreliance on US producers for critical technological inputs. 
Crucially, China has not yet succeeded in establishing a local semiconductor 
industry to produce the chips that power AI computing.34 China is also still 
catching up to the United States and others — albeit rapidly — in terms 
of quality patents, fundamental research, and attracting international 
expertise. China files more patents, for example, than any other country 
but only thirty-seven percent are maintained after five years.35 Programs 
such as the Thousand Talents 千人计划 have not been able to attract the 
best and brightest scientists and academics to return to China in the long 
term.36 Human rights and reputational concerns are likely to further deter 
foreign talent from working with Chinese firms, conducting joint research, 
investing in Chinese companies, or sharing data, all of which will also slow 
the pace of China’s AI development. 
The government’s continued use of authoritarian AI also undermines 
the credibility of its efforts to influence global standards and governance. It 
is difficult to imagine countries welcoming China to the global negotiating 
table while millions of Uyghurs remain in detention. It is equally difficult 
to imagine China coming to the table for meaningful negotiations with 
other countries that publicly criticise its human rights record and cut off 
its supply chains. There are concerns, too, that China is rapidly exporting 
its authoritarian AI to at least fifty-four countries, frequently packaging 
the technology into the Belt and Road Initiative.37
A Comfortable Panopticon
China’s burgeoning ocean of data, combined with its growing AI capabilities, 
generates new opportunities and temptations for social control. 
If China looks set to continue pursuing more authoritarian applications of 
AI, one key question is how its citizens 
might respond. Will there come a 
tipping point where they object? 
Ordinary Chinese are not naive. 
Aware that Big Brother is watching, 
they tend to moderate their behaviour 
accordingly. An interesting example 
of this is the case of Tay, Microsoft’s 
AI chatbot that notoriously began 
posting inflammatory and offensive 
tweets just hours after it was launched 
in 2016. Tay was first tested as Xiaoice 
小冰 in China, where it gained a strong 
following over eighteen months with 

















































no such off-script moments. One reason for this difference is that Chinese 
netizens closely follow online rules. They generally do not harass, smack 
talk, or troll each other because there is always the possibility that the 
state is listening in.38 The online environment thus resembles English 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s concept of a ‘panopticon’ — a prison in 
which the inmates never know whether they are being watched and are 
therefore motivated to act as though they are always being watched.
A panopticon might sound chilling to some, but for others it is a 
comfort. Decades of Communist rule have inured much of the population 
to government intrusion while coopting them with its benefits. China 
has a deeply embedded and historical tradition of promoting good moral 
behaviour. Where fraud, corruption, and cheating are rife, systems that 
bolster trust and deter wrongdoing are considered necessary and even 
welcome.39 Social credit, for example, is far more controversial outside 
China than within. The Party-state encourages all its citizens to contribute 
to systems of community policing. In many rural locations where Sharp 
Eyes is piloted, locals can tune into the live surveillance feeds and report 
their neighbours’ transgressions.40 Hebei province has released a ‘debtor 
map’ 老赖地图 app that allows users to blow the whistle on wealthy- 
looking debt dodgers in their vicinity.41
Many Chinese accept automated monitoring as a small price to pay 
for stability, prosperity, and social harmony. Those who follow the rules 
reap the spoils of an ascending China. Those who step out of line pay the 
costs. China’s dreams of AI development are inextricably linked with the 
use of AI as a tool for social engineering. If China should succeed at both 
— vastly expanding its AI capabilities and universally deploying those 
capabilities towards controlling its citizens — its AI dream could turn into 



































LIFE AND DEATH 
Dream Babies  
·  JANE BROPHY 
Recurring Nightmare: The Plague Visits  
Beijing 





































































ON 25 NOVEMBER 2018, two days before the start of the Second 
International Summit on Human 
Genome Editing in Hong Kong, a 
clip appeared on YouTube entitled 
‘About Lulu and Nana: Twin girls 
born healthy after gene surgery as 
single-cell embryos’.1 In the clip, 
He Jiankui 贺建奎, an American-
trained Chinese associate professor 
of biophysics at Shenzhen University 
of Science and Technology, stands in 
his private laboratory (he oversaw a 
state university lab and founded his 
own private biotech company lab), 
speaking in English (with English 
and Mandarin subtitles). He claimed 
he had just brought into the world 
the first genetically edited babies — 
that is, the first babies to have had 
deliberately induced changes to their 
germline, which is a series of cell lines 
descended from previous cells that 
are passed down through generations 
of humans. This germline would be 
inherited by any future children they 
may produce.
At the summit, organisers quickly 
rearranged the program so He Jiankui 
could appear solo to explain himself. 
To a shocked audience, he revealed that 
he had represented the experiment 
to his participants as a study into 
an HIV/AIDS vaccine, and that they 
may not have fully understood what 
they were consenting to.2 Later 
investigations revealed that the ethics 
committee he cited as overseeing the 
‘trial’ claimed to have no knowledge 
of it and the paperwork produced 
as evidence of institutional ethical 
approval contained an extremely 





































unusual reference to the advancement 
of the People’s Republic of China’s 
(PRC) global reputation for scientific 
innovation as an ethical justification 
for the procedures.3 
A flurry of controversy engulfed 
the conference, and both Chinese 
and international attendees were 
swift in their condemnation.4 He 
Jiankui had broken many of the 
rules, but also the norms, of the 
genomics community. He contravened 
protocols of how scientific advances 
are communicated by announcing it 
via YouTube5 and, as George Estreich 
of Oregon State University pointed 
out in The Conversation, it was a 
bizarre announcement, riddled with 
misleading, emotive, and deceptive 
language.6 Was He Jiankui genuinely 
interested in scientific advancements 
or was he just courting publicity? 
There were a number of glaring holes 
and inconsistencies in the evidence he 
provided and the scientific process he 
described.
Scientists the world over have 
been investigating the multiple 
possible applications of a gene-editing 
procedure, known as CRISPR Cas-9, 
since the technique was pioneered 
by American molecular biologist 
Jennifer Doudna in 2012.7 The 
technique holds much promise for 
therapeutic genetic editing, which is 
commonly represented as a ‘cut and 
paste’ technique to add or remove 
genetic markers for conditions that 
adversely impact one’s health, thus 
curing genetically inherited diseases. 
It could possibly also be used to 
create ‘designer babies’, by altering 
genetic traits for aesthetic purposes 
as a matter of preference. Many 
laboratories are experimenting with 




in vitro up to fourteen days from 
creation, which has been agreed 
by the international genomics 
community as the ethically acceptable 
limit. The scientific consensus to date 
holds that it would be unconscionable 
to allow any edited embryo to 
progress through the process of 
invitro fertilisation (IVF) in a woman, 
ultimately resulting in a live birth. 
The scientific, ethical, moral, legal, 
and social objections for doing so are 
vast. The arrival of Lulu and Nana 
brought fresh urgency to the issue of 
ethical standards in research, which 
is hotly debated in the international 
genomics community. 
He Jiankui expected to be hailed a 
national hero in the name of advancing 
China’s dreams of international 
biomedical leadership. Instead, he 
was swiftly condemned both locally 
and internationally, removed from 
his university appointment, and soon 
after disappeared from public life.8 
The end of 2019 saw him sentenced to 
three years in prison, along with two 
colleagues, for practising medicine 
without a licence and ‘seeking fame 
and wealth’.9 
Prior to this, China had 
already attracted uncomfortable 
international scrutiny over the 
growth of commercial industries 
selling highly experimental, even 
unproven, treatments — notably, 
stem cell treatments.10 Despite China’s 
recent attempts to rein in the market 
for unproven stem cell treatments, He 
Jiankui’s story revealed that the 
structures of Chinese scientific 
institutions and enterprises still allow 
scientists and biotech entrepreneurs 
to operate away from the regulatory 
eye. In July, a Spanish scientist 
employed by the Salk Institute in 
the United States announced that 
he had created the first human–
monkey chimera (cells from both 
species combined in one organism) 
in a lab in December. This research 
— purportedly the first step in using 
animals for human organ transplants 
— is not permitted in the United 
States.11 The first pigs containing 
cynomolgus monkey cells were 
born full-term in December 2019, 
although they survived for only 
a week.12
Since China’s Reform and 
Opening Up in 1978, increasing 
numbers of scientists, doctors, 
biotech entrepreneurs, and patients 
in search of treatments not permitted 
in their home countries have travelled 




































regulatory grey areas.13 But beyond 
this, how did China become a favoured 
home for scientists wanting to push 
the limits of ethically acceptable 
scientific innovation?
As the anthropologist Aihwa 
Ong has argued in her work on 
biotechnology in Asia: 
[B]iotech mechanisms are 
presented as ethical operations 
that link the immediate needs 
of the individual consumer or 
patient to the political generation 
of civic virtue, that is, appropriate 
conduct and social obligations to 
contribute to national prosperity 
and security.14 
If his motives were indeed sincere, 
He Jiankui might have believed that 
he was employing a highly technical 
pathway to enhancing the health and 
prosperity of his country’s population. 
This would explain why he thought 
his work would be received positively 
in China.
As for Lulu and Nana’s story, we 
know very little about the lives of the 
twins or their parents; however, the 
father’s HIV status is a crucial element 
in the story. In his commentary on 
the YouTube announcement, He 
Jiankui cites the high level of anxiety 
experienced by the girls’ parents about 
the possibility of passing HIV on to any 
child they might conceive naturally.15 
Couples of whom either one or both 
of the parents are HIV positive are not 
allowed to access fertility treatment 
even if they can afford it. This dynamic 
was a key part of their willingness to 
participate in the experiment, which 
offered them a chance to have a baby 
who would not inherit the father’s 
virus. He Jiankui offered a procedure 
that would ‘wash’ the sperm to 
prevent transmission from parent to 
child, while introducing a genetic edit 
that purportedly would ‘switch off’ 
the embryo’s ability to acquire HIV.16 
As he explained in the YouTube video, 
‘discrimination in many developing 
countries makes the virus worse’. 
He rightly pointed out that people 
living with HIV face discrimination in 
employment as well as from medical 
professionals; some women even face 
forced sterilisation. Precisely because 
of the plight of people living with 
HIV in China, some critics considered 
the way the ‘study’ was presented 
to the couple to be a coercive 
recruitment strategy.17 
He Jiankui imagines a future in 
which genetic editing in babies will be 
considered as uncontroversial as the 
IVF procedure he used to implant the 
embryos into the mother. He cites the 
case of Louise Brown, the first baby 
born through IVF, and argues that ‘for 
forty years, regulations and moral [sic] 
have developed together with IVF’. 
But meanwhile, He’s ‘dream babies’ 
turned into a personal nightmare for 
him. He lost his lucrative university 
position, his professional standing, 
and ultimately his freedom, and his 
name is now synonymous with the 
2019 global reckoning with the ethics 
of innovation in genomics. The impact 
of the procedure on Lulu and Nana 
in the long term remains to be seen. 
Yet, as He Jiankui hints in the video, 
it may be just a matter of time before 
he is vindicated. In May 2019, new 
regulations were introduced in China 
stating that anyone who manipulates 
genes in humans is legally liable for 
anything that happens to the health 
of that person.18 Yet in June 2019, 
undeterred by He Jiankui’s fate, and 
beyond China’s regulatory borders, 
a Russian scientist announced his 
plans to proceed with a genetic-editing 
procedure that he is now stridently 
defending from criticism,19 and vowing 
to pursue.20 For those dreaming of a 
future of therapeutic genetic editing 
and designer babies, that future may 




















































SO WROTE ONE Weibo user in mid-November after days of widespread 
rumours in the capital of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) sparked panic. 
Then, the government confirmed it: the 
thought-to-be eradicated pneumonic 
plague had arrived in Beijing.
Pneumonic plague, a severe 
infection of the lungs, is one of three 
types of plague caused by the bacteria 
Yersinia pestis (of which there are 
many strains), the other two being 
bubonic (found in the lymph nodes and 
associated with the feared pustules of 
the ‘Black Death’ of fourteenth-century 
Europe) and septicaemic (found in the 
bloodstream).2 The bacteria is endemic 
in China and, while the bubonic form 
R E C U R R I N G  N I G H T M A R E :  
T H E  P L A G U E  V I S I TS  B E I J I N G 
Jane Brophy 
Bird flu in the year of the rooster … swine fever in the year of the pig. Next year is the year 
of the rat … the plague is coming.  
— Weibo user, November 20191 
is more common, pneumonic is the 
most virulent. Left untreated, it can 
be fatal within eighteen to twenty-
four hours, although if treated quickly 
and effectively with appropriate 
antibiotics, it is easily contained. The 
most common way of contracting the 
plague in China is through the bite 
of an infected flea or by coming into 
contact with (or even consuming) an 
infected rodent. Pneumonic plague 
can spread through respiratory 
droplets from an infected patient who 
sneezes or coughs, for example. In the 
southern, central, and western parts 
of China where the rodent population 
is high (increasing desertification and 




















































conditions) and rural life makes 
contact with disease carriers more 
likely, large public health campaigns 
since 1949 have been successful 
in mobilising teams of villagers to 
engage in pest-control work. Teams 
of rat catchers still trap and test rats 
periodically to monitor them for 
possible outbreaks and changes to the 
bacteria strain.3 
For Beijingers, however, the threat 
of the plague is a distant memory, as 
seen in a World Health Organisation 
(WHO) map of the global distribution 
of plague in 2016 (see opposite).4 Thus 
the news, first appearing via a quickly 
deleted social media post by a doctor 
working at central Beijing’s Chaoyang 
Hospital in early November, revealed 
that two plague patients had been 
mysteriously ‘transported’ from a 
hospital in Inner Mongolia.5 Despite 
attempts by China’s Centre for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) to limit 
further public discussion, rumours 
spread rapidly as the hospital ordered 
medical students working there to 
stay at home and all the seating in the 
emergency waiting area was replaced.6 
Government attempts to take control 
of the narrative and quell panic only 
fuelled it by providing an incomplete 
picture of what had actually 
taken place. This revived fearful 
memories of the mismanagement 
of SARS (‘severe acute respiratory 
syndrome’ or ‘bird flu’) at the same 
hospital in 2003, where a lack of 
public communication is believed 
to have resulted in the spread of 
the disease.7 
Occasional cases of plague 
infection are not rare in interior parts 
of China and are only sometimes 
lethal. But the presence of two infected 
patients in one of Beijing’s premier 
hospitals sent social media users into 
fits of panic and made international 
headlines.8 Locals on social media 
demanded to know more about the 
circumstances under which the 
patients were transferred to Beijing: 
Had the patients been taken by public 
transport? Had they been on a plane? 
What steps had health officials taken 
to prevent the potential airborne 
spread of the disease? 
Further investigative reporting 
by the English-language media outlet 
Caixin, which obtained an internal CDC 
brief, suggested this recent outbreak 
had been contained.9 It revealed that 
the highly unusual step of transferring 
the two patients (a married couple) 
more than 800 kilometres to the 
capital — when normal protocol is to 
isolate and treat patients as quickly 
and as locally as possible — was 
taken because of a delayed diagnosis 
and the need for more specialised 
facilities to treat the infection in 
its advanced stage.10 They were, 
moreover, transferred by ambulance. 
After their short stay in the emergency 
department at Chaoyang Hospital, 
the couple was taken to the smaller 
Ditan Hospital, which specialises in 
infectious diseases. The couple’s son 
and daughter were being monitored, 
and others at the Chaoyang Hospital 
who may have come into contact 
with them were being preventatively 
treated. While all this turned out to 
be something of a ‘storm in a teacup’, 
greater transparency at the outset 
could have prevented the panic and 
suspicion. 
While the memory of plague 
might not be so vivid for today’s 
citizens, China has a long history 
with the bubonic and pneumonic 
plagues. The third great plague in 
documented history began in 1855 in 
Yunnan. The two previous outbreaks 
were those suffered by the Byzantine 
empire in 541 and 542 and the Black 
Death that killed one-third of Europe’s 
population between 1346 and 1353. 
Driven by increased global trade 
and an influx of the ethnic majority 
Han people seeking to exploit the 
natural resources of south-western 
China (where many rats and fleas 
were carriers of plague bacteria), the 
Global distribution of natural plague foci as of March 2016




















































nineteenth-century ‘Third Plague’ 
bloomed into a global pandemic of 
(primarily) the bubonic strain, which 
was spread by rats and fleas on trading 
ships. In China and India alone, twelve 
million people died. The threat was 
considered active in China until 1960 
when cases reported to the WHO fell to 
below 200 per year.11  Despite this, or 
perhaps because of it, as admitted by 
health authorities in Inner Mongolia, 
public health campaigns to raise 
awareness of plague prevention 
and control have not been as visible 
in recent decades. Caixin spoke to 
residents of Inner Mongolia who 
were surprised to learn that the 
plague was an ever-present threat as 
they had not lived through a public 
education campaign.12
This 2019 case highlighted two 
uncomfortable truths: the persistent 
health divide between rural and urban 
areas, and the potential impact climate 
change is having on plague control 
efforts. According to the investigation 
by Caixin, the couple was from Sonid 
Left Banner, a country-level division 
of Xilingol League in remote central 
Inner Mongolia. They contracted the 
plague while carrying out pest-control 
work. In the past fifty years, China 
has recorded more than 1,000 cases 
of the plague and 183 deaths, with the 
hardest hit region being north-western 
Qinghai.13 In May 2018, the Xinhua 
Under the lens: The bubonic plague
Source: U.S. Dept. of Health & Human 
Services, Flickr
News Agency reported an explosion of 
the rat population in Inner Mongolia, 
which it attributed to ‘recent persistent 
drought’ and a vague reference to 
‘climate change’.14 For people looking 
for examples of the interplay between 
climate change and epidemiological 
trends around the world, this might 
represent a new but ongoing challenge 
to plague eradication. As well as 
examining rising rodent numbers, 
a small number of scientific studies 
have begun to explore the relationship 
between climate and the plague cycle, 
suggesting temperature extremes play 
a factor in increased transmission.15 
In response to the increased 
rodent population in 2018, the central 
government allocated twelve million 
yuan for pest control in the region, 
meaning more residents doing the 
frontline work in direct contact 
with rodents. The case of the couple 
from Inner Mongolia suggests that 
concurrent investment in healthcare 
infrastructure and resources to protect 
the health of those workers will be a 
crucial piece of managing the plague. 
It remains to be seen whether 2020, 
the year of the rat, will also be the year 
that the rat-borne plague returns to 







































































URBANISING TIBET: ASPIRATIONS, 
ILLUSIONS, AND NIGHTMARES
Gerald Roche, James Leibold, and  
Ben Hillman 
ON 28 MARCH 2019, the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) celebrated ‘Serfs Emancipation Day’ 西藏
百万农奴解放纪念日 or, alternatively, the sixtieth 
anniversary of ‘democratic reform in Tibet’ 西藏
民主改革. Exiled Tibetans commemorate 10 March 
1959, the date of the Dalai Lama’s flight into exile 
in India, as ‘Uprising Day’, when thousands of 
Tibetans surrounded the Potala Palace in Lhasa 
and skirmished with the military after rumours 
circulated that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
planned to kidnap the Dalai Lama and assume 
full control over Tibet. According to Beijing, 
the PLA ‘peacefully liberated’ Tibet in 1950 and 
claimed the territory for the new PRC, citing 
Tibet’s historical connection with former Chinese 
empires. The PLA allowed the Dalai Lama’s Tibetan 
government limited autonomy, which lasted until 
the uprising of 1959. However, Tibet had enjoyed 
de facto independence since the collapse of the 
Qing empire in 1911, and many Tibetan exiles and 
their supporters maintain that Tibet was forcefully 
invaded in 1950. Some continue to challenge the 
legitimacy of Chinese rule, even as all member 
countries of the United Nations now recognise the 






































































Like much of Tibet’s history, the events of 1959 remain contentious, as 
does the PRC government’s record in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), 
which was established in 1965. Exiled Tibetans and other critics draw 
attention to human rights abuses, the marginalisation of Tibetans in 
their own land, and the suppression of religious and cultural practices.1 
Many Tibetans remain frustrated with policies that constrain religious 
and cultural expression.2 
Meanwhile, Beijing trumpets its record in bringing prosperity and 
improved social systems to the region. Many among China’s Han ethnic 
majority has long viewed Tibetans as culturally backward: superstitious 
savages who required ‘saving’ and ‘civilising’ by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) to bring them into the modern world alongside the Han.3 As 
state media outlet Xinhua triumphantly proclaimed in March 2019: 
Democratic reform has achieved a great leap from the feudal serf 
system to the socialist system in Tibet. The establishment of the 
socialist system not only liberated and developed the productive 
forces, but also promoted Tibet’s economic development to a new 
level, and greatly promoted the overall progress of Tibetan society.4 
Beijing has long maintained that Tibetan grievances can be best addressed 
by improving Tibetan living standards and better integrating Tibetans 
into China’s mainstream society and economy.5 Since 2001, Beijing has 
invested more than US$100 billion in development projects across the 
Tibetan Plateau,6 and around ninety percent of the budget of the TAR, 
which was established in 1965, comes from Beijing.7 Development policy 
for the region now centres on urbanisation, which is seen as key not only 
for economic growth, but also for taming the wild plateau and its unruly 
inhabitants, and promoting ‘ethnic intermingling’ 民族交融, including 
intermarriage.8  Urbanisation has emerged as a new tool of multiethnic 
governance for the CCP — an integral strategy for President Xi Jinping’s 
dream of the ‘great rejuvenation’ 伟大复兴 and ‘communal consciousness’ 
共同体意识 of the Chinese nation.9 
Urbanising Tibet 
Party officials in Beijing dream of a string of ‘civilised cities’ 文明城市 
stretching across the Tibetan Plateau: urban landscapes of concrete, 
glass, and steel where Tibetans live, work, and consume much like their 
Han counterparts in Beijing and Shanghai. Cities are sites of civility 
and modernity in the eyes of Chinese leaders — places where orderly, 
rational, and obedient citizens act out the China Dream 中国梦 according 
to party prescripts. With more intrusive and detailed forms of state 
surveillance, cities increase the control of the Party over citizens.
The National New-Type Urbanisation Plan (2014–2020) aims to 
raise urbanisation rates to sixty percent nationally.10 This is not just 
an economic strategy to increase consumption and growth, but also a 
mechanism for enhancing Party governance. The Thirteenth Five Year 
Plan specifically targets China’s ethnic frontier, including all areas of 
Tibet, where urbanisation rates are relatively low: 47.1 percent in 2015 
compared with the national average of 56.1 percent.11 In 2010, only 5 
percent of Tibetans permanently resided in a city — an increase of just 
6.9 percent over the previous decade.12 There are now ambitious plans 
to boost the urbanisation rate in the TAR to more than thirty percent 
by 2020,13 with similar efforts under way across the Tibetan Plateau 
(which extends beyond the TAR to include Qinghai province and parts 
of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, and Xinjiang). 
Tibetans are shaping their own visions of what urbanisation means 
for them, including the opportunities and threats cities present for their 
livelihoods and ethnic identity. These visions, as expressed in popular 
culture, and pop songs in particular, are far from homogeneous. Three 
recent Tibetan pop songs, and the rich visual tapestry of their music 
videos, display a range of Tibetan attitudes towards urbanisation 
as well as providing an insight into the complex realities of Tibetan 
urbanisation today. They also evoke ideas of universal relevance to the 







































































The song ‘City’ གྲོང་ཁྱེར by Lobsang Nyima བློ་བཟང་ཉི་མ presents 
urbanisation as a Tibetan nightmare. The song’s video clip opens with the 
camera hovering above a snow-speckled mountainscape. The Tibetan 
lute སྒྲ་སྙན་ that can be heard as the camera drifts across the landscape 
is deep and resonant, combining a Metallica-esque riff with a melody 
from a traditional circle dance སྐོར་གཞས, and creating an unsettling trill 
reminiscent of a sprightly dirge. Suddenly, the urban form materialises: an 
upside-down cityscape occupying the empty space above the mountains. 
Here, we see the basic theme of the song: the city as the inverse of 
the rural.
The singer, Lobsang Nyima, was born in the countryside of Ngawa 
རྔ་བ/Aba 阿坝 county14 in the mountainous north-western corner of 
Sichuan province, which has been a hotspot of ethnic protests and self- 
immolations since 2008. While ninety-one percent of its residents are still 
classified as nomads, the county seat, Ngawa/Aba town, is now home to 
nearly 12,000 residents, having tripled its population in recent decades. 
The new county-level city of Barkam འབར་ཁམས/Markang 马尔康市 is only 
Still from the music video, ‘City’, by Lobsang Nyima 
Source: Tibetan HeartBeat, YouTube
a couple of hours away by road, and is home to another 60,000 urbanites, 
who live in high-rise buildings squeezed on to the region’s steep, 
rugged mountains.
The lyrics to ‘City’ contrast images of rural purity — white clouds, 
white eagle feathers, and yoghurt — with the pollution of the city. This 
pollution includes not just the dust, noise, and bustle of the city, but also 
social pollution — the ways in which the city corrodes trust between 
people, leading to spiritual and emotional suffering. The singer laments 
losing his ‘mind’ སེམས and his capacity to love in the urban milieu. 
The video follows the singer on his downward spiral through 
pollution and loss, from arriving in the city in his traditional robes 
to donning a leather jacket, getting drunk, and becoming violent and 
disoriented, before returning to his rural homeland, perched atop a 
mountain ridge, wistfully surveying the landscape. Equating the city 
with the sufferings of ‘worldly existence’ (from the Sanskrit samsāra), 
this idyllic return to the homeland seemingly equates the rural not just 
with freedom, but also with mastery of the self. 
Decades of research by Indigenous scholars in settler-colonial 
states such as Australia, the United States, and Canada have shown how 
Indigenous peoples have been discursively erased from the city because 
their cultures are portrayed as being ‘incongruous with modern urban 
life’.15 To portray Indigenous people as fundamentally rural is to justify 
their exclusion from cities and their containment in rural spaces. Since 
the mid twentieth century, Indigenous social movements around the 
world have asserted the right of Indigenous people to inhabit urban 
spaces and claim them as their own.16 Therefore, while Lobsang Nyima’s 
song evokes the ways in which state-led urbanisation negatively impacts 
Tibetans, it also reinforces a problematic romantic binary in which 
‘authentic Tibetanness’ is rural and traditional, while the urban and 
modern are antithetical to it; Han space can only corrupt, erode, and 







































































The contrasting images of rural purity and urban pollution are challenged 
by one of the most popular Tibetan pop songs in recent years, ‘Fly’ འཕུར, 
by ANU ཨ་ནུ.The rich synth tapestry, rolling beats, and electronic steel 
drums make for an irrepressibly upbeat song (think Avicii, but Tibetan). 
When the city first appears in the video clip for this song, the singer is 
standing on a mountain top, arms spread, the city far below him. Similar 
images are repeated throughout the video, showing the city as something 
to soar above and tower over rather than get lost within.  
The city in the music video is Xining, the provincial capital of 
Qinghai province and the largest city on the Tibetan Plateau, with 2.4 
million permanent residents. Han norms dominate Xining’s language, 
architecture, and culture yet it is also home to more than 130,000 Tibetans. 
Payag and Gonpa are the two young men behind ANU. The band’s full 
name, Anu Runglug ཨ་ནུ་རིང་ལུགས, means the ‘philosophy of youth’ or 
‘youthism’ in Tibetan. Originally from rural Nangqên/Nangqian County 
ནང་ཆེན་རྫོང/囊谦县 in southern Qinghai, the pair moved to Beijing in their 
twenties to pursue their music dreams. Multilingual and media savvy, 
they make effective use of Chinese-language social media outlets such 
as WeChat and the video-sharing app Meipai to promote their music and 
fashion label (also called ANU), using one to cross-promote the other.17 
Differing from the didactic cautionary tale of ‘City’, ‘Fly’ is more of a 
neo-liberal hymn to aspiration and self-realisation. The lyrics encourage 
listeners to ‘fly’ — breaking the chains of fate to love liberty, find their 
true soul, achieve their highest dream, and escape a meaningless life. 
And if you don’t fly? ANU tell us that your hopes will be wasted and your 
life will be over. 
Throughout the clip, the fast-moving imagery shifts back and forth 
between the urban and the rural. Rather than presenting a binary 
contrast between the two, both environments are represented as spaces 
for unfettered bodily motion and human achievement; people run, leap, 
and dance; they raise their fists in the air as they crest a mountain, the 
city lights glowing below them. Importantly, we see a city that is at 
once unashamedly modern and exciting and also Tibetan. Stupas and 
prayer flags perch above the metropolis, where Tibetans have tattoos 
featuring traditional iconography such as the Buddhist ‘endless knot’ 
and breakdance to Tibetan hip hop in nightclubs. 
‘Fly’ highlights another contrast. Many Chinese cities such as 
Chengdu and Xining, and even Beijing and Shanghai, are important 
cultural and social hubs for Tibetan youth. With the exception of Tibet 
University in Lhasa, all the major institutions of higher education for 
Tibetans and other ‘ethnic minorities’ (or minzu 民族 in Chinese for 
short), which are major engines of socioeconomic mobility, are located 
in such cities. For Tibetans, the most significant institutions are Qinghai 
Minzu University in Xining, Northwest Minzu University in Lanzhou, 
Southwest Minzu University in Chengdu, and Minzu University of China 
in Beijing. For those such as Payag and Gonpa who seek commercial 
success and fame, moving to one of these larger cities — often to 
establish a business enterprise with the help of government subsidies 
— is an important strategy. Provincial and local governments offer 
start-up grants to entrepreneurs to support establishment costs (such as 
rent and decorating a store or restaurant) and staff training. 







































































Yet Tibetans also migrate to cities in search of more menial jobs 
such as construction or factory work. The city has, therefore, in one way 
or another, become a place where Tibetans can pursue their dreams of 
upward mobility, regardless of their levels of skill and education. The 
Party-state uses the hukou 户口 (household registration) system and 
other forms of social control to guide Tibetan mobility and urbanisation. 
There is a hierarchical aspect to this. Rural migrants are more generally 
encouraged to move to, but not settle in, large cities, in a manner that 
sociologist Eli Friedman labels ‘just-in-time urbanisation’, attracting 
‘high-quality’ 高素质 individuals to large cities as permanent residents 
while drawing on ‘low-quality’ 低素质 migrant labour as needed.18 In 
fact, for most Tibetans, urbanisation occurs in situ through the creation 
of small urban settlements built on former pastureland with only a 
couple of thousand inhabitants. In 1978, Qinghai province had just one 
city and six towns; today, there are six cities and 143 towns.19 
The Illusory City 
If ‘Fly’ subverts the moral binary proposed in ‘City’, ‘Flame’s Lament’ 
མེ་ལྕེའི་འོ་དོད by Lhudrup Gyamtso ལྷུན་སྒྲུབ་རྒྱ་མཚོ/黎智坚措, aka Uncle 
Buddhist, presents a more complex picture. It portrays both the city 
and the rural homeland as dreams — dreams in the sense of fantasies 
or mirages rather than aspirational goals. Uncle Buddhist delivers his 
lyrics in a rapid-fire whisper, both urgent and intimate. The acoustic 
guitar, soaring flute, and plaintive vocal hook of the chorus give the 
song a brooding, melancholic feel. And, while the video clips for ‘Fly’ 
and ‘City’ depict anonymous cities of steel, concrete, and glass, ‘Flame’s 
Lament’ takes us to Lhasa, bringing the tensions of urbanisation to the 
very heart of Tibetanness.    
The thirty-year-old Uncle Buddhist, now known as ‘Scar K!d’ in 
English, was born in a pastoral area along the upper reaches of the 
Yangtze River but grew up in the urban townships of Golog Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture མགོ་ལོག་བོད་རིགས་རང་སྐྱོང་ཁུལ་/果洛藏族自治州 
in south-eastern Qinghai. Like ANU, he honed his musical talents in 
Beijing, where he has lived since graduating in 2012 from the Beijing 
Contemporary Music Academy. His eclectic sound merges traditional 
Tibetan music with edgy urban rap in the style of Kanye West and Jay-Z, 
while singing in Mandarin, Tibetan, and English.20 
The lyrics of ‘Flame’s Lament’ begin by describing an idyllic image of 
the singer’s rural childhood home: the shining sun, clear water, and the 
grassland where he would happily sleep. He then compares this with his 
life in the city, which is noisy, polluted, hot, bustling, and alienating. The 
city is a space of absence, loss, and exclusion, where you have ‘no house, 
no car, no job’, and even ‘completely forget your mother tongue’ ཐ་ན་ཁྱེད་
ཀྱིས་ཕ་མའི་སྐད་དང་ཡི་གེ་བརྗེད་ཚར. But rather than settling with this familiar 
contrast between the idyllic rural and the nightmarish urban, the lyrics 
then take us back to the singer’s hometown, which is now developed 
and polluted. As the lyrical pace and intensity build to a crescendo, we 
hear that the city is becoming green, and its air pure — the rural and 
Still from the ‘Dreaming of Tibet’ music video by Uncle Buddhist & Kalnor






































































urban have changed place — and the singer describes searching in vain 
for a road back to a homeland that has seemingly vanished forever. 
Consistent with the complexity of the lyrics’ treatment of the rural–
urban divide, the images in the video clip also present contrasts that are 
less stark than those in ‘Fly’ or ‘City’. Although we see iconic depictions 
of mountains and grasslands, most of the visuals are harder to parse. For 
example, the city is mostly represented by the Potala Palace, surrounded 
by bright lights and streaming traffic, and the rural is represented 
more often by images of small-town Tibet than by uninhabited nature. 
Like the lyrics, the visuals make it difficult to draw a sharp distinction 
between urban and rural, and to contain particular moralities and 
identities within either space. 
Finally, ‘Flame’s Lament’ draws attention to the translocalism 
and fractured identities of most Tibetans today. Although their rural 
homelands have been economically and socially dismantled, few 
Tibetans are able or have the permission required to move to large 
cities permanently thanks to the Party’s ‘just-in-time’ urbanisation 
strategy. For most Tibetans, urbanisation presents two stark options. 
One is to relocate to low-tier towns — the orderly yet soulless prefecture 
and county-level settlements scattered across the Tibetan Plateau. The 
other is translocality — moving back and forth between urban places of 
employment and rural places of belonging; between exclusion from a 
dynamic urban socioeconomic context and inclusion in stagnant rural 
economies; between the social, linguistic, and cultural alienation of the 
city and the cultural security of the countryside.  
Urban Futures: Dream or Fantasy? 
President Xi recently asserted: ‘Today, we must closely rely on the 
collective strength of each ethnic group if we are to achieve the China 
Dream.’21  Xi’s vision involves an urban and collective future for all 
Chinese citizens, including Tibetans. Cities are what Party officials call 
‘large melting pots’ 大熔炉 in which to forge a shared national culture 
and identity and inscribe the thoughts, behaviour, and norms of the 
Han-dominated Party-state. By urbanising Tibet, the Party-state hopes to 
integrate Tibetans more firmly into the social fabric of the nation.
Yet, like other governments across the globe, the CCP also fears the 
instability associated with large-scale urbanisation and has sought to 
carefully manage it.22 It employs a toolkit of governance mechanisms 
such as the hukou restrictions, identification checks, facial recognition 
tracking, and other surveillance tools to regulate and monitor the flow 
of human and material capital to raise the ‘quality’ of urban populations 
and create a hierarchy of urban spaces. On the one hand, the Party 
stresses the need to make cities more accessible to ethnic minorities. 
On the other, it remains nervous about the clash of cultures and any 
spontaneous outbursts of resistance, especially in large urban centres.23 
And so most Tibetan urbanisation occurs chiefly in small and medium-
sized townships created by the rezoning and development of former 
pasturelands, rather than through large-scale migration into major Han 
metropolitan centres. 
Tibetan pop songs highlight some of the complex responses of 
younger Tibetans in the PRC to urbanisation. For some, the city is the 
secret to realising their dreams; it is a place where they can move easily, 
express themselves, and achieve their full potential. For others, the city 
represents a nightmarish end to Tibetan ethnic and cultural identity. 
Many more Tibetans are trapped in a sort of peri-urban limbo, lamenting 
the rural past while aspiring to a brighter future under the city lights. 
As cities come to Tibet and Tibetans go to the city, urbanisation is 






































 ‘Prairie Mothers’ and Shanghai Orphans  































































































ON 17 SEPTEMBER 2019, President Xi Jinping signed a presidential 
decree to award National Medals 
国家勋章 and National Honors 国家
荣誉称号 to forty-two people on the 
occasion of the seventieth anniversary 
of the founding of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC). Among them was an 
ethnic Mongol woman, Duguima 都贵
玛, from Inner Mongolia, who won the 
honorary title of People’s Model 人民 
楷模. According to Xinhua, this medal
symbolises the major contri-
butions made by the winners 
in various fields and industries 
and the exemplary role they 
play in inspiring the people of all 
nationalities in China to remain 
true to our original aspiration and 
keep our mission firmly in mind, 
and to struggle ceaselessly to 
realise the Chinese dream of the 
great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation ’1
At the awards ceremony, held in the 
Great Hall of the People in Beijing 
on 29 September, Xi personally 
awarded Duguima her honorary title 
and medal.
Duguima was born in 1942 to a 
herder’s family in a rural community 
in Dorbod Banner 四子王旗 in Inner 
Mongolia. When she was nineteen 
years old, her fate became intertwined 
with a group of Shanghai orphans. 
From the late 1950s to the early 1960s, 
China experienced a catastrophic 
famine, which resulted in the deaths 
of tens of millions of people. Parents 
in the provinces surrounding Shanghai 
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who were unable to feed their 
children brought them into the city 
and abandoned them — with the total 
numbering in the tens of thousands. 
With Shanghai’s food supply already 
under enormous pressure, Kang 
Keqing 康克清, then chairman of the 
National Committee for the Defence 
of Children, appealed to prime 
minister Zhou Enlai 周恩来 for help. 
Zhou discussed the issue with Ulanhu 
乌兰夫, chairman of the Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region, who agreed to 
move 3,000 orphans to Inner Mongolia. 
These children, ranging in age from 
a few months to seven years, were 
sent in waves to several banners2 and 
counties in Inner Mongolia between 
1960 and 1961. The local government of 
Dorbod banner assigned Duguima to its 
nursery school to look after twenty-five 
orphans before they could be adopted 
by local families.
For many years, the Party-state 
has promoted the story of how Inner 
Mongolians cared for the Shanghai 
orphans as a model of love, national 
unity, and patriotism. At the time of 
the fiftieth anniversary of the founding 
of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region in 1997, Ma Li 马利, then a 
journalist and deputy director of the 
domestic political department of the 
Still from the documentary on Duguima
Source: 爱我中华, YouTube
People’s Daily, wrote a widely read 
piece titled ‘Three thousand orphans 
and prairie mothers’ 三千孤儿和草原 
母亲. Zhang Jinxi 张锦贻, director of 
the Literary and Art Theory Research 
Office of the Institute of Literature of 
the Inner Mongolia Academy of Social 
Sciences, commended Ma Li: 
This is reportage of national and 
historical significance. It lets the 
people of all ethnic groups … know 
the meaning of the ‘big family of 
the motherland’ 祖国大家庭 and 
the ‘national unity’ 民族团结.3 
Inspired by Ma Li’s work, the famous 
Mongolian director Ning Cai 宁才 
filmed a sixteen-episode TV series, The 
Silent Emin River 静静的艾敏河, about 
the ‘prairie mothers’ and the Shanghai 
orphans. The national channel CCTV 1 
broadcast the series in 2002. In 2009, 
Ning Cai filmed the related film, My 
Mongolian Mother 额吉, which was 
selected as a key ‘tribute’ film 国庆
献礼片 for the sixtieth anniversary 
of the founding of the PRC. In 2019, 
for the seventieth anniversary, the 
State Administration of Radio, Film 
and Television selected the 2018, 
forty-episode TV series on the same 
subject, National Children 国家孩子, 
by director Baatar 巴特尔 (whose 
mother is Mongolian and father is 
Han Chinese). 
For all the prominence given to the 
story of the orphans and their ‘prairie 
mothers’, many questions remain. The 
Still from National Children

















































Party-state maintains that the extreme 
shortage of food in China from 1959 to 
1962 was caused by natural disasters. In 
contrast, independent scholars in China 
and overseas highlight the role of Mao’s 
Great Leap Forward, which, combined 
with the withdrawal of Soviet aid and 
natural disasters, led to economic 
chaos and industrial and agricultural 
collapse. Other questions persist about 
the famine’s total death toll; estimates 
range from four million to thirty 
million. The total number of Shanghai 
orphans is another mystery. According 
to a reporter for the Southern People 
Weekly 南方人物周刊, Wu Congling 
吴聪灵, there were at least 50,000 
orphans. Children were sent not only to 
Inner Mongolia, but also to Shandong, 
Shanxi, Henan, Hebei, Shaanxi, Jilin, 
Xinjiang, and other places.4 
According to a 2015 CCTV news 
report, less than one percent had 
the opportunity to reunite with their 
biological families in later life.5 Most 
step-parents have been unwilling to tell 
the truth to the orphans, while many 
orphans have not actively looked for 
their own biological parents because of 
not wanting to hurt their step-parents. 
In many cases, orphans started the 
search for their biological parents 
after the death of their step-parents, 
although, because they lack detailed 
birth records, this has proven very 
difficult. Some have used newspapers 
and online platforms, and some 
have visited Shanghai, Zhejiang, and 
Jiangsu to find their relatives. While a 
small number of orphans had bodily 
markings, such as tattoos and ear-cuts, 
left by their biological parents, most 
Still from documentary 
Shanghai Orphans and 
Their Prairie Mothers
Source: 欢乐剧场, YouTube
have had to rely on observations of 
facial similarity to make preliminary 
matches, followed by DNA testing to 
determine relationships. In recent 
years, the average age of orphans 
has reached sixty, and most of their 
biological parents are no longer alive, 
leaving them only with the hope of 
meeting their brothers and sisters. 
Duguima may have been a People’s 
Model in her ‘ceaseless struggle’ to 
support these orphans in times when 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation was 
just a very remote dream. For many of 
the orphans themselves, reuniting with 
their birth families remains a distant 



























































SCHEMES, DREAMS, AND NIGHTMARES: 
CHINA’S PARADOX(ES) OF TRUST
Gerry Groot
IN EARLY NOVEMBER 2019, the son of Wanda 
billionaire Wang Jianlin 王健林, Wang Sicong 王思聪, 
was banned from flying first class, using high-speed 
trains, and buying luxury goods because he had 
failed to repay a debt. He was also named and shamed 
on a publicly accessible Social Credit System 社会信用
制度 (SCS) blacklist. He was among some 23 million 


























































In some places, debtors’ faces are flashed on to public television screens 
when they are in the vicinity or those around them receive phone 
notifications that a debtor is near. A song, ‘Be as Good As Your Word’ 
说到做到, is just one way the Party-state conveys the Santa-like message: 
we know if you’ve been good or bad, so be good for goodness sake.2 
The latest phase in the evolution of these initiatives, embodied in the 
2014–2020 Social Credit System plan 国务院关于印发社会信用体系建设 
规划纲要(2014–2020年)的通知,3 ends soon, but there is no end in sight to 
the SCS — just one aspect of what many in the West are calling the People’s 
Republic of China’s (PRC) ‘surveillance state’.4 Closed-circuit television 
(CCTV) cameras are another. Chongqing is now reputed to be ‘the world’s 
most surveilled city’, with some 2.58 million cameras for a population of 
fifteen million people.5 On 1 December 2019, it became mandatory for all 
applicants for new phone SIM cards across the country to have their faces 
scanned — supposedly to prevent identity theft, but it also facilitates the 
use of facial recognition software systems.6 
In some places, bio-data collection augments video surveillance. An 
in-depth New York Times article about Chinese researchers working on 
facial imaging based on DNA samples — particularly among the Uyghur 
Muslim minority of Xinjiang — indicates how bio-data can be integrated 
into larger systems of surveillance and control.7 Both Uyghurs and 
Tibetans are heavily surveilled, policed, and documented right down to 
recording of their iris patterns, blood types, fingerprinting, and facial 
scans (see the China Story Yearbook: Power, Chapter 4 ‘Internment and 
Indoctrination: Xi’s “New Era” in Xinjiang’, pp.98–111). The Party-state’s 
emphasis on developing artificial intelligence (AI) also feeds into the 
strengthening of these systems of surveillance and control (see Chapter 
5 ‘AI Dreams and Authoritarian Nightmares’, pp.143–154). The new 
cybersecurity program released on 1 December and based on the 2016 
Cybersecurity Law further strengthens surveillance, censorship, and the 
control of data in the online sphere. As Steve Dickinson wrote in the China 
Law Blog: ‘The core of the plan is for China’s Ministry of Security to fully 
access the massive amounts of raw 
data transmitted across Chinese 
networks and housed on servers in 
China.’8 Or, as Guo Qiquan 郭启全, 
chief engineer in the Cybersecurity 
Bureau, famously put it: the goal 
is ‘full coverage’. Overseeing it 
all is the bureau’s new director, 
Wang Yingwei 王瑛玮, who has 
a PhD in applied mathematics 
from Peking University and 
personal experience developing 
pattern recognition systems for 
policing purposes.9 
Ideology meets technology 
and surveillance in the app 
Study Strong China 学习 
强国, the name of which is 
also a cognate for ‘Study Xi and strengthen the country’. The Party 
monitors the progress and activity levels of the 100 million–plus 
users of the app, which is mandatory for party members.10
What to Make of All This?
The Netflix drama Black Mirror and dystopian analogies conjured up 
by Western observers potentially misunderstand the nature of China’s 
surveillance state. The present reality, while dark enough, is more complex 
and fragmented than such totalitarian narratives allow. The use of facial 
recognition and AI to name and shame jaywalking pedestrians by showing 
their faces on public screens in the high-tech southern city of Shenzhen, 
for example, is still only a local initiative. That the AI company involved 
Big Brother is watching you


























































wants to link the results to social media accounts such as WeChat,11 
however, is likely a sign of things to come — as are the fast-evolving 
technologies surrounding and linking bio-data collection and surveillance. 
To understand the logic, limitations, and future trajectories of these 
systems, we should examine the origin and nature of the social credit 
schemes. One key lies in much older ideas of public shaming, which 
are evident in the Shenzhen example above, and another in the ancient 
philosophy of ‘legalism’: governance by reward and punishment (see 
Chapter 2 Forum ‘Legalism and the Social Credit System’, pp.73–77). For 
these to work as intended, there needs to be a perception of fairness. 
Anything less than universal implementation of social credit schemes is 
likely to compound the general lack of public trust in the Party-state at 
the lower levels, with which the public has the most frequent and direct 
contact, and if that becomes evident, it can only result in more surveillance 
and further declines in mutual trust. 
China’s ‘Paradox (es) of Trust’12
In October, Xi Jinping called for more utilisation of blockchain technology 
across society to help build a ‘trusted system’.13 Trust 信用 and honesty 
(sometimes translated as sincerity) 诚信 are social goods that are often 
in short supply in China. The two are related; as psychologist Nigel Holt 
has written, ‘honesty is a marker that encourages trust and cooperation’.14 
Holt was writing in response to a controversial study conducted in 355 
cities across forty countries and published in June 2019 in Science. China 
ranked last in terms of whether people who ‘found’ a wallet containing 
the contact information of the ‘owner’ returned it. Zhou Xinyue 周欣
悦 of Zhejiang University was one of many who questioned the survey’s 
methodology, noting that in a separate Chinese study, seventy-one percent 
of test wallets were neither kept nor returned, but simply left untouched. 
She notes that behaviour is shaped by ‘economic and psychological costs 
and the culture-specific norm’ and that ‘active helping and honesty are 
distinct concepts’.15 News reports of the survey stirred both anger and self- 
searching online, some of which can be found in forums such as Zhihu 
知乎, which features a category titled ‘The honesty crisis 诚信危机’.
The background to this is historical, philosophical, and political. 
In addition to legalism, China had a strong Confucian tradition that 
emphasised loyalty within family and clans as well as to the ruler, 
and a tradition of collective punishment that encouraged self-policing 
within clans and neighbourhoods. But there was little incentive and no 
responsibility to look after anyone outside the family, clan, and emperor — 
and a consequent awareness that strangers similarly had no responsibility 
to you but were always potentially dangerous — or even ghosts. 
After seizing power in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began 
staging a series of mass political movements that assumed a set percentage 
of people were ‘bad elements’ (‘rightists’, ‘counterrevolutionaries’, and so 
on). These movements demanded the participation of ordinary citizens 
in identifying such people among their peers and colleagues. During the 
Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), the Party even encouraged children 
to denounce their parents and teachers. These factors, combined with 
dramatic reversals of policies and corruption, have all contributed to a 
trust deficit. 
Trust: China 
ranked last in 
terms of whether 
people who found 
a wallet would 





























































For example, personal relations or guanxi 关系 make it possible to 
navigate bureaucracy and business. Guanxi is often consolidated by gift-
giving (including bribery) and other behaviours, ranging from excessive 
banqueting to visiting hostess clubs. This builds mutual trust based on the 
potential for mutual incrimination.15 Yet such behaviour is itself corrosive 
of broader social trust because it readily allows people to assume that 
power and privilege are transactional and not merit based. In addition, at 
the lower levels, the lack of transparency and procedural fairness as well 
as exposure to corruption by Party and state officials are generally seen 
as resulting from the moral failings 失道 or lack of ‘quality’ 素质 of the 
officials involved, as opposed to systemic failings of the Party-state system. 
The National Public Complaints and Proposals Administration 国家信 
访局 provides a space for venting about problems, yet only a tiny number 
are ever resolved.17 When they are resolved, the blame lands on ‘immoral’ 
officials and not on structural issues, such as how guanxi networks and 
political imperatives are embedded in administrative systems from top to 
bottom. As a result, trust in the central levels of the Party and government 
remains high.18 The Party-state nonetheless recognises that the issue of 
trust poses a serious challenge to its legitimacy. So, on the one hand, it 
pursues highly publicised anticorruption campaigns and, on the other, it 
builds social credit schemes.
Guanxi builds mutual trust based on 
the potential for mutual incrimination
Photo: Neal Sanche, Flickr
China’s Developing Social Credit System(s)
Currently there are some forty rapidly evolving experiments in social 
credit. China cyber-policy specialist Séverine Arsène likens social credit to 
a ‘chimera’ to emphasise its 
patchwork, decentralized and bureaucratic character. Thus far the 
system is an assemblage of heterogeneous indicators and enforcement 
mechanisms which differ according to the geographical location 
individuals find themselves in, and the kind of professional activities 
they are involved in.19  
Some systems focus on financial probity. In the twenty-first century, after 
decades of market reforms and the rise of commercial enterprises in China, 
banks and other financial institutions need to assess the creditworthiness 
not only of companies, but also of individuals who may want to take out 
mortgages or personal loans. With people now freer to move around 
the country, such data have to be available nationally. Credit China 信用 
中国, which takes guidance from the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), keeps 
a national public database of blacklisted enterprises and individuals.20  
As Jeremy Daum of chinalawtranslate.com points out, this system 
aims to regulate business and force compliance with the law. There are 
blacklists 黑名单 that lead to punishments, such as that experienced by 
Wang, and ‘red lists’ 红名单 that lead to rewards. The designers of local- 
level systems, guided by central government directions and institutions 
such as the PBOC, are also adjusting them to protect whistle-blowers who 
alert authorities to malfeasance and public officials from undue attacks.21 
These local government social credit systems focus on four key 
areas: governmental affairs, commercial activity, social behaviour, and 
encounters with the judicial system. As coordination between government 
levels, departments, and commercial bodies improves, the goal, according 


























































use credit information exchanges and sharing to bring about linked 
credit rewards and punishments across multiple departments and 
regions, making it so that the trustworthy benefit at every turn and 
the untrustworthy can’t move an inch.22 
For this reason, some observers have described these systems as 
‘gamifying’ social compliance.
Xiamen’s Bailu (‘egret’) score 白鹭分 and Fuzhou’s Moli (‘jasmine’) 
score 茉莉分 together cover eleven million registered local residents. Local 
Public Credit Platforms 公共信用信息分享平台 assign scores based on 
personal data, contributions to the public good (honours, acts benefiting 
public welfare), financial behaviours (overdue loans, donations to charity, 
and so on), and legal violations (civil, administrative, and criminal).23 
While most of the negative criteria are objectively measurable, the basis 
for positive, or red credit is more open to interpretation. Crucially, these 
schemes are largely voluntary; in 2019, they involved only twenty-one 
percent of Fuzhou residents and a mere five percent of Xiamen residents. 
Few low scorers have been penalised; there is at present no legal basis 
for that. There is neither much public awareness nor much interest in 
the schemes.24 
The other layer of complexity in these systems is the role of commercial 
credit operators, including online payment and credit services and peer-
to-peer lending, which has resulted in the wide dispersal of financial 
data. In 2015, the PBOC allowed a number of companies to trial new 
credit rating systems; the most famous is Alibaba’s Sesame Credit 芝麻 
信用, which rates users via a points system.25 But along with companies 
such as Ant Financial and Tencent Credit, they may also access government 
blacklists and factor them into their own rankings. It works both ways: 
some local governments subcontract data management to firms such as 
Sesame Credit.26 
As Arsène notes, this has led to a ‘wild proliferation of ratings’ mixing 
public and commercial data. She gives the theoretical example of a young 
Shanghai resident who might have scores on Sesame, the municipal 
Honest Shanghai app, and even a third app, Unictown 优你通,27 which 
was developed in conjunction with the Communist Youth League Central 
Committee and the National Development and Reform Commission. The 
Unictown app is designed ‘to give college students and fresh graduates a 
taste of the rewards brought by having a good social record’ and values 
‘Confucian ethics’ such as righteousness, benevolence, good manners, 
wisdom, and trust.28 Public information about Unictown offers little clarity 
about its methodologies.29 Unictown claims it is designed to reward good 
behaviour, yet shaming alleged wrongdoers is at least one of its functions. 
Surveillance, from Tiananmen to Xinjiang and 
Beyond
Thirty years after the 
events of 4 June 1989, the 
photograph of ‘Tank Man’ 
remains an iconic image 
— at least outside China — 
about standing up to power. 
On the anniversary of 
these events, some foreign 
reporters approached 
passers-by in Beijing to 
ask them whether they recognised the image. Police hovered in the 
background filming the proceedings.30 Three decades of censorship had 
been effective: some thought the photo had been taken in another country. 
Observing the changes from afar, a Dutch cartoonist drew the Tank 
Man, but now with his bags full of branded goods, including one from 
Huawei, transforming him into ‘Consumer Man’. Above Consumer Man’s 
head looms a surveillance camera. In 2014, James Areddy described 
4 June 1989: ‘Tank Man’


























































China’s then 100 million 
surveillance cameras as the 
legacy of 1989;31 they are expected 
to total some 300 million by 2020. 
In Xinjiang, cameras are a key 
element in the system of tracking, 
control, and intimidation that also 
uses AI and available databases, 
so that, for example, police can 
pull up personal information 
on a person passing through a 
checkpoint and know whether 
they have been to a mosque or, 
for that matter, a coffee shop that 
day.32 According to the tranches 
of leaked documents published 
by The New York Times and 
the International Consortium 
of Investigative Journalists, an additional function of the use of AI is to 
help the police carry out ‘predictive policing’. Since 2016, Xinjiang’s 
Integrated Joint Operations Platform 体化联合作战平台 has been used 
to pick up ‘suspicious actions’ and generate lists of those ‘who ought to 
be taken, should be taken’ 应收尽收.33 SenseNets,34 a Shenzhen-based 
firm specialising in facial recognition and crowd analysis technology, is 
working with the Xinjiang government to perfect its surveillance systems. 
The current reality across the PRC is of a very messy complex 
of surveillance systems driven by perceived security concerns, local 
government needs, higher-level government imperatives, and commercial 
interests. There is as yet no integrated national system of surveillance, 
but among the highly advanced surveillance systems being developed 
are specific technologies such as Yidiantong’s 亿点通 Key Person Control 
database. These target criminals (including parolees, those in community 
‘Consumer Man’
Source: The Daily Gorilla, Twitter
corrections, and drug users); people seen as threats to social and political 
stability (petitioners, Uyghurs and other Muslims, rights lawyers, and so 
on); and others such as members of ‘Evil Cults’ (see Chapter 2 Forum ‘ “Evil 
Cults” and Holy Writ’, pp.79–82), internal migrants, and the mentally ill. 
Yidiantong’s software also covers those who are considered a threat to 
national security, extremists, foreigners, and ‘online targets’ — presumably, 
critics on social media. Another Yidiantong product, Community Alert 
社区警务, maps communities down to the apartment level for the benefit 
of policing.35 
Emile Dirks’ examinations of tenders led him to conclude that 
technology suppliers were extending the scope of their databases 
in response to demands from local public security organs.36 It is the 
demand from below rather than orders from above driving much of the 
mission creep.
Non-Chinese in China are also subject to surveillance, including 
iris and fingerprint scans at immigration points. TikTok, created by the 
Chinese company ByteDance, is wildly popular among young people 
outside China, but when a young American Uyghur woman posted a clip 
that was ostensibly about makeup but quickly segued to the subject of 
human rights abuses in Xinjiang, it was deleted, raising concerns about 
censorship and the potential for such apps to also send user information 
back to China.37
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace reports that at least 
seventy-five countries including liberal democracies now use Chinese 
technology from firms such as Huawei, Hikvision, Dahua, and ZTE, 
making China the world’s largest supplier of surveillance technology.38 
This does not take into account issues raised by Chinese mobile phone 
technology and apps such as TikTok. The American military is among 
those concerned by the potential for Chinese actors to remotely access 
Chinese-made surveillance cameras and systems.39 Foreign companies, 
conversely, have been implicated in human rights abuses through sales of 


























































Demands for Better Privacy Protection in China
While censorship ensures that most Chinese are unaware of the literature, 
movies, and television series that trigger Western fears of totalitarian 
dystopia, some are pushing back against creeping oversight. Although one 
survey revealed that sixty to seventy percent of Chinese felt safer because 
of surveillance, they also expressed concern about the vulnerability of 
databases and loss of personal information. Increasing numbers of Chinese 
are becoming sceptical after encountering facial recognition systems — 
now present in places such as subways and even apartment blocks — that 
did not work, with negative consequences.40 In November 2019, one man 
took a private wildlife park to court for enforcing facial recognition for 
entry though he had accepted the use of fingerprint scanners in the past.41 
Qinghua professor Lao Dongyan 劳东燕 wrote on WeChat that no attempts 
had been made to establish any legitimacy for facial recognition on the 
Beijing subway or even whether it would improve efficiency. Lao also 
noted that the increasing use of identity checks, even to enter or leave 
places such as her own university, was hardly a sign of increased trust.42 
Protestors in Hong Kong — hyper-aware of the consequences of 
surveillance — have attacked ‘smart lampposts’ they suspected of being 
used to monitor them and smashed CCTV cameras in Mass Transit Railway 
stations and elsewhere. They have famously protected their identities 
with masks (an ‘anti-mask’ law was struck down by a Hong Kong court 
in November, infuriating Beijing), aimed lasers at CCTV cameras during 
demonstrations, and stuck reflective Mylar on goggles to defeat facial 
recognition systems. 
While general acceptance of social credit and surveillance in mainland 
China seems to be high, this may change should it become apparent to 
broader sections of the population that the criminal, deranged, and 
religious are not its only targets.
Conclusion
China’s surveillance systems remain largely 
fragmented due to the PRC’s administrative 
complexity and wide variations in the ways 
many different technologies are deployed. 
It is for reasons such as these that Arsène 
believes full integration is all but impossible. 
And yet the systems will continue to multiply. 
Dirks writes: 
It is unclear what key individuals these systems will target next. What 
is clear is that in the absence of robust media or judicial oversight — 
or any other institutional checks on the Communist Party’s domestic 
security apparatus — key individual management [systems by which 
individuals are targeted] will continue to metastasize, bringing ever 
greater swaths of the Chinese public under its control.43 
The central Party-state under Xi Jinping seeks to increase social trust and 
hence trust in the government. Yet local experimentation and variations in 
social surveillance and control not only contribute to the system’s incredible 
complexity. They are also likely to result in unintended consequences and 
perverse outcomes. Given the opaque interplay between governmental 
and commercial interests, sooner or later there will be actions that inspire 
significant public anger. While Han Chinese currently display little or no 
sympathy for the suffering of Uyghurs, if similarly extensive and intrusive 
biometric testing, surveillance, and data collection regimes are applied 
more generally, public attitudes could change.44  
The greatest paradox is that if the Party displays no trust in its 
own citizens by employing ever-more intrusive social monitoring and 
surveillance, the likely result will be even more distrust, leading to unrest, 
leading to even more monitoring and control — for such are the lessons of 
escalation in Xinjiang.







































Taking Justice into their Own Hands:  
‘Netilantism’ in Hong Kong 




































































































THE 2019 HONG KONG protests (see Chapter 2 ‘Hong Kong’s 
Reckoning’, pp.51–67 and Chapter 
8 ‘Hong Kong and the Tiananmen 
Playbook’, pp.223–235) have 
been called protests with ‘no 
main stage’ 無大台. Most of the 
activities have been organised 
via brief messages distributed 
through digital technologies. 
While digital technologies such as 
WhatsApp and Telegram, as well as 
online forums such as HK Golden 
高登, were also used in the 2014 
Umbrella Movement, there was 
still a centralised core group who 
made decisions. However, the 2019 
protests were famously ‘leaderless’; 
decisions on actions and gatherings, 
and even the writing of the lyrics 
to the newly composed anthem, 
‘Glory to Hong Kong’ 願榮光歸 
香港, were made collectively using 
digital technology. Anyone could 
organise an event and disseminate 
news through apps or online forums. 
This made the 2019 movement more 
flexible and creative compared with 
its predecessor; it could ‘be water’. 
It also made possible simultaneous 
protests in all of Hong Kong’s 
eighteen regions and enabled 
different types of protests, including 
flash mobs at shopping malls singing 
‘Glory to Hong Kong’ 願榮光歸香港.1 
TA K I N G  J U S T I C E  I N TO 
T H E I R  O W N  H A N D S : 
‘ N E T I L A N T I S M ’  I N 






























































Protesters and their sympathisers 
also used digital technologies to 
identify ‘black police’ 黑警 — police 
who had allegedly facilitated attacks 
on protesters by criminal triads or 
who used excessive force. They also 
used digital technologies to identify 
those who had been arrested, and to 
inform family and friends. 
Internet vigilantism aimed at 
exposing the personal details of police 
and their supporters falls under a 
kind of doxing known in Chinese as 
人肉搜索 or 人肉搜查 ‘human flesh 
searching’ or 起底 ‘digging through 
to the bottom layers’. The term first 
appeared on the mainland in early 
2000 and has become common in 
the greater China region (that is, the 
PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan). Since 
2010, doxing has become a common 
phenomenon throughout the world. 
It is a type of collective online action 
aimed at shaming and punishing 
criminals or deviants in order to 
reinstate legal or moral justice.
In our 2016 paper on the subject, 
Ryan Poon and I used the term ‘internet 
vigilantism’ (or ‘netilantism’) to refer 
to online attempts to identify crime 
(for example, through anticorruption 
activities in China), to investigate 
crime or deviant behaviour (for 
example, cases of police brutality 
in Hong Kong), and/or to punish 
criminals (for example, cyberbullies 
and online child predators) through 
public naming and shaming.2 We 
looked into Hong Kong students who 
participated in netilantism and found 
‘Glory to Hong Kong’ graffiti 
Source: Studio Incendo, Flickr
that they tended to have higher self-
confidence than others and believed 
they could contribute to change in 
the world. They also believed that the 
Hong Kong criminal justice system 
was not effective in delivering justice, 
and therefore took matters into their 
own hands through netilantism.
For example, in the 2019 hunts 
for ‘black police’ acccused of using 
excessive force on protestors, internet 
netilantes typically disclosed not only 
the names and identification numbers 
of the police, but also personal 
information about their family 
members. The Hong Kong Supreme 
Court has issued an interim injunction 
against the ‘unlawful and wilful’ 
disclosure of personal information 
about individual police.3 Previously, 
the Junior Police Officers’ Association 
had won an injunction against the 
publishing of the electoral roll on 
similar grounds. At the same time, 
there are also forums, such as HK 
Leak, created to aid the hunt for the 
details of journalists and protestors. 
It is believed these forums are linked 
to the Chinese Communist Party as 
they are promoted on official Weibo 
sites such as those of the Chinese 
Communist Youth League and China 
Central Television (CCTV).
‘Bulletproof’ sites — sites 
registered on servers outside 
Hong Kong — have provided good 
protection for these netilantes. For 
example, HK Leak was registered 
on a Russian server, which made 
criminal investigation difficult 
and time-consuming.4 
In Hong Kong, any return to 
social stability will require the 
rebuilding of trust between the police 
force and the citizenry. The latter will 
not stop doxing while ever there is the 
perception that the police are using 
illegal methods, including excessive 
force and triad connections, to control 
the populace and as long as activists 
and journalists are themselves targets 























































HONG KONG AND THE TIANANMEN 
PLAYBOOK 
Louisa Lim and Graeme Smith
THE EXPLOSION OF Hong Kong’s season of discontent 
began the same week an estimated 190,000 people 
turned out in Victoria Park to mark the thirtieth 
anniversary of the 3–4 June 1989 crackdown on 
student-led protests in Beijing and elsewhere in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). Even though the 
Party-state has largely succeeded in excising the 
deadly suppression from the collective memory on 
the mainland, the events of 1989 are still lodged 
deep in the Hong Kong consciousness. Back then, 
a million Hong Kongers marched in solidarity 
with the mainland protestors and, after the deadly 
suppression, they helped smuggle activists out of 
China. Thirty years on, Hong Kongers continue to 
turn out to the annual vigil, knowing they bear the 
moral weight of being the only people on Chinese soil 






















































Just five days after the 2019 commemoration, a million people congregated 
at the same spot to march against the extradition bill. It was a protest path 
— Victoria Park to the Legislative Council building in Admiralty — that 
became well-trodden over the following months by crowds that swelled 
to an estimated two million people at one point (for details of the protests, 
see Chapter 2 ‘Hong Kong’s Reckoning’, pp.51–67). 
The massive protests were covered intensely by the international 
media. What received less coverage was the appearance that same week 
of a small volume that does much to explain Beijing’s response to the 
ongoing crisis in Hong Kong — a slim book printed by Hong Kong’s New 
Century Press 新世紀 called The Last Secret: The Final Documents from the 
June Fourth Crackdown 最後的秘密——中共十三屆四中全會「六四」結論文.1 
It is a collection of speeches and notes leaked by an anonymous official 
and written by China’s leadership at two extraordinary meetings of the 
expanded Politburo on 19–21 June 1989 to consider the events of that 
month, create a strategy to prevent 
a recurrence, and set China’s future 
political course. The speeches were 
printed and circulated among 500 
officials at a meeting held a few days 
later. As a classified document, all 
copies were meant to be collected 
afterwards. One copy remained 
at large.
In the introduction to The Last 
Secret, the author (using the pen 
name Wu Yulun 吴禹論) remarks that 
operational flexibility underpins the 
longevity of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) and explains the logic 
of the meetings held in the wake 
of Tiananmen: 
The Last Secret book cover
Source: New Century Press 
This kind of process, usually involving purges, is the key mechanism 
by which a Stalinist party remains in power. Its primary purpose is 
to ensure that the one-and-only supreme leader remains in charge, 
often with total disregard for any purported ideology, existing laws 
or institutional regulations. It is for this reason that these procedures 
have always been regarded as the most top secret by the Party. Thus, 
not only do these documents reveal the ‘last secret’ of the Tiananmen 
protests of 1989, they reveal what may well be the ultimate secret of 
how the Party stays in power to this day.
The book lifts a thirty-year-old veil on the aftermath of the violence in 
Tiananmen Square. As events in Hong Kong unfolded in 2019, it became 
increasingly clear just how much China’s rulers are still informed by the 
Tiananmen playbook thirty years on, despite Hong Kong’s own particular 
political proposition. As the protests continued to grow, Beijing’s rhetoric, 
its on-the-ground tactics, and the solutions endorsed all seemed to hew 
close to the Tiananmen model. Andrew Nathan summed up the lessons 
the Party learned thirty years ago: 
First, that the Chinese Communist Party is under permanent siege 
from enemies at home colluding with enemies abroad; second, that 
economic reform must take a back seat to ideological discipline and 
social control; and third, that the party will fall to its enemies if [it] 
allows itself to be internally divided.2 
China’s position in the world may have changed dramatically since 1989, 
but these lessons still hold true today.  
The Rhetoric of ‘Black Hands’ and ‘Turmoil’
Beijing signals its mindset through its rhetoric, and the language deployed 






















































12 June 2019, Hong Kong police fired tear gas and beat protestors who had 
been blocking lawmakers from reaching the Legislative Council for the 
second reading of the contentious extradition legislation. Chief Executive 
Carrie Lam then characterised the events on the street as a ‘riot’ 暴動. That 
designation echoed the label of ‘turmoil’ 動亂 given to student protests 
in the 26 April 1989 editorial in the People’s Daily. In both cases, the 
designation inflamed the situation, swelling the size of the marches and 
sparking a new demand from protestors — namely, the withdrawal of the 
terms ‘riot’ and ‘turmoil’. The fact that Hong Kong, and not Beijing, officials 
used such terminology strengthened suspicions that Hong Kong policy 
was being dictated from Beijing, or at least from its representative office 
in the territory, the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government. 
The recycling of Tiananmen-era phraseology illustrates how Beijing 
continues to fall back on its instinct to blame unrest on a small number 
of people with ulterior motives. In 1989, the Party-state consistently 
blamed ‘black hands’ 黑手 or ‘a very small number of turmoil organisers 
and plotters’ for whipping up the students. In 1989, those ‘black hands’ 
included the disgraced Communist Party secretary general Zhao Ziyang 
趙紫陽, whose fate was sealed at that 19–21 June meeting and who spent 
the next sixteen years under house arrest; physicist Fang Lizhi 方勵之, who 
subsequently fled to the United States; cultural critic and later Nobel Peace 
Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo 劉曉波; and democracy activist Chen Ziming 
陳子明; as well as the Voice of America, and Hungarian American financier 
George Soros.
In 2019, the term ‘black hands’ re-emerged. The Chinese state 
broadcaster CCTV labelled US Consul-General Julie Eadeh a ‘behind-the-
scenes black hand creating chaos in Hong Kong’ after she held a meeting 
with pro-democracy politicians including Nathan Law 羅冠聰 and Joshua 
Wong 黄之鋒. State-run media also accused a number of foreign bloggers 
and journalists of being US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents, while 
nicknaming four senior pro-democracy figures — Martin Lee 李柱銘, 
Albert Ho 何俊仁, newspaper tycoon Jimmy Lai 黎智英, and former civil 
servant Anson Chan 陳方安生 — the ‘Gang of Four’ and accusing them of 
being ‘agents for Western anti-China forces’. Singling out small numbers 
of instigators deflects attention from the protestors’ actual demands. One 
key difference between 1989 and 2019 is the Party’s use of social media to 
seed and spread these allegations among Chinese-speaking communities 
worldwide. In 2019, these disinformation campaigns — using Twitter and 
Facebook as well as WeChat — have caused deep rifts between overseas 
Chinese and Hong Kongers around the world. 
Writing of the Party’s response to the 2008 Lhasa protests, Ben 
Hillman could have been describing present-day Hong Kong: 
The CCP’s identification of protestors as antagonists with links to 
‘hostile forces’ gives local authorities limited political space to show 
tolerance toward protestors. Sympathizers risk being accused of 
disloyalty. It also discourages local officials from experimenting with 
conflict-sensitive social and economic policies lest they be accused 
of stoking Tibetan ethnic consciousness or nationalism. This has 
also resulted in decreased cooperation between local governments 
and local and international NGOs [nongovernmental organisations], 
further limiting the space for public debate and policy influence.3  
A poster 

























































Tiananmen in the Popular Imagination
The spectre of Tiananmen has been a consistent motif both in the Hong 
Kong popular imagination and in the protest movement’s presentation of 
itself. The movement has drawn inspiration and imagery from sources 
including Japanese anime culture, actor Bruce Lee, and Hollywood movies 
such as V for Vendetta. But Tiananmen-era imagery is ever-present in 
the use of tanks and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers in posters 
and memes. 
When a Hong Konger stood in front of a policeman with a loaded 
gun, the media dubbed it Hong Kong’s ‘Tank Man’ moment, and Hong 
Kongers have used language explicitly linking their movement with 1989. 
One example is graffiti on the Prince Edward Mass Transit Railway (MTR) 
station, where unsubstantiated rumours held that police beat someone to 
death. Spraypainted on the wall was early twentieth-century writer Lu 
Xun’s phrase ‘Blood debts will be repaid in blood’ 血債血還, which was so 
often used in connection with the 1989 deaths. 
When riot police besieged students inside the Polytechnic University 
in late November 2019, lobbing tear gas and firing rubber bullets to 
stop them from escaping, graffiti appeared on a prominent advertising 
hoarding, reading: ‘Is now 1989 4th June?’ Such messages are a vivid 
reminder that Hong Kongers have access to Western history books and 
‘Is now 1989 4th June?’ and ‘Blood Debts will be Repaid in Blood’ graffitis
Source: Louisa Lim 
may publicly remember the Tiananmen anniversary at the annual vigil, 
unlike mainlanders, most of whom do not share collective memories of 
the events due to effective government censorship.
‘Life or Death Struggle’ 
In both cases, the Party has portrayed the stakes in existential terms. In 
August 2019, Wang Zhimin 王志民, director of the Liaison Office of the 
Central People’s Government in Hong Kong, said the turmoil represented 
a ‘life or death fight for the very future of Hong Kong’ and warned there 
could be ‘no retreat’. This echoes language from 1989, when the protests 
were described as a ‘struggle involving the life and death of the Party and 
state’. Such language, which is designed to mobilise domestic and diaspora 
support for the Party, also underlines how seriously the Party views the 
threats posed by large-scale protests. 
The Last Secret reveals the existential anxiety that animated the 
speeches of party bosses in 1989, dovetailing with a fear of external forces, 
real or imagined. Only strict adherence to Deng Xiaoping’s Four Basic 
Principles — upholding socialism, the ‘people’s democratic dictatorship’, 
the Party, and Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong Thought — could 
safeguard the Party from destruction. According to The Last Secret, party 
elder Peng Zhen 彭真 meanwhile contended: 
In reality, the enemy forces at home and abroad who hated and 
wanted to destroy our socialist system have not ceased for one day 
their struggle against us, have not ceased for one day their activities 
to overthrow our state. The painful lesson for us is that these riots are 
the result of their long-term, deliberate fabrications. 
His solution, which implicitly criticised Deng’s leadership, was to end 
the neglect of ideology. Peng noted: ‘For many years our party has not 






















































thinking, organization, and work styles.’ Thirty years later, President Xi 
Jinping took up this task with vigour. 
The Solution 
If the rhetoric sounds familiar, so too do the solutions. In 1989, five days 
after the crackdown, Deng Xiaoping said the Communist Party’s biggest 
failure was one of political education. This led to the birth of the patriotic 
education program — an ideological education campaign that continues 
to this day. 
In 2019, senior pro-Beijing figures in Hong Kong returned to this 
theme, repeatedly blaming the protests on failures in the education 
system. One pro-Beijing advisor, George Lung Chee-Ming 龍子明, argued: 
‘A small minority of young people do not recognise their country, and are 
affected by “Hong Kong independence” because they are sick, and patriotic 
education is a good cure for such sickness.’ Yet it was the attempt to 
introduce ‘national and moral education’ to Hong Kong’s curricula in 2012 
that created the student-led movement that brought young activist Joshua 
Wong to prominence. But pro-Beijing politicians take their cautionary 
tales from Beijing’s textbooks rather than Hong Kong’s recent history. 
Thirty years ago, China’s leaders — even those known to be more 
liberal — were prescribing similar medicine. The Last Secret quotes Li 
Ruihuan 李瑞環, then party secretary of Tianjin, as he catalogued a host 
of social ills: 
A variety of problems are emerging in society, such as corruption, 
bad social customs, ‘look to money in all things’, a lack of interest in 
ideals, a lack of interest in morality. There are many reasons for this, 
but we have to recognise the bad consequences of having weakened 
party leadership and ignored political thought work over these past 
few years. 
There are chilling signs, however, that the official rhetoric could be 
shifting from the Tiananmen lexicon to the Xinjiang playbook. Towards 
the end of 2019, state-run media began referring to demands for liberal 
democracy in Hong Kong as an ‘infection’, echoing moves to pathologise 
Islam in Xinjiang, where as many as one million Uyghurs are in political 
indoctrination camps, according to credible reports received by the United 
Nations. An editorial in the China Daily in November 2019 explicitly made 
this comparison: 
The problems of Hong Kong and that of terrorism have similar causes: 
lack of realistic economic opportunities and misguided ideology. 
Regarding terrorism, China has shown the world a more effective and 
humane approach than that pursued by other countries. 
The editorial posited that a ‘weakened immune system’ can only be healed 
by the education of ‘corrigible’ youngsters, raising the chilling prospect 
of Xinjiang-style political re-education in Hong Kong. (See the China 
Story Yearbook 2017: Prosperity, Chapter 9 ‘Prosperity and Freedom: Hong 
Kong’s Dilemma’, pp.295–307.) 
The Role of Police
As Hong Kong’s protests continue, one clear parallel is not the crackdown 
in Beijing in 1989, when the PLA opened fire on the people, but the 
lesser-known contemporaneous suppression of protestors in Chengdu, 
Hong Kong police at protests






















































when the People’s Armed Police (PAP) dispersed people with batons and 
water cannon. According to official propaganda, eight people were killed 
in the Chengdu crackdown,4 though recent documents released in the 
United Kingdom hint that the real number of deaths in Chengdu could be 
as high as three hundred. In Chengdu, the PAP purposely beat protestors 
over the head, and hospital corridors were crammed with people suffering 
head injuries. 
In Hong Kong, the brutal methods of the police have echoed some 
of the Chengdu tactics. In 2019, both Beijing and Hong Kong understand 
all too clearly the political cost of deploying the PLA against ordinary 
citizens and have firmly resisted such a move. But when Hong Kong police 
removed their identification badges, there was speculation that their 
ranks had been swelled by PAP from China. In October, Reuters reported 
that Beijing had doubled its troop presence in Hong Kong, including with 
elements of the PAP. Anecdotal evidence includes footage of mainland 
police being transported over the border carrying anti-riot gear marked 
with simplified Chinese characters, suggesting their mainland origin. 
The Lessons of Tiananmen 
One lesson from Tiananmen was the political cost of declaring martial 
law, which included costly international sanctions, opprobrium overseas, 
and resentment towards the army at home. By using the colonial-era 
Emergency Regulations Ordinance, Lam managed to impose a de facto 
curfew in October 2019 without declaring martial law. The ordinance has 
enabled the Hong Kong government on occasion to shut down entire public 
transport networks, stop university and school classes, and withhold 
permission for public marches — in effect, banning public assembly. 
People have been detained in the lift lobbies of their own apartment 
blocks or while walking back to the office after lunch break. A formal 
declaration of martial law has thus proved unnecessary. The flip side has 
been a collapse in public trust in both the police and the government. 
Once eroded, public trust is unlikely to recover, even if the Party replaces 
Lam with a more popular chief executive.
The post-Tiananmen dream that emerged after Deng’s Southern Tour 
of 1992 was an implicit bargain, whereby the state could buy stability 
with the promise of economic growth. This bargain — combined with 
intense investment in the apparatus of ‘stability maintenance’, which 
includes internal security agents and domestic surveillance — has worked 
to suppress mass expressions of dissent within China’s urban areas, 
although this may also be due to more effective control of information and 
harsh treatment of activists. While there is still unrest in rural areas — 
often linked to corruption and the expropriation of farmland — protests 
are nearly always contained within county lines. And even relatively 
well-known protests such as those in Wukan 烏坎 in Guangdong, where 
participants demanded more democracy, have not had a significant impact 
on the stability of rural institutions. 
The post-Tiananmen bargain has been less than effective in China’s 
restive peripheries, from Tibet to Xinjiang and now Hong Kong, where other 
sources of information are available and other futures can be imagined. 
While the Internet is ruthlessly censored, and sometimes disconnected 
entirely in Tibet and Xinjiang, Tibetans can identify with a nation led by 
His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Dharamshala-based government in 
exile, while exiles from Xinjiang may feel stronger ties with their Turkic 
brethren than with Communist Party leaders in far-off Beijing. In Hong 
Kong, one method of providing an economic impetus to the territory has 
been allowing access to increased numbers of mainland tourists, yet this 
has not been welcomed by Hong Kongers, who fear the disruption caused 
by an influx of mainland tour groups. For Hong Kongers, whose per capita 
material wealth is nearly five times that of China’s citizens, and whose 
economic success has been built on British rule of law and their own 
endeavours, trading liberty for economic wealth holds limited appeal. 





















































S Yet in the wake of a humiliating defeat for pro-Beijing candidates in Hong 
Kong’s district elections, which left pro-democracy candidates controlling 
seventeen of Hong Kong’s eighteen district councils, Beijing is more likely 
to favour rectification over concessions. 
The dilemma for the Hong Kong administration is that it is effectively 
boxed in. In a leaked speech, Lam lamented her own lack of autonomy. 
She noted that Beijing was ‘willing to play long, so you have no short-term 
solution. Hong Kong suffers, you lose tourism, economy, you lose your IPOs 
[initial public offerings] and so on, but you can’t do much about it.’ With 
Hong Kong already in recession, this could have a longer economic impact 
than the two years of economic stagnation that China suffered in the wake 
of Tiananmen, when growth slowed from more than eleven percent to 
around four percent per year, as foreign businesses and investors stayed 
away. In Hong Kong, the protest movement — which has targeted pro-
Beijing businesses — has not shied away from actions that might hasten 
the territory’s economic decline. One plank of Beijing’s response, as some 
Chinese scholars are advocating, might be to accelerate Hong Kong’s 
integration into the Greater Bay Area, an economic entity encompassing 
Hong Kong, Macau, and nine other cities in southern China. 
The Last Secret reveals how elderly generals and officials took turns to 
condemn party chairman Zhao Ziyang for siding with his favoured ‘think 
tank intellectuals’ who advocated economic liberalism, while ignoring 
The ‘Study Xi- 
Strong Nation’ app
Source: ACM Tube, 
YouTube
the essential task of party building, which was code for enforcing greater 
ideological rigour on party members. The generals’ aspirations are finally 
being met by today’s President, whose ‘Study Xi — Strong Nation’ 學習 
強國 app is now used to track and rank the ideological enthusiasm of 
party members in real time. Thirty years ago, nonagenarian Marshal 
Nie Rongzheng 聶榮政 proposed a solution that would have met with 
Xi’s approval: 
We should sum up the experience of the political thought work of the 
1950s, carry forward the Party’s outstanding traditions, thoroughly 
rectify the atmosphere inside the Party, unify the masses, revitalize 
the national spirit, and promote patriotic thought.  
But Nie was more explicit than most of his colleagues in naming what 
was going to keep the Party in power: violence. Recalling Mao’s words in 
1949, he reminded his colleagues that the people’s dictatorship could only 
vanquish enemy forces because of its power as 
a tool of repression, of violence, it’s nothing to do with ‘benevolence 
仁慈’ … The last forty years have shown that whenever the dictatorship 
of the people prevails, the nation is peaceful, united and flourishing. 
When it founders, turmoil and suffering ensue.  
As Carrie Lam now refers to students as ‘enemies of the people’, the state 
apparatus seems to be grinding inexorably towards a national security 
solution that could include more violence but will almost certainly boost 
patriotic and ideological education for Hong Kongers. The bargain of 
buying stability with economic growth has held on the mainland for three 
decades, but the idea that this type of post-Tiananmen solution could also 
be applied in Hong Kong is likely to be a pipedream; Hong Kong had both 
economic growth and stability before the return to mainland sovereignty 
and, so long as its people are free to remember and write their own history, 






































South Korea and the ‘China Effect’ 
·  HYUNG-GEUN KIM
Taiwanese Dreams: Security, Sovereignty, and 

















































WHEN THE FOREIGN ministers of South Korea, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), and Japan met 
in Beijing on 21 August 2019, Chinese 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi offered to 
help South Korea and Japan settle their 
simmering trade dispute. The dispute 
over security controls on Japanese 
exports to South Korea had spiralled 
into an argument about Japan’s use of 
forced Korean labour in World War II. 
In 2019, relations between Tokyo and 
Seoul reached their lowest point in 
decades. South Koreans are boycotting 
en masse Japanese-made goods such as 
cars and beer. Now China has offered to 
mediate. Does Beijing’s overture signal 
the end of China’s recently aggressive 
posture towards South Korea? Could 
China become a peacemaker in 
north-east Asia, where the faultlines 
of the Cold War still divide the 
Korean Peninsula?
The answers to those questions 
are complicated for South Korea. 
Like Australia, South Korea’s major 
security partner is the United States, 
but its major trading partner is 
China. Rising tensions between the 
United States and China put South 
Korea in a difficult position. Korean 
commentators liken its situation to ‘a 
shrimp caught between big whales’, as 
the Korean saying has it: ‘when whales 
fight, they break the shrimp’s back’. In 
recent years, the US government has 
become increasingly concerned about 
China’s rising economic and political 
influence in north-east Asia. South 
Korea has firsthand experience of 
S O U T H  KO R E A  A N D  T H E 

















































how the Chinese government can use 
its economic power to apply political 
pressure. In 2017, following the 
deployment on the Korean Peninsula 
of the US Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD) system, Chinese 
state media encouraged a consumer 
boycott of South Korean goods to 
signal China’s displeasure with South 
Korea’s decision. The hardest hit South 
Korean company, discount store chain 
Lotte Mart, accrued operating losses of 
US$224 million, while Hyundai’s sales 
in China dropped sixty-four percent 
in the second quarter of 2017 from 
a year earlier. As a result of a ban on 
Chinese tour groups travelling to South 
Korea, tourism-related industries 
suffered an estimated revenue loss 
of US$15.6 billion that year, and even 
though tourist numbers recovered 
in 2019, they were still much lower 
than in previous years.1 The political 
ramifications of Beijing’s displeasure 
with South Korea have also been 
significant. For example, the Korea–
China Defence Strategic Dialogue, 
which was held regularly from 2011 to 
discuss military cooperation between 
the two countries, has not been held 
since the tensions began. 
At the same time, South Korea 
maintains other close economic 
ties to the PRC. It joined the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 
in 2015, but it has not yet signed up to 
the Belt and Road Initiative, although 
President Moon Jae-in declared his 
interest in doing so in 2018. Moon has 
also actively promoted better ties with 
Lotte Mart has been 
hard hit by Chinese 
state media’s 
encouragement of a 
consumer boycott of 
South Korean goods
Source: Minseong Kim, 
Wikipedia
North Korea, so it is not surprising that, 
under his watch, relations with Japan 
have soured. Washington, too, has 
watched these developments warily. 
Washington is also watching 
closely South Korean trade with China, 
especially in advanced technology 
sectors. In June 2019, American 
Ambassador to Seoul Harry Harris told 
the Chosun newspaper that the United 
States was ‘naturally concerned’ about 
any plans for Huawei’s involvement in 
South Korean 5G networks. Washington 
did not want to ‘expose sensitive 
security information to an unacceptable 
risk level’ and would need to ‘re-
evaluate how we share information 
with allies’. The United States currently 
stations almost 30,000 troops in South 
Korea to bolster its defences against the 
north. South Korea can scarcely afford 
to lose the umbrella of US protection. 
At the same time, however, Huawei 
alone accounts for seventeen percent 
of South Korean electronic parts 
exports to China. Perhaps Wang Yi’s 
offer of assistance to solve the Korea–
Japan conflict — following so soon 
after Harris expressed his concerns 
— was a reminder to South Korea that 
China could play a protective role in 
the region, too? Regardless, for Korea, 
there are no easy solutions.2 
Caught between the whales, South 
Korea is seeking to reduce its reliance 
on trade with China and reconsider 
its investment strategies.3 Large South 
Korean firms such as Samsung, Kia, 
Large South 
Korean firms such 
as Samsung, Kia, 
and Hyundai are 



















































and Hyundai are already scaling back 
investments in China, partly to manage 
political risk and partly because 
China’s own firms have become more 
competitive in the personal electronics 
and automobile industries. To hedge 
against the downsides of trade with 
China, South Korean policymakers are 
considering a range of institutional and 
cooperative frameworks to strengthen 
trade and investment relationships 
with other countries in the region, 
including members of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
Both China and the United States 
expect — and sometimes even demand 
— practical cooperation from South 
Korea across a number of issues. 
South Korea would be wise to give 
China some of what it wants, such as 
higher participation in the Belt and 
Road Initiative, in return for what 
Seoul needs, such as cooperation in 
the ongoing efforts to denuclearise the 
Korean Peninsula and find a diplomatic 
solution. At the same time, until that 
solution is found, Seoul will likely try to 
keep its American ally by its side. South 
Korea’s future relies on maintaining a 
delicate balancing act, as well as the 
ability to achieve greater independence 
both economically and in terms of 
security from the two ‘whales’ — not 
an easy call. But as Parag Khanna, 
author of the book The Future Is Asian, 
told The Atlantic’s Michael Schuman: 
‘No one wants to choose sides. We 
live in a multipolar system. No smart 
country sides with only one power. 
Instead they play all the powers off 































































































































AT THE START OF 2019, marking the fortieth anniversary of 
Beijing’s call in 1979 for an end to 
military confrontation across the 
Taiwan Strait, Chinese President Xi 
Jinping expressly linked unification 
to the ‘national rejuvenation’ that is 
at the heart of his much-promoted 
notion of the China Dream. He called 
for ‘in-depth democratic consultations 
for a cross-strait relationship … and 
transitional arrangements for the 
peaceful development of cross-Strait 
ties’. Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen 
responded by stating that Taiwan 
would not cede its sovereignty. 
In Taiwan — the region with 
the most complicated ties with the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
— the China Dream has not been 
warmly embraced. Beginning in 
2013, when Chinese authorities 
began promoting the slogan, many 
Taiwanese commentators charged that 
it concealed a plan to force Taiwan’s 
‘reunification’ with the mainland. 
The then minister of the Mainland 
Affairs Council of Taiwan, Chen Ming-
Tong, is reported to have said that 
‘the Taiwanese Dream and the China 
Dream are mostly incompatible with 
each other’.1 According to Chen, the 
Taiwanese Dream is about security, 
sovereignty, and human rights, and 
China cannot accept such ‘dreams’. 
The China Dream seems in 
some ways like a duplication of the 
American Dream; even Xi himself 
claimed on a visit to Seattle in 
September 2015 that the China Dream 
TA I WA N E S E  D R E A M S : 
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parallels the American Dream. As 
Jeffrey Wasserstrom notes, at the core 
of the American Dream are the ‘tales 
of individuals and families bettering 
their situations through their own 
efforts’. Xi’s China Dream also 
encompasses this. However, while 
the American Dream emphasises 
individualism and requests that 
political authorities get out of the 
way, the China Dream emphasises 
the role of the state and the Chinese 
Communist Party in enabling people 
to pursue better lives.
Xi’s proposed rejuvenation of the 
great Chinese nation poses practical 
as well as ideational challenges for 
Taiwan. A standout example of China’s 
pursuit of national rejuvenation on 
the world stage is the Belt and Road 
Initiative. For the Government of the 
Republic of China in Taipei, resisting 
the initiative could result in the loss 
of Taiwan’s position in the global 
economic chain. At the same time, 
wholehearted participation in the 
scheme would mean buying into the 
China Dream, and potentially ceding 
to Beijing’s leverage that might be 
used to force talks on unification.
Taipei has tried different 
strategies to hedge against a hegemonic 
Chinese national rejuvenation; it has 
tried (and failed) to join the Trans- 
Pacific Partnership and the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership. 
But Taiwan has been more successful 
in building an international profile 
as a great place for doing business 
(in contrast with the mainland). 
Taiwan ranked thirteenth out of 190 
jurisdictions listed in the World Bank’s 
2019 Ease of Doing Business Index. The 
PRC is far behind in forty-sixth place. 
And Taipei’s New Southbound Policy 
aims at strengthening the island’s 
ties with eighteen countries in South 
and South-East Asia and Australasia, 
including Australia and New Zealand. 
It promotes cooperation in trade, 
technology, agriculture, medicine, 
education, and tourism.
China’s perceived aggressiveness 
in pursuit of national greatness raises 
other concerns for Taipei. Taiwan 
is paying particular attention to 
developments in Xinjiang province 
and Hong Kong. In August 2019, 
a commentary posted on The 
Storm Media discussed the current 
situation in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, 
arguing that the China Dream was 
characterised by ‘bullying patriotism’.2 
The author warned the Taiwanese 
people of the risks of signing up to the 
China Dream. 
The 2019 Hong Kong protests — 
triggered by an extradition bill that 
Beijing said was needed to bring to 
justice a suspected murderer who 
committed the crime in Taiwan 
and hid in Hong Kong — have had 
a profound impact on Taiwanese 
society. Taiwan’s political leaders 
have pointed to the Hong Kong 
protests to highlight the failings of 
the One Country, Two Systems model 
(notably, Beijing’s failure to respect 
Hong Kong’s semi-autonomy), which 
is the same model Beijing proposes 
for Taiwan’s reunification with the 
mainland. Sympathy for Hong Kong 
protestors prevails; according to a 
poll released in June 2019, more than 
seventy percent of Taiwanese support 
Hong Kong’s anti-extradition protests.3 
In addition to posting comments 
criticising the Hong Kong police and 
China on social media, Taiwanese 
supporters have established ‘Lennon 
Walls’ on the campuses of all major 
universities in Taiwan. Lennon Walls 
have also suddenly appeared in some 
of Taiwan’s famous tourist spots, 
although local authorities have been 
quick to take them down. Lennon 
Walls and activities organised in 
support of the Hong Kong protests 
have angered some mainland Chinese 
students and tourists in Taiwan. Some 
have vented their anger by tearing 
down posters from Lennon Walls.4 



































































According to the poll conducted by the 
Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan in 
August 2019, more than eighty percent 
of the Taiwanese population opposes 
the One Country, Two Systems model 
for Taiwan’s reunification with the 
mainland. Such surveys highlight 
a big divide between the Chinese 
mainland and Taiwan over the China 
Dream of national rejuvenation. For 
many Taiwanese, ‘the rejuvenation 
of the Chinese nation’ no longer ends 
with a question mark, but with an 
exclamation mark. It is a vision of a 
Chinese future that many Taiwanese 
refuse to embrace, preferring instead 
to leave themselves unrestricted, each 




































































CAMPUS CONUNDRUMS: CLASHES 
AND COLLABORATIONS
Jane Golley, Paul Harris, 
and James Laurenceson
IT WAS A TYPICALLY MILD and sunny winter’s 
day on 24 July 2019 in Brisbane, the capital city 
of the state of Queensland in eastern Australia. 
At the weekly Market Day on the University of 
Queensland (UQ) campus, a group of students 
from Hong Kong had set up a makeshift Lennon 
Wall in sympathy with the protests occurring back 
home. At first, students from the mainland of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) who approached 
them seemed more curious than agitated. But 
around midday, another group of protestors, 
including Australian students, assembled nearby. 
They supported the Hong Kong protests but were 
also demonstrating against the mass detention of 
Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, 



































































After the leaders of this second group began chanting into megaphones, 
the situation quickly deteriorated, with abuse being hurled in all 
directions. A large group of mainland Chinese students began drowning 
out the protesters’ chants with a boisterous rendition of their national 
anthem blasting out from a speaker of their own. UQ security officers 
called the police and order was eventually restored.1 But UQ’s China 
conundrums were only just getting started. 
The next day, China’s Consul-General in Brisbane, Dr Xu Jie 
徐杰, issued a statement praising ‘the spontaneous patriotic behaviour 
of Chinese students’.2 Earlier that month, UQ had appointed Dr Xu as an 
adjunct professor in the School of Languages and Cultures, albeit in an 
honorary capacity. In the media, questions were raised about whether the 
appointment of a serving diplomat was consistent with the university’s 
commitment to freedom of speech and academic inquiry, particularly 
in light of Dr Xu’s statement a day earlier. On 26 July, Australian Foreign 
Minister Marise Payne made it clear that the government expected foreign 
diplomatic representatives to respect the right to free speech and lawful 
and peaceful protest, saying she ‘would be particularly concerned if any 
foreign diplomatic mission were to act in ways that could undermine 
such rights, including by encouraging disruptive or potentially violent 
behaviour’.3 The Chinese Embassy in Canberra replied that Dr Xu’s remarks 
were ‘appropriate and measured’ and that any ‘misinterpretation’ and 
‘overreaction’ were ‘regrettable and unacceptable’.4  
The day after the protests, the Nine Network reported on UQ’s 
agreement with Hanban, the Chinese government organisation that 
manages all CIs and is guided by the United Front Work Department 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). According to the Nine Network, 
the agreement required UQ to accept Beijing’s authority on teaching 
matters in courses run by the CI that it hosts.5 Between 2013 and 2018, 
UQ Vice-Chancellor Peter Høj had also acted as an unpaid consultant to 
Hanban, receiving a formal commendation for his service in 2015. UQ 
claimed that its CI had no input into award courses. 
Controversy also spread to UQ’s research programs. In August, Alex 
Joske, a researcher at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 
briefed a journalist at The Australian about a new ASPI report alleging 
a UQ professor of Chinese origin had set up a company supplying 
surveillance technologies to a local government in Xinjiang, as well as 
operating a joint laboratory with the Ministry of Public Security.6 The 
university responded that the academic had left in 2017, although he 
retained an honorary position. Nonetheless, Joske drew a connection 
with the researcher’s earlier work at UQ. He also cited evidence that the 
researcher had held multiple positions in China, including as head of a 
school of computer science and engineering at a university, while still 
employed at UQ and receiving Australian government research grants 
— possibly in contravention of funding body rules.7  
Such were the ferocity and breadth of criticism around UQ’s 
engagement with China that the university felt compelled to set up a 
dedicated webpage to ‘provide clarity’.8 UQ Chancellor Peter Varghese, 
a former Director-General of the Office of National Assessments (now 
the Office of National Intelligence) and Secretary of the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, also came to UQ’s defence. Varghese 
noted that UQ was managing its financial exposure to China by means 
including the establishment of a contingency fund that could be drawn 
on in the event of a sudden sharp fall in the number of Chinese students. 
China conundrums at the 




































































He described allegations that Høj was a CCP stooge as belonging ‘more 
to the anti-communist witch hunts of the McCarthy era in the US than to 
the rational debate we need to have in Australia’.9 While welcoming a 
dialogue with the Australian government to ensure that the university’s 
international research collaborations did not endanger national security, 
he also cautioned against ‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’.
UQ is not a unique case in Australia — a country with one of the 
most internationalised higher education systems in the world. In 2013, 
international student fees earned Australia AU$17 billion; by 2018, it 
was AU$35 billion. Chinese students are by far the largest group of 
international students in the country, and are especially concentrated 
in the leading research-intensive universities, which are known as the 
Group of Eight. In addition to ensuring free speech on campus and 
mitigating against an overreliance on fee-paying Chinese students, 
these universities face an even more complex challenge — hinted at 
above in the ASPI warning about 
breaches of funding body rules and 
Varghese’s defence of UQ’s research 
practices. This involves collaborative 
research, which is also increasingly 
international. 
In April 2018, Senator Payne, 
then Minister for Defence, 
announced a review of Australia’s 
Defence Trade Controls (DTCs), which 
apply to university-based research 
projects, to ensure the legislative and 
regulatory framework ‘appropriately 
balances’ defence requirements 
‘while not unnecessarily restricting 
trade, innovation or research 
collaboration’.10 In November 2018, 
The Lennon Wall at The Australian National 
University
Photo: Melodie Liu
Minister for Education Dan Tehan instigated a review into the 
state of freedom of speech on university campuses. In August 2019, 
he announced the establishment of a taskforce charged with ‘the 
development of best practice guidelines to counter foreign interference 
in the Australian university sector’.11 The guidelines were released 
in November.12 
Five Eyes on China
The Australian government is not alone in its concerns. In September 
2019, Dr Kelvin Droegemeier, Director of the White House’s Office of 
Science and Technology Policy, using language strikingly similar to 
that of minister Tehan, called for the development of ‘best practices 
for academic research institutions’ in response to countries that had 
sought to ‘exploit, influence and undermine our research activities and 
environments’.13 Just a few days earlier, on 13 September, Assistant 
US Secretary of State for International Security and Non-Proliferation, 
Christopher Ford, said his department had been hard at work building 
international ‘coalitions of caution’ among friends and allies to protect 
against ‘Chinese technology-transfer threats’.14  
By the end of 2019, six bills had been introduced to the US Congress 
proposing tighter screening of Chinese applicants for student visas 
and stronger measures to address intellectual property (IP) theft and 
espionage in universities. One draft bill stated that the US government 
should publish annual lists of research institutions in China ‘affiliated 
with, or funded by, the People’s Liberation Army’ and deny visas to 
their associates. The same draft bill also states that Australia and other 
Five Eyes countries should implement similar measures. Along with 
discussions of the feasibility and implications of ‘decoupling’ from 
China in key technology sectors, there is increasing interest in creating 
an ‘allied innovation zone’ with greater research cooperation between 



































































These views have been gaining strength in Washington since the 
release of the US National Security Strategy in 2017, which focused on 
‘strategic competition’ with China. In February 2018, Director of the 
US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Christopher Wray testified to 
Congress about the university sector’s ‘naïvety’ with regard to China’s 
exploitation of the open research and innovation system that the 
United States has led since the Second World War. In June 2018, the 
State Department followed up by announcing that Chinese graduate 
students studying in the United States in key sectors such as advanced 
manufacturing, aviation, and robotics would henceforth be entitled to 
only one-year visas instead of five-year visas. The Department of Defense 
(DoD) told universities they would have to apply for a special waiver if 
they wanted to maintain a CI as well as having access to DoD funds for 
foreign language education. After a number of US universities applied 
for waivers, the DoD announced that it would not be granting waivers 
after all, making the choice stark. By November, fifteen universities had 
announced the closure of their campus CIs. In mid-2019, the Department 
of Energy forbade its staff and grant recipients from participating in 
foreign ‘talent recruitment programs’, such as China’s Thousand Talents, 
which Beijing established in 2008 to draw top international science 
and technology researchers to China. The US Department of Education 
and major research funding agencies such as the National Institutes of 
Health have also introduced new rules on foreign funding and conflicts 
of interest.
The US Department of Commerce, meanwhile, is reviewing 
whether its export control regime should be broadened to cover a 
wider range of ‘emerging technologies’ such as artificial intelligence 
(AI). Throughout 2019, more than 170 Chinese individuals and 
organisations — including Sichuan University and leading Chinese 
technology companies Huawei, Hikvision, IFLYTEK, Megvii Technology, 
and Sense Time — were placed on the US ‘entity list’, barring them 
from dealing with American universities and companies unless they 
successfully apply for a licence to do so.15  
On 28 September, David R. Stilwell, US Assistant Secretary of 
State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said that US 
intelligence and law enforcement communities had identified ‘an 
increasing number of instances in which foreign intelligence services 
had “co-opted” individual academics, researchers and others to conduct 
intelligence-related activities while in the US’. In the following breath, 
he cited the FBI’s Wray in saying that investigations around IP theft saw 
‘almost all [of them] leading back to China’. Stilwell also accused China 
of undermining and exploiting fundamental scientific values such as 
free inquiry, openness, and ethics for ‘unfair gains’ such as the theft of 
IP and ‘illiberal and repressive uses’.16  
In response to the rapidly changing landscape, throughout 2019 US 
universities reviewed and tightened their internal processes to protect 
IP and ensure compliance with federal legislation while also making a 
case for the benefits of continued cooperation, and the importance of 
foreign talent for their ability to do high-quality research. In June 2019, 
Rafael Reif, the President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT), wrote an email to staff that conceded that, across the United States, 
‘small numbers of researchers of Chinese background may indeed have 
acted in bad faith’. But, he asserted, bad actors were ‘the exception 
and very far from the rule’.17 Indeed, since 2014, charges against at 
least five China-born scientists have been dropped.18 In the second half 
of 2019, senior MIT leaders spoke out publicly to Washington think 
tanks about the value to the United States of research collaboration 
with China, and the MIT campus in Boston was the site of protests 
by academic staff over what they argued was the unfair targeting of 
Chinese–American academics.
Meanwhile, bilateral education and research links between the 
United States and China continued to grow, according to the latest 
available data. In 2007–08, there were just over 80,000 Chinese students 
studying at American colleges and universities. By 2017–18, this had 
grown to 363,000. Despite a downturn in total international student 



































































Chinese student numbers has been consistent. By 2018, according to 
the InCites database, 10.7 percent of scientific papers published in the 
United States in that year included a co-author affiliated with a Chinese 
institution. This was up from 8.6 percent in 2016 and just 2.7 percent in 
2008. While policymakers in Washington may consider some amount 
of ‘decoupling’ as desirable, this can only come at a significant cost — 
financially and intellectually for universities, and also for the Chinese 
(and potentially Chinese–American) students and researchers who find 
themselves in the firing line.
Facts and Folly
For Australia, the costs of decoupling from China would be significant. 
A report by the Australia–China Relations Institute released in July 2019 
showed the dramatic expansion of research collaboration between 
Australian and Chinese institutions over the past two decades.19 
In 1998, only one percent of all Australian peer-reviewed articles 
included a co-author affiliated with a Chinese institution; by 2018, it 
was fifteen percent. By this measure, China overtook the United States 
to become Australia’s leading international collaborator in 2019. Most 
Chinese–Australian collaborations are in the physical and computer 
sciences, whereas American–Australian collaborations tend to be in the 
life sciences. 
The Australian government has long seen the benefit of such 
collaborations, some of which it funds through the Australia–China 
Science and Research Fund.20 In August 2018, then prime minister 
Malcolm Turnbull addressed the University of New South Wales (UNSW), 
praising its ‘international partnerships and collaboration, particularly 
with China’.21 Yet not everyone is convinced. In a submission to the 
recent independent review of DTCs commissioned by the Australian 
government, Michael Shoebridge, from ASPI, wrote that ‘it is a 
growing certainty that Australian research partnerships with Chinese 
counterparts will be directly advancing Chinese military capability’. 
Therefore, he said, it is likely that if decisions are made on the basis 
of national security, there could be many more refusals in future.22 
John Fitzgerald of the Swinburne University of Technology echoes the 
concerns of Stilwell when he asserts: 
Australian universities are sailing into uncharted waters when they 
venture into major research collaborations with institutions and 
systems that do not share their commitment to liberal values and 
free and open critical inquiry. It is not clear that they are equipped 
to manage the risks.23  
In May 2019, a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report documented how 
a subsidiary of China Electronics Technology Corporation (CETC), a 
massive Chinese state-owned conglomerate with military connections, 
had designed surveillance equipment being used in Xinjiang.24 Back 
in the first half of 2017, when the University of Technology Sydney 
(UTS) announced a research partnership with CETC,25 a PhD student at 
The Australian National University and a researcher at the US Studies 
Centre raised questions about the national security implications of the 
On ABC’s Four Corners program, ANU Vice-Chancellor Brian Schmidt was grilled about student activism on 




































































collaboration.26 UTS responded by noting that all the research it undertook 
was subject to DTCs. In July, the ABC’s Four Corners program followed 
up, revealing that UTS had launched an internal review of the CETC 
collaboration in April after being made aware of the soon-to-be released 
HRW report.27 In October, the South China Morning Post obtained a copy 
of the agreement between UTS and CETC. According to James Leibold, 
a specialist on Xinjiang at La Trobe University, it showed that: ‘UTS is 
essentially providing CETC with an overseas laboratory for its research 
in dual-use technologies that are contributing to the advancement of the 
Communist Party’s “security-surveillance complex”.’28 
What the UTS review actually found — a summary of which was 
made publicly available in August — received little media attention. 
Its academics had engaged in five projects in collaboration with CETC. 
Only one was potentially relevant to the surveillance technologies being 
deployed in Xinjiang, yet it was initiated only after HRW had already 
obtained the problematic surveillance application. Further, all projects 
had been submitted for approval to the Department of Defence where 
required under DTCs. 
Questions were raised about the national security implications of the partnership between 
the University of Technology Sydney and China Electronics Technology Corporation
Photo: Charlie Brewer, Flickr
To date, there is no evidence that any Australian university 
has violated the laws and regulations put in place by the Australian 
government. Questioned about compliance in Senate estimates in 
late 2017, then secretary of defence, Greg Moriarty, replied that in his 
experience Australian universities ‘are very conscious of the dangers 
and risks around these leakages of technology’.29 
While universities may follow the rules, the existing DTCs are 
arguably inadequate for managing the risks in a changed national 
security environment. This view is reflected in the DTC review released 
in February 2019. It concludes that some gaps exist that need closing, 
such as ‘inadequate control of emerging and sensitive military and dual-
use technology’. However, the sweeping changes advocated by some in 
the defence and security community were deemed unnecessary.30 
This is not to deny the existence of security and other risks for 
Australia in international scholarly collaboration and exchange, 
including with China. But there are also economic and even security 
benefits stemming from Australia’s capacity to create knowledge and 
access cutting-edge technologies in a growing number of fields in 
which China now leads the world. Australia spends about US$25 billion 
(AU$36.4 billion) on research and development (R&D) each year.31 Both 
the United States and China spend about US$500 billion. Last year, 
the R&D budget of a single Chinese technology company, Huawei, was 
US$15.3 billion,32  which is more than the total spent by all businesses in 
Australia. If Australia punches above its weight in research in science 
and engineering — fields that help drive long-term prosperity — this is 
in no small part due to international research collaboration, including 
with Chinese partners. As just one example, in 2017, of Australian 
articles in the top one percent of the AI articles most cited globally, 
64.6 percent involved a collaborator in China. That is, only one-third of 
Australia’s AI knowledge creation with the highest impact was produced 



































































In June 2019, former secretary of the Australian Department of 
Defence Dennis Richardson observed that if the United States were to 
pursue a technological decoupling from China, and Australia followed 
suit, Australia would risk ‘for the first time, us not having access to the 
best technology’.33 In August, UQ’s Varghese told an audience assembled 
by the US Studies Centre at Sydney University that, realistically: 
For Australia, there is no sensible alternative to engaging China 
… the notion that global technology supply chains can be divided 
into a China-led system and a US-led system is both economic and 
geopolitical folly.34
Concluding Thoughts
In October 2019, the ABC’s Four Corners program again turned its 
attention to Australian universities and their relationship with China, 
with a program titled ‘Red Flags: The infiltration of Australia’s universities 
by the Chinese Communist Party’. The reporter grilled UQ’s Høj (as 
well as ANU Vice-Chancellor Brian Schmidt) about student activism on 
campus, cybersecurity, research collaboration, and links to the Chinese 
government. These issues, as we have seen, are complex and intertwined. 
But many of them are not nearly as sensational as portrayed in the media, 
nor does the commentary around them always do justice to the deeper 
structural changes in international education, research, and innovation. 
One thing is clear, however: as US–China competition intensifies, the 
Australian government and universities find themselves in increasingly 
difficult policy terrain. Navigating our way will require lucidity and focus 
on Australia’s national interests and values — drawing clear red lines 
with respect to China on matters of academic freedom, for example, but 
also with the United States, which could pressure Australia into making 
decisions that threaten the university sector’s ability for knowledge 
creation and collaboration with leading international partners. 
Australians are not the only ones learning to navigate their way. 
Just as the more contentious areas of joint research attract the most 
attention, so do the loudest and most aggressive students. Yet the 
majority of Chinese students (and scholars) studying and researching 
in Australian universities are simply pursuing their academic dreams 
and contributing positively to the intellectual and cultural vibrancy of 
campus life in the process. The right to (respectful) protest is one of 
several unfamiliar freedoms they must learn to navigate, with pressure 
coming from all directions, including from Chinese officials who expect 
them to toe the party line and vocal Australians who expect them not to. 
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A ‘moderately prosperous society’ with no Chinese 
individual left behind — that’s the vision for China set out 
by Chinese President Xi Jinping in a number of important 
speeches in 2017. ‘Moderate’ prosperity may seem like 
a modest goal for a country with more billionaires (609 
at last count) than the US. But the ‘China Story’ is a 
complex one. The China Story Yearbook 2017: Prosperity 
surveys the important events, pronouncements, and 
personalitites that defined 2017. It also presents a range 
of perspectives, from the global to the individual, the 
official to the unofficial, from mainland China to Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. Together, the stories present a richly 
textured portrait of a nation that in just forty years 
has lifted itself from universal poverty to (unequally 
distributed) wealth, changing itself and the world 
in the process.
PREVIOUS CHINA STORY 
YEARBOOKS
2018: Power 
In 2018, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was, by most 
measures, more powerful than at any other time in its 
history and had become one of the most powerful coun-
tries in the world. Its economy faced serious challenges, 
including from the ongoing ‘trade war’ with the US, but 
still ranked as the world’s second largest. Its Belt and 
Road Initiative, meanwhile, continued to carve paths of 
influence and economic integration across several con-
tinents. A deft combination of policy, investment, and 
entrepreneurship has also turned the PRC into a global 
‘techno-power’. It aims, with a good chance of success, 
at becoming a global science and technology leader by 





































2014: Shared Destiny 
The People’s Republic of China under the leadership 
of the Chinese Communist Party and Xi Jinping, has 
declared that it shares in the destiny of the countries of 
the Asia and Pacific region, as well as of nations that are 
part of an intertwined national self-interest. The China 
Story Yearbook 2014 takes the theme of Shared Destiny 
共同命运 and considers it in the context of China’s 
current and future potential.
2015: Pollution
This Yearbook explores the broader ramifications of 
pollution in the People’s Republic for culture, society law 
and social activism, as well as the Internet, language, 
thought, and approaches to history. It looks at how it 
affects economic and political developments, urban 
change, and China’s regional and global posture. The 
Chinese Communist Party, led by ‘Chairman of Everything’ 
Xi Jinping, meanwhile, has subjected mainland society to 
increasingly repressive control in its new determination 
to rid the country of Western ‘spiritual pollutants’ while 
achieving cultural purification through ‘propaganda and 
ideological work’.
2016: Control 
‘More cosmopolitan, more lively, more global’ is how the 
China Daily summed up the year 2016 in China.
It was also a year of more control. The Chinese 
Communist Party laid down strict new rules of conduct 
for its members, continued to assert its dominance over 
everything from the Internet to the South China Sea and 
announced a new Five-Year Plan that Greenpeace called 
‘quite possibly the most important document in the 
world in setting the pace of acting on climate change’.
2012: Red Rising, Red Eclipse 
The authors of Red Rising, Red Eclipse survey China’s 
regional posture, urban change, social activism and law, 
human rights and economics, the Internet, history, and 
thought. This inaugural China Story Yearbook offers an 
informed perspective on recent developments in China 
and provides a context for understanding ongoing 
issues that will resonate far beyond the Dragon Year 
of 2012–2013
2013: Civilising China
As China becomes wealthier and more confident on 
the global stage, it also expects to be respected and 
accommodated as a major global force — and as a 
formidable civilisation. Through a survey and analysis of 
China’s regional posture, urban change, social activism 
and law, mores, the Internet, history, and thought — in 
which the concept of ‘civilising’ plays a prominent role 
— China Story Yearbook 2013 offers insights into the 
country today and its dreams for the future.

